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This thesis explores an intellectual tradition that represents cognitive-behavioural flexibility 
in terms of a flexible arrangement of inflexible units. It aims to show that during the period 
1830 to the present, the influence of models derived from computing technology resulted 
in this tradition attaining a specific expression. This thesis offers an explanation of how the 
mechanical computers designed by the British polymath Charles Babbage (1791-1871) 
enabled this computational model of cognition and behaviour to emerge in the mid-
nineteenth century. A primary purpose of this thesis is to highlight and explore 
representations of this model in nineteenth-century literature and culture, focusing upon 
its significance for the portrayal of pedagogical methodologies in this era. This thesis gives 
particular consideration to depictions of this model in the fiction of George Eliot (1819-
1880), with the aim of revealing how this computational model was freighted with cultural 
meaning.  This thesis seeks to make an intervention in nineteenth-century studies by 
tracing the role of Babbage and Eliot in shaping the literary and sociocultural 
representation of computing technology.  
  This thesis also argues that a comparable model characterises twentieth- and 
twenty-first-century attachment theory as a result of twentieth-century computers similar 
to those invented by Babbage. It is the intention of this thesis to situate the models of 
mental processing studied as corresponding instances of an intellectual tradition. I hope to 
show that attending to the representation of this computational model in Eliot’s fiction can 
allow us to reflect upon the cultural implications of this model in the twentieth and twenty-
first centuries, especially as regards pedagogical methodologies. This thesis seeks to 
illustrate that these correspondences can provide a historical and critical framework for 
applying attachment theory to nineteenth-century texts. 
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This thesis explores an intellectual tradition that represents cognitive-behavioural flexibility 
in terms of a flexible arrangement of inflexible units. This thesis aims to show that during 
the period 1830 to the present, the influence of models derived from computing 
technology resulted in this tradition attaining a specific expression. A primary purpose of 
this thesis is to consider how this computational model of cognitive-behavioural flexibility 
has shaped understandings of theories and practices relating to the education of children. 
These include models of child development in twentieth-century psychoanalysis and 
attachment theory, and the pedagogical methodologies associated with systems of popular 
education in the nineteenth century.  
As well as highlighting various instances of this tradition, this is an interdisciplinary 
thesis that seeks to draw comparisons between examples of this tradition across the period 
studied. This model of a flexible arrangement of inflexible units within modular hierarchies 
offers a definite set of criteria that a cognitive-behavioural model must satisfy before it can 
be considered as an instance of this tradition. This thesis is intended to show that this 
model can provide a rigorous basis with which to draw comparisons between the different 
historical periods and fields of inquiry discussed in this thesis.   
Although it would be tempting to introduce the term “analogy” into this discussion, 
the interdisciplinary scope of this thesis and the comparisons it makes between various 
fields makes it difficult to draw the precise functional and structural parallels that an 
analogy would require. I hope to show that a comparison of models that foreground a 
flexible arrangement of inflexible units within modular hierarchies can provide theoretical 
rigour whilst still offering scope to read across different periods and disciplines. For these 
reasons, I would suggest that the interdisciplinary aims of this thesis are better served by 
speaking in terms of rigorous comparisons rather than analogies.   
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In addition to the term comparison, this thesis makes use of a cluster of terms to 
draw attention to comparable instances of this tradition. These terms are correspondence, 
parallel, and similarity.1 The Oxford English Dictionary would appear to consider these 
terms to be largely synonymous: “similarity” is listed as a meaning of both 
“correspondence” and “parallel”, whilst “to represent as similar or corresponding (to)” is 
listed as a meaning of “parallel”. The OED also associates these terms with the process of 
formulating comparisons. This is exemplified by the definition of “parallel”, which is 
defined as a “[c]lose correspondence . . . a point of comparison or similarity” (OED, 
emphasis added). These terms are therefore used interchangeably in this thesis to draw 
attention to corresponding instances in which cognitive or behavioural flexibility has been 
represented in terms of a flexible arrangement of inflexible units. 
This thesis does not seek the origin of this tradition, but instead aims to trace how 
computing led to manifestations of this tradition in the science and culture of the 
nineteenth, twentieth and twenty-first centuries. As indicated above, it is the intention of 
this thesis to situate the models of mental processing studied as comparable instances of 
an intellectual tradition. Historian Alan Richardson writes that although it is essential to 
remain cautious of “false parallels . . . and imaginary lines of descent”, an “informed 
comparison with models, findings and controversies from the present” has the capacity to 
bring certain historical “developments and debates into focus” (Romanticism 3).  
The primary contribution to knowledge that this thesis therefore seeks to make is 
to show that an understanding of the ways in which computing has shaped a tradition of 
conceptualising cognition and behaviour can offer a historically sensitive perspective with 
which to reflect upon correspondences in thinking across the period 1830 to the present, 
particularly as regards models of mental processing and their impact upon pedagogical 
theory and practice. Pedagogy is interpreted in this thesis as any activity undertaken by 
                                                          
1 This thesis also uses cognates of these terms such as “corresponding” and “similar”. 
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individuals or institutions that has the aim of influencing the cognitive-behavioural 
development of another. This definition is informed by the historical meaning of 
“pedagogy” as “instruction, discipline, training . . . a means of guidance” (OED). 
This introductory chapter begins with an overview of the aims and scope of this 
thesis. The sections which follow survey the existing literature relating to three key areas 
addressed by this thesis: the computational origins and literary uses of attachment theory; 
the computational origins and literary uses of cognitive science; and the cultural, scientific 
and literary impact of computing technology in the nineteenth century. This introductory 
chapter then concludes with a discussion of the organisation of the thesis and a brief 
summary of the content of each chapter.  
 
Overview of Thesis  
 
A key purpose of this thesis is to highlight and explore computational expressions of this 
tradition in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. This thesis considers how in the mid-
twentieth century flexibility in computers was formalised as a flexible arrangement of 
inflexible units of machine behaviour, tracing this model in the work of the British 
computer scientist Alan Turing (1912-1954) and the American computer scientists Allen 
Newell (1927-1992), John Clifford Shaw (1922-1991), Herbert Simon (1916-2001) and 
Marvin Minsky (1927-). I focus upon the work of these particular individuals in order to 
assess their impact upon one of the most influential texts of mid-century cognitive science, 
Plans and the Structure of Behaviour (1960). This text was written by three American 
cognitive scientists, George Miller (1920-2012), Eugene Galanter (1924-) and Karl Pribram 
(1919-2015). Through close reference to features of mid-century computing, I hope to 
reveal previously overlooked parallels between this text and computing technology.  
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This thesis seeks to trace how computational models transformed attachment 
theory in the late 1960s as a result of the influence of Miller, Galanter and Pribram upon 
the work of the British psychologist John Bowlby (1907-1990), known as the “father of 
attachment theory” (Wallin 11). In this thesis I aim to contribute to the historicization of 
this theoretical framework by offering an interpretation of how the attachment model of 
cognitive-behavioural flexibility derives from mid-twentieth-century computers that enact 
flexibility as a flexible arrangement of inflexible units. This thesis argues that although the 
computational origins of this model have been obscured through its dissemination into 
attachment theory via Plans, a computational understanding of the structure of cognition 
and behaviour has been a consistent feature of attachment thinking since the 1960s. I wish 
to illustrate that the manner in which the child in attachment theory is understood to learn 
strategies for flexibly arranging inflexible units from its caregivers is similar to the manner 
in which a computer is “taught” by its programmers to flexibly arrange machine 
instructions. As far as I am aware, the correspondences that this thesis identifies between 
computing and attachment theory have never before been suggested. Computational 
cognitive science has in recent decades been regarded as largely obsolete, having been 
ostensibly supplanted by neurobiological approaches (Herman 156; McConachie x). I seek 
to question this view by illustrating that computing continues to influence thinking 
regarding child development via attachment theory.  
The other aspect of my researches seeks to highlight similar relationships between 
computing and models of mental processing in the nineteenth century. It is my contention 
that during the period 1830-1840 the British polymath and inventor Charles Babbage 
(1791-1871) developed a model of computational flexibility comparable to that found in 
twentieth-century computing. I hope to show that Babbage subsequently suggested 
correspondences between this computational model and human cognition and behaviour 
in his 1864 text Passages from the Life of a Philosopher. The computers that Babbage 
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designed were meant to replace human “computers”, a term used in this period to 
describe persons employed to perform calculation. These machines, known as the 
“Engines”, can therefore be described without anachronism as mechanical computers 
(OED; Schaffer, “Intelligence” 203). The ability of the Engines to automatically execute a set 
of stored procedural rules means that they are also describable as computers in a modern 
sense.  
Through close reference to the technical specificities of the Engines, this thesis 
seeks to demonstrate that flexibility in computers consists of a movement between states 
of total but temporary inflexibility and partial fragmentation. I want to show that in the 
nineteenth century, this model resulted from the evolution of the flexible “Analytical 
Engine” (c. 1834-1846) from its predecessor, the inflexible “Difference Engine” (c. 1822-
1833). This thesis proposes that by drawing parallels between this model of computational 
flexibility and flexible cognition and behaviour, Babbage gave a tradition of thinking about 
mental processing a highly specific expression. This analysis of Passages is designed to 
show that computing is not only responsible for bringing a traditional model of mental 
processing to the forefront of cultural consciousness, but that it has also actively 
determined the manner in which this tradition has been expressed in science and culture.  
This thesis also argues that Babbage in Passages foregrounds a computational 
model of human cognitive-behavioural development that parallels the evolution of his 
computing machines. This is, to my knowledge, the first time that a computational model 
of cognitive-behavioural development has been identified in the nineteenth century. This 
thesis also reflects upon the pedagogical aspects of this model, arguing that the narrative 
of cognitive-behavioural development in Passages has an additional basis in similarities 
that Babbage perceived between teaching children and computers.  
This thesis claims that the computational mode of representing flexible cognition 
and behaviour that characterises Passages corresponds to the pedagogical narrative of 
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human development found in attachment theory. These similarities are attributed to 
correspondences between the architecture of the Engines and the architecture of mid-
century computing. In computing, the term “architecture” is used to refer to the structure 
of a computer’s instruction set (Belzer, Holzman and Kent 289). I seek to justify these 
parallels between nineteenth- and twentieth-century models of cognition and behaviour 
via a detailed engagement with the computing technology of both periods.   
There remains much critical controversy regarding the extent to which Babbage 
influenced mid-twentieth-century computing, with historians typically renouncing direct 
lines of descent (Clayton 118; Wilkes “Pioneer” 416). This thesis, however, represents the 
mid-nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries as two historical moments in which 
computing technology intersected with a traditional model of the structure of cognition 
and behaviour. This approach is designed to shift emphasis away from narrow questions of 
genealogy onto what I hope is a much more productive field of enquiry: that is, the 
discussion of similarities between computationally-inflected instances of this tradition and 
their articulation in the literature and culture of their respective historical moments.  
This thesis seeks to offer new readings of the fiction of George Eliot (1819-1880) as 
a means of reflecting upon the cultural and social implications of this computational model. 
I give particular consideration to how Eliot traces the impact of computational models upon 
dominant pedagogical institutions and practices. I hope to make a critical intervention in 
nineteenth-century studies by tracing Eliot’s role in shaping the sociocultural 
representation of computing technology. This thesis also focuses upon Eliot’s fiction as a 
means of exploring the tensions and paradoxes contained within this computational model. 
For instance, this thesis argues that comparing Eliot’s novels with the work of the 
Hungarian psychologist Sándor Ferenczi (1873-1933) can reveal that this computational 
model portrays states of cognitive inflexibility arising from trauma as similar to those that 
enable flexible cognition and behaviour. 
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 Further to this, I wish to illustrate that this comparison of Eliot and Ferenczi can 
reveal similar correspondences between normative and pathological pedagogies. This 
thesis aims to show that comparing Eliot and Ferenczi’s writings can offer an indication of 
the extent to which this model foregrounds correspondences between incest trauma and 
play, and factory labour and “enabling” forms of learning. I want to show that it is 
important to address the troubling parallels generated by this model in order to 
comprehend its historical significance.  
I wish to pause a moment here to discuss my reasons for selecting certain 
terminologies with which to speak about the type of processes that this computational 
model foregrounds. This thesis situates “psyche” and “cognitive” as allotropes, simply 
different languages for speaking about mental processing. I hope to show in what follows 
that the various languages of mind through which instances of this tradition are expressed 
do not alter its fundamental expression. Viewing these disciplines as engaging with a 
traditional model of representing cognition and behaviour will, I hope, enable me to read 
across the boundaries of psychoanalysis and cognitive science and identify previously 
overlooked correspondences in these models.  
The linguistic registers aligned with optimal development in childhood constitute 
another area in which terminologies have historically been diverse, ranging from “agency” 
to “versatility”. The decision to foreground a language of “flexibility” in this thesis is a 
conscious one, reflecting the fact that this term is used in attachment theory to describe 
processes whose structure I argue derives from computing technology (see Kobak et al. 
232; Lewis-Morrarty et al. 19).  It is the case, however, that no comparable terminology 
exists in the nineteenth century for the optimal developmental outcome presupposed by 
this model. Therefore, in consideration of the correspondences that this thesis identifies 
between nineteenth-century models and the attachment model, and for the sake of clarity 
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and continuity, I have chosen to foreground the language of cognitive-behavioural 
flexibility throughout this thesis.  
I have also exercised critical selectivity in my decision to use the architecture of 
twentieth-century computing to reflect upon the architecture of nineteenth-century 
computing, and to use the cultural meanings of this computational model in the nineteenth 
century to consider similar meanings in attachment theory. In the case of the former, I 
hope to show that drawing parallels between features of twentieth-century computing and 
the Engines, when grounded in an understanding of the computing technology of both 
periods, can elucidate previously overlooked aspects of Babbage’s thinking as regards his 
computing machines. In the latter case, this thesis aims to illustrate that nineteenth-
century critique of this computational model can reveal hidden facets of the attachment 
model that have influenced our current thinking about child development. In both cases, 
my intention in assuming a particular critical and chronological stance has been to afford 
the most illuminating perspectives upon the sources and objects I discuss.  
 
The Computational Origins and Literary Uses of Attachment Theory  
 
As indicated above, a primary purpose of this work is to contribute a computational 
perspective to the project of writing a cultural, literary and social history of attachment 
theory. This thesis undertakes to show that the cognitive-behavioural models that Bowlby 
introduced at mid-century are determined by computing to an extent that is insufficiently 
acknowledged in current histories of this field. Although psychologists Peter Fonagy and 
Mary Target identify a “metaphor of the mind as an information-processing mechanism” in 
Bowlby’s writings, no detailed reading of attachment theory in relation to Plans or specific 
features of mid-century computing yet exists (421).  
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Clinician Inge Bretherton credits Miller, Galanter and Pribram with introducing the 
concept of “behavioural systems organised as plan hierarchies” into attachment theory, 
but does not trace the origin of this concept to computing technology (766). Computing is 
entirely overlooked in major studies such as Jeremy Holmes’ John Bowlby and Attachment 
Theory (1993), David Wallin’s Attachment in Psychotherapy (2007), Richard Bowlby and 
Pearl King’s Fifty Years of Attachment Theory (2004) and the volume Attachment Theory: 
Social, Developmental and Clinical Perspectives (1995). I would suggest that Bowlby’s 
claims regarding the evolutionary stability of the attachment model have made it difficult 
to think critically about technological approaches to this subject (Attachment 39-40, 54, 
61). I would also surmise that these difficulties have been compounded by the unfamiliarity 
of computing to historians whose expertise lies in ethology and psychology. This thesis 
seeks to address these gaps in existing scholarship by providing a detailed account of how 
the model of cognitive-behavioural flexibility foregrounded by attachment theory parallels 
specific features of mid-twentieth-century computers. 
This thesis also seeks to contribute to scholarship by highlighting correspondences 
between the computational aspects of attachment thinking and nineteenth-century mental 
science. There have as yet been no studies that identify computational concepts similar to 
those found in attachment theory before the mid-twentieth century.  Historians tracing 
nineteenth-century precedents of attachment theory have focused upon Darwinism, a 
theory which provided the theoretical basis for the twentieth-century science that 
informed the ethological and evolutionary facets of Bowlby’s thinking (Carroll 436; 
Grossman 106).2 I hope to illustrate that it is also useful to consider the influence of 
                                                          
2 For histories of the relationship between ethology and attachment theory, see C.P van der 
Horst, John Bowlby from Psychoanalysis to Ethology (2011) and Marga Vicedo, The Nature 




computing technology when identifying comparisons between historical models and the 
structures of cognition and behaviour posited by attachment theory.   
There has also been growing critical interest in historiographies that locate 
attachment thinking in relation to various social and political contexts. Historian Mathew 
Thomson has explored the influence of Bowlby’s thinking upon the post-war formation of a 
welfare state, whilst the studies The Politics of Attachment: Towards a Secure Society 
(1996) and The Politics of Uncertainty: Attachment in Private and Public Life (2003) examine 
the influence of attachment thinking upon recent social and economic policy. There have 
also been several studies that have established a critical stance upon the notion that 
“Bowlbyism” functioned to normalise a patriarchal family structure and to situate women 
solely in terms of their role as mothers (Eyer 78; Franzblau 93-94). This focus on the social, 
political and ethnographic has also dominated the work of historians tracing antecedents of 
attachment thinking in previous centuries, as in the discussions of familial structure in Colin 
Heywood’s Growing Up in France: From the Ancien Régime to the Third Republic (2007) and 
in scholarship by Klaus E. Grossman (Heywood 116-18, 132; Grossman 85-86, 93-100).  
Largely absent from these histories, however, is a consideration of the role of 
pedagogy in the formation and reception of attachment theory and its historical 
antecedents. Historians Suzan van Dijken, Réne van der Veer, Marinus van Ijzendoorn, and 
Hans-Jan Kuipers have claimed that Bowlby’s experience as a teacher in progressive schools 
contributed to his belief that “the impulses children have are right & should be allowed to 
find expression” (qtd. Dijken et al. 252). Thomson mentions the influence of Bowlbyism 
upon the provision of free meals and milk in post-war schools, but does not discuss any 
comparable influence upon actual pedagogical practice (81). This thesis aims to focus 
scholarly attention upon pedagogical models as a key context in which ideas associated 
with attachment theory have achieved expression in culture.  
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In addition to offering a scientific and social history of ideas associated with the 
computational aspects of attachment theory, I also wish to investigate their relationship to 
literary culture. I have been encouraged in this approach by scholars such as Gillian Beer, 
Laura Otis and Sally Shuttleworth, who have demonstrated that far from being a passive 
conduit for scientific ideas, literature plays an integral role in shaping these concepts. There 
are, however, currently few studies that consider how attachment concepts and their 
historical precedents were shaped by their representation in literature and the popular 
press. Grossman has argued that the foundations of attachment theory are traceable to an 
eighteenth-century concern with human interiority that was informed by the literary works 
of Goethe (101), whilst historians Ellen Boucher and Michal Shapira have documented the 
role of the British media in mediating the claims of attachment theory as regards familial 
and institutional care (Boucher 183-86; Shapira 211-12, 229-235). Historians have also 
discussed how a Bowlbian conception of women’s roles was disseminated in the mid-
twentieth century via publications expressly aimed at women (Carter 19; Stockman, 
Bonney and Sheng 166). As far as I am aware, however, there has been no link forged 
between models corresponding to this computational understanding of attachment theory 
and the literature and popular press of the nineteenth century.  
This thesis sets out to examine the role of Eliot’s literary oeuvre in shaping the 
representation of this computational model. This thesis seeks to accord Bowlby and Eliot a 
comparable function in perceiving the wider social and pedagogical implications of this 
computational model in their respective centuries. I also consider whether Eliot can be 
regarded as a more incisive critic of the computational expression of this tradition than 
Bowlby and his followers, who, I argue, often seem blinkered to the cultural and 
sociological tensions inherent in this model. This thesis seeks to illustrate that Eliot’s 
critique of the ramifications of this type of computational thinking can suggest how these 
tensions affect attachment theory in a similar manner.  
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I hope that the interpretations of Eliot’s novels contained in this thesis will 
illustrate that situating attachment theory as part of a computational tradition of 
representing cognition and behaviour can offer new possibilities for literary study. It is the 
intention of this thesis to strengthen the claim of attachment theory to be an appropriate 
framework with which to interpret nineteenth-century literature and culture. This 
application of attachment theory is still in its infancy, with only a handful of studies 
applying attachment concepts to nineteenth-century texts. The major contributions to this 
emergent field are Peggy Johnstone’s The Transformation of Rage: Mourning and Creativity 
in George Eliot (1997), and Jillmarie Murphy’s Monstrous Kinships: Realism and Attachment 
Theory in the Nineteenth- and Early Twentieth-Century Novel (2011).  
These studies use a range of concepts from attachment theory as tools for literary 
analysis, including the dual phenomena of attachment and exploratory behaviour, and the 
spectrum of behaviours associated with separation from caregivers. Yet neither study 
makes a sustained attempt to trace comparable models in the nineteenth century. Murphy 
briefly refers to nineteenth-century constructions of the mother-child relationship as 
anticipating the focus of attachment theory upon the caregiver-child relationship (11, 39), 
and aligns the concern demonstrated by the nineteenth-century realist novel for “empirical 
knowledge” with the emphasis upon observational studies in attachment theory (16). She 
does not, however, offer any further analysis of the nineteenth-century antecedents of 
specific attachment concepts.  
In a critical counterpoise to the current lack of interest in historicizing attachment 
theory within nineteenth-century studies, I want to show that such a historical 
consideration would enable literary and cultural critics to legitimise their use of this 
theoretical framework in relation to nineteenth-century texts and to apply its concepts 
with greater precision. This thesis seeks to ground its application of attachment theory to 
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nineteenth-century literature in an understanding of corresponding nineteenth-century 
models of mental processing.  
 
The Computational Origins and Literary Uses of Cognitive Science  
Because of their theoretical correspondences, in historicizing attachment theory I also hope 
to deepen our historical understanding of the computationally-based cognitive science that 
emerged at mid-century. As a basis for the more comprehensive historicization of 
attachment theory that this thesis performs, this can be regarded as a second-order project 
within my thesis. This thesis nevertheless aims to contribute to existing scholarship in this 
field by tracing the afterlife of computational cognitive science in twentieth-century 
attachment theory, particularly as regards the influence of computational concepts upon 
recent play theory. 
This thesis can therefore be aligned with studies that trace how ideas associated 
with computational cognitive science were mediated in twentieth-century culture and 
society. These include Margaret Boden’s Mind as Machine: A History of Cognitive Science 
(2006) and Bradd Shore’s Culture in Mind: Cognition, Culture and the Problem of Meaning 
(1996). Boden considers various scientific cultures that share theoretical orientations with 
computational cognitive science, including ethology and linguistics (275, 428, 627), whilst 
Shore addresses contexts such as the composition of texts using computer software, and 
the technologically-inflected desire for modularised and reconfigurable consumer products 
(134, 142-43). This thesis seeks to contribute a new strand to this cultural, social and 
intellectual history.  
One of the purposes of this thesis is to provide for this incarnation of cognitive 
science a cultural and literary history comparable to that which Richardson produces for 
recent cognitive neuroscience in British Romanticism and the Science of the Mind (2001) 
and The Neural Sublime: Cognitive Theories and Romantic Texts (2010). In these texts 
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Richardson interleaves original histories of neural science in the Romantic period with 
literary analysis of images of cognitive processing in Romantic texts. Deftly woven through 
this analysis are concepts derived from recent neurobiological studies, which are used by 
Richardson to highlight parallels with cognitive science in the Romantic texts and cultural 
phenomena he studies. Richardson’s work demonstrates that comparing the cognitive 
concerns of different historical periods can provide fascinating new avenues for both 
literary and historical analysis. Other notable contributions to this field include the volumes 
The Artful Mind: Cognitive Science and the Riddle of Human Creativity (2006) and 
Embodiment and Cognition in Culture (2007) and monographs by Mary Thomas Crane, 
Antonina Harbus, Elaine Scarry and Ellen Spolsky. 
By formulating these comparisons between computational aspects of cognitive 
science and their expression in pre-twentieth-century culture, I seek to address a gap in the 
existing literature. In his history of cognitive science Howard Gardner identifies nineteenth-
century researches into the possibility of chess-playing automata as constituting a type of 
proto-artificial intelligence, but does not proceed to draw any detailed parallels with 
cognitive science (142). Historian George Mandler has observed that William James 
“informed us about the distinction between retention (storage) and recollection (retrieval) 
long before anyone dreamed of the computer metaphor” (69). There is no suggestion, 
however, that computing influenced James in formulating this distinction: the parallel is 
figured as coincidental. Historian Christopher Green has broached the subject in greater 
depth, but he concludes that there is insufficient evidence to justify the claim that models 
similar to those of computational cognitive science existed in the nineteenth century 
(“Cognitive Science” 149-50).  This thesis proposes that attending to the computational 
expression of a tradition of conceptualising cognition and behaviour can reveal new 
evidence of this type of cognitive thinking in the nineteenth century.  
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It has been stated previously that this thesis seeks to offer a historical framework 
for the application of the attachment model to literary texts. I hope that the historical work 
performed by this thesis will also help to advance the use of computational cognitive 
science in literary studies. In recent decades there has been emergent movement in the 
humanities referred to as “cognitive literary studies”, in which scholars interpret literary 
texts and explore the reader-text dynamic using concepts from cognitive theory. A focus 
upon concepts drawn from computational cognitive science, however, is far from being the 
predominant approach in this discipline.  
The vast majority of scholars working in this field, including Mary Thomas Crane, 
Rachel Giora, Antonina Harbus, Alan Richardson, Elaine Scarry, Ellen Spolsky, Mark Turner, 
Kay Young and Lisa Zunshine, base their literary analysis upon concepts from recent 
cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience. Although Zunshine has written of the 
need to ground cognitive literary studies in a cultural historicist approach (“Cultural 
Historicism” 122), there has been an overwhelming reluctance on the part of literary critics 
to utilise an ostensibly outmoded “first generation” computational cognitive science as a 
framework for textual analysis (Herman 156; McConachie x).  
Although there have been some notable exceptions, the trend towards 
neurobiological approaches has relegated computing to the margins of cognitive literary 
studies. In his monograph Between Literature and Science: Poe, Lem and Explorations in 
Aesthetics, Cognitive Science and Literary Knowledge (2001) Peter Swirski applies both 
cognitive and computational models to literary texts, but does not make any significant 
effort to foreground the literary uses of the computational cognitive science that I discuss 
in this thesis. Swirski’s nearest approach to this subject is to discuss the potential for 
computers to compose literary works (94). Although Swirksi briefly mentions the Analytical 
Engine as part of this discussion, it is only to emphasise that it lacks the type of creativity 
that he is interested in (100).  
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The marginality of computational concepts in cognitive literary studies is also 
evident in Zunshine’s consideration of the obstacles facing software attempting to attribute 
mental states to characters in literary texts (“Social to the Literary” 186-88). Although 
Zunshine references computing here, the thrust of her argument is that the neurobiological 
processes that underlie human cognition result in a registering of affect infinitely more 
nuanced than anything achievable in a computer. This thesis is intended to show that there 
is the potential for a cognitive literary studies that uses as an interpretative framework 
computational forms of representing cognition belonging to the period in which a 
particular literary work was composed. I hope to illustrate that embracing the 
computational in the cognitive concerns of earlier periods can enable us to identify how 
authors have historically represented the processes underlying cognition, and in doing so, 
to uncover previously overlooked aspects of our own thinking. 
 
The Cultural, Scientific and Literary Impact of Computing in the Nineteenth Century 
 
As well as advancing our understanding of twentieth- and twenty-first century modes of 
representing the structure of cognition and behaviour, this thesis seeks to investigate the 
literary and scientific impact of computing technology in the nineteenth century. This thesis 
aims to contribute to nineteenth-century studies by tracing the role of the Engines in 
shaping the nineteenth-century expression of a tradition of representing flexible cognition 
and behaviour as a flexible arrangement of inflexible units. I hope to show that this 
approach has the potential to enrich our comprehension of the scientific and sociocultural 
significance of these computing machines in the era in which they were designed.  
This thesis draws upon various technical descriptions, drawings and diagrams in an 
effort to provide the most detailed discussion of the Engines yet included in a work whose 
primary purpose is to consider their cultural and literary significance. As my own 
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background is in literary and cultural studies, I can understand how intimidating these 
technically complex machines can appear. Through patient study, however, I have gradually 
familiarised myself with their design. It is my intention that this thesis should offer detailed 
yet accessible technical descriptions of the Engines to scholars working in nineteenth-
century literary and cultural studies, thus providing the conceptual framework for a 
renewed appreciation of the significance of these machines as cognitive objects. 
By attending to these mechanisms in detail, I hope to draw attention to the 
specificity of Babbage’s thinking about human mental processing and to make detailed and 
substantiated claims regarding his status in nineteenth-century mental science. As 
discussed in this thesis, several historians including William Ashworth, Harro Maas, Simon 
Schaffer, Dorothy Stein and Herbert Sussman have made intelligent and plausible 
suggestions as to how Babbage perceived the relationship between the Engines and human 
mental processing. Otis has also approached the Engines from a neurobiological 
perspective, arguing that the modular construction of these computers has affinities with 
the cell theory of the physician Hermann von Helmholtz (1821-1894) (33).  
Yet despite this scholarship, there still remains much scepticism as to whether the 
Engines can be ascribed cognitive significance: Boden denies the possibility outright (131), 
whilst Green claims that comparisons between the Engines and mental processing “were 
simply a matter of verbal shorthand for Babbage” (“Mechanical Model” 42). By presenting 
new analysis of texts written by Babbage in conjunction with new interpretations of the 
architectural evolution of the Engines, I seek to provide an explanation of how Babbage 
used these computers to conceptualise the structure of mental processing that is 
technically precise and grounded in his writings. I hope that this approach will support the 
argument that these machines represent significant nineteenth-century resources for 
thinking about mental processing.  
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As far as I am aware, this computational model of the structure of cognition and 
behaviour has never before been discussed in scholarly writing concerning nineteenth-
century mental science. Detailed and accomplished historiographies of various aspects of 
nineteenth-century mental science can be found in the work of historians such as Jenny 
Bourne-Taylor, William Cohen, Nicholas Dames, Michael Davis, John Gordon, Adela Pinch, 
Alan Richardson, Vanessa Ryan, Rick Rylance and Sally Shuttleworth. Particular attention is 
given in these accounts to associationism, phrenology, evolutionary psychology, faculty 
psychology, epiphenomenalism, and the influence of physiological models of mind.  
Rather than revisit models that have already been given extensive and admirable 
treatment in existing scholarship, I seek to focus scholarly attention upon a computational 
model of mind not yet explored in these histories. As many historians have observed, in the 
nineteenth century this field was speculative, interdisciplinary, and experimental in its use 
of explanatory metaphor. It is not the object of this thesis to discount any of the models 
foregrounded in previous historiographies, but rather to further exploit the metaphorical 
and conceptual richness of mental science in this period. This thesis proposes that this 
computationally-derived model of a flexible arrangement of inflexible cognitive-
behavioural units represents another strand of a vibrant and experimental nineteenth-
century science of the mind. 
Because of its emphasis upon an dynamically adaptive model of cognition and 
behaviour, this thesis can be aligned with studies documenting nineteenth-century 
attempts to foreground a more dynamic view of the psyche than those afforded by the 
relatively static models of mental structure- permanent associations and cerebral 
localisation- foregrounded by associationism and phrenology. These include Dames’ 
account of dynamically constituted aggregates of sensory perceptions (179-80), and the 
dissociation into a multiplicity of self-states that Kay Young detects in Thomas Hardy’s 
fiction (180). Dames’ vision of the dynamic psyche is strongly biologized, reflecting the 
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emphasis placed upon depictions of the embodied mind in histories of nineteenth-century 
mental science. Dames traces the existence of a “unit” of consciousness as a concept in 
nineteenth-century mental science, where each unit represents a unit of sensory data (177-
79). These “units” or “bits” of sensory data form a stream of consciousness that is more 
accurately read as a string of discrete units: “the sound of the constant combination and 
recombination of individual elements or ‘simple sensations’” (178). Although Dames does 
not consider the structure of these units beyond the idea of a bit-stream, the existence of a 
model of mind as an organisation of discrete units indicates that models corresponding to 
the one I describe were not only present in nineteenth-century mental science, but were 
being used to comprehend the flexible nature of mind. It is the intention of this thesis to 
show that computing in this period resulted in a tradition of representing the dynamic 
psyche achieving a specific expression. 
This thesis also seeks to offer new perspectives upon the representation of mental 
pathology in this period. Historians Jill Matus, Mark Micale, Andrew Scull and Sally 
Shuttleworth have traced a constellation of nineteenth-century registers within which 
psychopathology was comprehended, including moral insanity, psychic shock and hysteria. 
This thesis aims to show that computing also influenced how cognitive-behavioural 
disturbance was conceptualised in the nineteenth century. This thesis also seeks to 
illustrate that computing sharpened perceptions of correspondences between mental 
processes regarded as normative and mental processes regarded as pathological. This type 
of slippage has been identified by Matus in relation to automatic mental functioning, 
where similar neurobiological mechanisms could either allow an individual to commit a 
crime unconsciously or to act automatically according to “established moral principles” (35-
36). I want to show that the model Babbage derived from computing depicts states figured 
as normative and those figured as pathological as sharing correspondences.  
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 At this point I wish to explain my decision to use the language of trauma in relation 
to the pathological polarity of this model.  The significance of “trauma” for nineteenth-
century studies has been much discussed, with historians Ruth Leys and Jill Matus stressing 
the need to apply this term in a manner that is sensitive to historical and contextual 
specificities. Although I appreciate this concern, I hope to illustrate that the models of 
mental pathology discussed in this thesis share correspondences across the period studied. 
Because the Ferenczian model of incest trauma foregrounds psychopathologies similar to 
those I argue are depicted in Eliot’s fiction, it is my contention that using the language of 
trauma foregrounded by Ferenczi can function as a means of highlighting and exploring 
these correspondences.  
It is also my contention that considering the status of the Difference Engine as a 
physical embodiment of the model of cognitive-behavioural pathology foregrounded by 
this tradition can justify the appropriateness of this term in this particular nineteenth-
century context. As illustrated in this thesis, the materiality of this machine appears to have 
caused the computational expression of this tradition to feature a highly physicalized 
model of mental pathology, one which conceptualises psychic damage in terms of material 
shatter and inflexibility. This thesis seeks to illustrate that these cognitive-behavioural 
pathologies are made visible in nineteenth-century texts via images of physical trauma. This 
would appear to be a computational expression of a mode of representation at mid-
century in which “emotion, internal feeling, is rendered bodily and physical, read through 
its corporeal manifestations” (Matus 58). This thesis aims to show that this conflation of 
physical trauma with corresponding psychic processes makes the language of psychic 
trauma appropriate in this context. 
I want to show that the Engines also reveal correspondences between 
“technophobic” and “technophilic” understandings of the cognitive significance of 
machinery in this period. According to historian and literary critic Tamara Ketabgian, a 
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technophobic figuration of machines as an alienating and dehumanising force has until 
recently dominated accounts of the psychological significance of machinery in this period 
(2). In her monograph The Lives of Machines: The Industrial Imaginary in Victorian 
Literature and Culture (2011), Ketabgian offers compelling evidence for the presence of an 
alternative register in nineteenth-century literature and culture. This technophilic register 
embraces the machine as a metaphor for the circulation of affect, instinctual behaviours, 
intersubjectivity, and aesthetic sensibilities (3, 49, 98, 111, 145, 160). In the course of my 
researches I have encountered insightful readings of the psychically vital machine in the 
nineteenth century in the work of historians and literary critics including Joseph Bizup, 
Deidre Coleman, Nicholas Daly, Hilary Fraser, Richard Menke, Allison Muri and Laura Otis.  
This thesis seeks to reinforce Ketabgian’s claims in The Lives of Machines for the 
coexistence of technophobic and technophilic attitudes to machinery in this period, such as 
the synergistic relationship she identifies between “technical precision viewed as 
repetitive, automatic and coldly mechanical” and “the strong emotional aura of 
performers” such as the pianist Franz Listz (1811-1886) (150). This thesis argues that the 
manner in which Babbage derived the structures of computational flexibility from his first, 
inflexible machine led him to posit a model of flexible cognition and behaviour predicated 
upon states of cognitive-behavioural inflexibility. I want to illustrate that, as regards 
nineteenth-century computing, correspondences exist between technophobic and 
technophilic attitudes to machinery.  I hope to show that in this instance “technophilic” and 
“technophobic” approaches are not separate modes of interpreting the nineteenth-century 
machine, but that each is integral to the expression of the other.  
This thesis also sets out to show that the cognitive-behavioural models suggested 
by computing technology also played a role in shaping nineteenth-century thinking 
regarding models of child development. In her important work The Mind of the Child: Child 
Development in Literature, Science and Medicine, 1840-1900 (2010) Sally Shuttleworth 
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documents the burgeoning of scientific discourses related to child development in the mid-
late nineteenth century. To the best of my knowledge, however, there has been no 
discussion of the role of computing in shaping the conceptualisation of child development 
in this period. This thesis aims to contribute to this field of study by pointing attention to 
nineteenth-century computers that were understood to develop in a similar manner to 
children, and children who were understood to develop in similar ways to computers.   
It is a core premise of this thesis that the study of computing technology has the 
potential to enrich our understanding of models of mental processing and cognitive 
development in the nineteenth century. Babbage is generally omitted from accounts of 
mental science in this period, but this thesis aims to show that he gave a tradition of 
thinking about cognitive-behavioural structure a concrete expression in his Engines. 
Furthermore, this thesis seeks to illustrate that Babbage also considered the implications of 
this model in relation to a range of cultural, economic, social and technological practices.  
I want to show that a key aspect of the sociocultural significance of this model that 
Babbage helps us to perceive is the influence of computing upon the attitudes of 
nineteenth-century educationalists towards the “half-time” system in mid-century textile 
factories. This thesis offers an explanation of how Babbage derived from the Difference 
Engine an understanding of the types of pedagogy necessary to cultivate the cognitive-
behavioural traits necessary for efficiency in nineteenth-century factories. I suggest that a 
result of the success of the text in which Babbage communicated his computational ideas 
regarding the training of workers, The Economy of Machinery and Manufactures (1834), 
these ideas gained appreciable currency in discussions of half-time education in the mid-
nineteenth century.  
As discussed in this thesis, several historians including Ketabgian, Schaffer and 
Andrew Zimmermann have presented analyses of specific disciplinary technologies that 
Babbage foregrounds in Economy. They have identified the symbolic representation of each 
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component of the labour process, the use of machinery for paring off extraneous actions in 
the worker, and the practice of limiting the worker’s autonomy by locating part of the skill 
necessary to complete a given task in a mechanical object. This thesis seeks to extend this 
scholarship by illustrating that the architecture of the Difference Engine led Babbage to 
attribute to the factory worker cognitive-behavioural pathologies similar to those that 
Ferenczi associated with incest trauma. This thesis also considers the role of 
computationally-derived pedagogies in Babbage’s disciplinary schemas. Although 
Zimmermann briefly mentions Babbage’s conviction that “systems of machinofacture could 
become true only to the extent that workers were trained to accept these systems”, there 
has as yet been no attempt to trace the influence of computing upon the portrayal of the 
half-time system that by mid-century determined the educational experiences of 
thousands of child textile workers (19).  
Due to its social and cultural importance there have been numerous studies of the 
impact of the half-time system, including work by historians Peter Kirby, Clark Nardinelli 
and Harold Silver. In this thesis I refer to a range of mid-nineteenth-century sources to 
trace the impact of computing upon the thinking of factory inspectors, educationalists and 
commentators. I hope that by grounding my approach in the study of nineteenth-century 
computing I will be able to offer new perspectives upon contemporary portrayals of this 
pedagogical scheme, uncovering a technophobic narrative in which the factory worker is 
taught to function in similar manner to Babbage’s Difference Engine. 
This thesis accords Eliot a comparable status to Babbage as a key nineteenth-
century interpreter of the computational expression of this tradition. I hope to show that 
Eliot in her fiction depicts correspondences between principles associated with the Engines 
and nineteenth-century factories. As a critique of how the factory system was represented 
in the nineteenth-century novel, this reading of Eliot can be aligned with recent work in this 
field by Carolyn Lesjak, Chris Louittit and Ketabgian. Lesjak examines the tensions between 
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depictions of work and leisure in nineteenth-century fiction, whilst Louittit considers how 
Victorian novelists represented the relationship between factory labour and working-class 
masculine identity. Ketabgian, meanwhile, considers the relationship between instinctual 
nature and the operation of industrial machinery in the fiction of Charles Dickens. It is my 
intention that the computational approach taken in this thesis should offer new insights 
into the novelistic representation of the factory system and its pedagogies in this era.  
 In addition to its influence upon cultural perceptions of the half-time system, I 
argue that computing technology was integral in shaping nineteenth-century perceptions 
of the didactic value of play. In his monograph The World in Play: Portraits of a Victorian 
Concept (2011) cultural historian Matthew Kaiser identifies a dominant logic in nineteenth-
century culture that he terms “play as paideia”: “that children and young animals in 
particular learn, adapt, and develop through life-enabling play” (30). This thesis seeks to 
ask questions about the role of computing in shaping nineteenth-century perceptions of 
the role of play in education.  As far as I am aware, this is the first time that these 
correspondences between play, pedagogy and computing have been identified in the 
nineteenth century. This critique of parallels between pedagogy and computing in the 
nineteenth century is therefore not only intended to advance our understanding of 
pedagogical theory and practice in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, but is also 
offered as a contribution to nineteenth-century cultural studies.  
As indicated above, I wish to contribute to nineteenth-century literary studies by 
giving critical consideration to the portrayal of computational models in Eliot. As far as I 
have been able to ascertain, I am the first to suggest that Eliot played a role in shaping the 
representation of computing technology. This thesis offers three new interpretations of 
Eliot’s novels that seek to draw attention to this facet of her thinking. Ketabgian has argued 
against the perception of Eliot’s organicist worldview as distanced from machine culture, 
claiming that Eliot in her writing “integrat[es] mechanical and ontologically hybrid features” 
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(109). To explain how this hybridity is expressed in Eliot’s fiction, Ketabgian focuses upon 
how the steam engine operates as a model for the circulation of “affective energy” and 
“emotional spontaneity” (13, 14). This thesis seeks to further deepen our understanding of 
the extent to which Eliot in her novels parallels the structures of human experiencing with 
technological advances, bringing into focus her engagement with concepts derived from 
nineteenth-century computing. I wish to highlight the specific manner in which Eliot 
deploys these concepts in her work, comparing this with a wider tradition of representing 
cognition and behaviour in computational terms.  
By formulating claims for the relevance of computing to a tradition of representing 
cognition and behaviour, this thesis seeks to provide new grounds for reassessing the 
relevance of computing for literary study beyond the twentieth- and twenty-first century 
text. Several detailed explorations of the relationship between computational concepts and 
the literary text exist, including the work of David Ferro, Katherine N. Hayles, Matt 
Kirschenbaum, Loss Pequeño Glazier and Eric Swedin. Many of these studies examine how 
computing has transformed our relation to the literary text, particularly regarding the 
structure of literary language, the status of authorship, and the status of the text-as-object. 
The work of these critics is characterised by a sensitive applications of computational 
concepts, but the scope of their analysis is limited to twentieth- and twenty-first century 
literature. This thesis proposes that an understanding of how computing shaped cultural 
perceptions of the structure of cognition and behaviour can provide a framework for 
tracing computational models in nineteenth-century literature. 
 
Organisation of Thesis  
 
This introductory chapter concludes with an overview of the organisation of this thesis, 
whose structure consists of two distinct but intimately connected sections. It can be 
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thought of as a type of diptych, the two hinged wings of the thesis folding together the 
images that they contain to form a continuous yet segmented object. The first two chapters 
explore the mechanisms of pathology foregrounded by this tradition, whilst the third and 
fourth examine the structures of normative flexible cognition that it posits. Central to the 
construction of each panel is the design of a mechanical computer, with the inflexible 
Difference Engine corresponding to the mechanism of pathology, and the flexible Analytical 
Engine corresponding to that of normative cognition and behaviour. The reason these two 
sections are placed in this order is to parallel the argument of this thesis that this tradition 
figures normative flexible cognition and behaviour as having its structural foundation in 
inflexible units. This thesis argues that because this model simultaneously associates 
inflexibility with cognitive-behavioural pathologies, correspondences exist between 
normative and pathological states. It examines how, by extension, this has historically 
meant coming to terms with similarities between concepts that appear opposed to one 
another: for instance, between incest trauma and play behaviours.   
The opening chapter, “Fragmentation, Inflexibility and Pedagogical Incest(s): 
Reading Trauma in Daniel Deronda and Sándor Ferenczi”, explores how a model of 
pathology predicated upon psychic fragmentation and inflexibility is used to portray the 
effects of incest trauma in the work of Sándor Ferenczi and in Eliot’s 1876 novel Daniel 
Deronda.  This chapter also draws attention to Ferenczi’s claim that repressive pedagogical 
methods could result in psychopathologies similar to those caused by incest perpetrated by 
a caregiver or an adult in loco parentis. This chapter argues that Eliot makes a similar claim 
in Deronda, comparing the psychopathologies generated by incest trauma with those 
arising from nineteenth-century pedagogical methods.  
The second chapter of this thesis, “The Difference Engine and Incestuous 
Pedagogies: Babbage, Eliot and the Factory System”, considers how the architectural 
principles of Babbage’s first computer informed his theories of labour organisation in 
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Economy. Referring closely to the architecture of this computer, I offer an explanation of 
how Babbage utilised fragmentation and inflexibility in units of machine behaviour to 
achieve computational efficiency.  This chapter argues that Economy associates efficiency 
in factories with workers that function in a similar manner to a Difference Engine, with 
cognitive-behavioural “habits” premised on the performance of fragmented and inflexible 
tasks. I also want to illustrate that the factory worker depicted in Economy acquires these 
cognitive-behavioural habits as a result of pedagogical methods.  
The second half of this chapter seeks to illustrate that by mid-century these 
“habits” were figured as cognitive-behavioural pathologies resulting from methods used in 
half-time education. This chapter proposes that the half-time system as depicted in these 
sources generates cognitive-behavioural effects comparable to those produced by the 
incestuous pedagogies discussed in the first chapter. This chapter also begins to explore the 
paradoxes that I argue characterise this model. This chapter claims that pedagogies similar 
to those described in Economy cause the factory system in these sources to appear 
fragmented and inflexible from the perspective of the worker. I hope that this approach 
can offer new perspectives upon the impact of computing technology in this period, 
highlighting its influence upon portrayals of the factory system and its pedagogies at mid-
century. This chapter concludes with a reading of George Eliot’s novel Silas Marner (1861). 
This interpretation seeks to show that Marner critiques the role of concepts associated 
with computing technology in shaping an emergent factory system.  
The transition between chapters two and three constitutes a hinging point in this 
thesis. Having reflected in the first half of this thesis upon correspondences between the 
architecture of the Difference Engine and depictions of cognitive-behavioural pathologies, 
in the second half I offer an account of how states characterising flexible cognition and 
behaviour came to be depicted as comparable to pathological states as a result of 
computers that enact flexibility as a flexible arrangement of inflexible units.  
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The chapter “Teaching Children and Computers: Constructing Flexible Behaviour 
from Babbage to Bowlby” seeks to trace how Babbage during the 1830s and 1840s 
developed a more sophisticated computer, the Analytical Engine, capable of enacting 
computational flexibility as a flexible arrangement of inflexible units within modular 
hierarchies. This chapter aims to illustrate that this model of computational flexibility has 
its basis in the architecture of the Difference Engine as an inflexible arrangement of 
inflexible units within modular hierarchies.  This chapter also seeks to show that this model 
of computational development was used by Babbage in his 1864 text Passages from the 
Life of the Philosopher to construct narratives of human development with cognitive-
behavioural flexibility as their goal. This chapter argues that the developmental narrative 
described in Passages therefore foregrounds correspondences between the cognitive-
behavioural effects of incest trauma and states that characterise flexible cognition and 
behaviour. The new interpretation of the design evolution of the Engines contained within 
this chapter underpins its argument that computing in the nineteenth century resulted in 
correspondences between technophobic and technophilic attitudes regarding the 
cognitive-behavioural significance of technology. 
A primary purpose of this chapter is to show that the model of cognitive-
behavioural flexibility that Babbage foregrounds in Passages corresponds to the 
attachment models foregrounded by Bowlby in the 1960s. This chapter attributes these 
correspondences to similarities in the architecture of nineteenth- and twentieth-century 
computing, arguing that in both periods computing technology enabled a traditional model 
of conceptualising cognition and behaviour to be articulated and elaborated.  This chapter 
claims that these historical moments are not only comparable in terms of the visibility of 
this tradition, but also in the computational mode of its expression.   
This chapter aims to show that another point of comparison between the 
developmental narrative in Passages and that foregrounded by attachment theory is that 
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both are pedagogical narratives of child development. Having previously argued that the 
design evolution of the Engines led to correspondences being foregrounded between 
normative and pathological states, this chapter seeks to identify parallels between the 
incestuous pedagogies of earlier chapters and the normative pedagogies depicted in 
Passages. This chapter also argues that similar correspondences between states figured as 
normative and states figured as pathological characterise attachment theory as a result of 
the computational origins of this model. I want to show that reflecting upon how these 
correspondences were negotiated in the nineteenth century can suggest ways in which 
attachment theory has dealt with the paradoxes of this computational model.  
The fourth chapter of this thesis, “The Child-Machine at Play: Child Development 
and Computational Models in Babbage, Eliot, Turing and Attachment Theory”, seeks to 
determine how Turing’s concept of a “child-machine” has influenced recent thinking about 
the developmental significance of play. Turing theorised that his hypothetical computer, 
the “child-machine”, might learn strategies for the flexible organisation of behavioural 
units by playing games such as chess and GO. It would then subsequently apply these 
techniques not only to additional gameplay situations, but also to a wider range of 
behavioural contexts. Turing’s thought-experiment therefore parallels the child-machine’s 
ability to flexibly implement play behaviours with its general capacity for behavioural 
flexibility and sophistication. This chapter seeks to assess the impact of this computational 
model upon the “playful pedagogies” described by recent attachment theory.  
 This chapter also seeks to highlight and explore similarities between 
developmentally significant machine and child play in the mid-nineteenth century. This 
chapter accounts for these similarities by suggesting that Babbage was able to consider the 
role of play in human development through study of the Engines and a hypothetical tic-tac-
toe machine named “Automaton”. I want to show that Babbage’s own writings depict a 
computational logic of play of progress similar to that found in attachment theory. Building 
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upon my analysis of Passages in the third chapter of this thesis, this chapter seeks to give 
additional consideration to the developmental narratives contained within this text. I hope 
to show that comparing Passages with the models of playful pedagogy discussed in this 
chapter can reveal new aspects of the pedagogical narratives in this text. 
 This chapter aims to illustrate that this computational logic of play as progress 
views play as a means by which to learn how to negotiate the partial fragmentation and 
partial inflexibility required for flexible cognition and behaviour on this model. This implies, 
however, that cognitive-behavioural states generated as a result of play share 
correspondences with states that this model understands to be pathological- such as those 
generated by incest trauma and factory pedagogies. I want to show that these parallels are 
explored in Eliot’s novel The Mill on the Floss (1860), a text which I argue theorises the 
developmental significance of play in comparable ways to Babbage and Turing. Instead of 
consigning these correspondences to the past, this thesis seeks to ask questions about the 
implications this intellectual tradition might have for our own cultural assumptions about 
play. I want to show that examining how these tensions have been negotiated in earlier 
periods can suggest means by which our own culture has tried to disavow the more 
unsettling aspects of this tradition.  
This thesis seeks to show that the meanings ascribed to this cognitive-behavioural 
model in the mid-nineteenth and mid-twentieth century continue to influence our 
comprehension of developmental norms. The conclusion of this thesis suggests that the 
recent film The LEGO® Movie (2014) illustrates that the pathological consequences of 
factory pedagogies identified in the 1860s continue to provide a stimulus for our cultural 
emphasis upon developmentally significant play. This interpretation of The LEGO® Movie 
reads across nineteenth-century, twentieth-century and twenty-first century models of 
child development with the aim of illuminating their corresponding basis in computing 
technology and their similar cultural implications. In its intention to draw long historical 
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relationships between manifestations of a computationally-inflected tradition of 
conceptualising the structure of cognition and behaviour, this reading helpfully 

























Fragmentation, Inflexibility and Pedagogical Incest(s): Reading Trauma in Daniel Deronda 
and Sándor Ferenczi 
 
This chapter seeks to illustrate that pathologies of psychic fragmentation and inflexibility 
form the core of George Eliot’s representation of incest trauma in her 1876 novel Daniel 
Deronda. By conceptualising the psychic damage caused by incest in terms of these specific 
pathologies, this chapter argues that Eliot foregrounds a model of trauma similar to that 
found in the work of the Hungarian psychologist Sándor Ferenczi (1873-1933). I want to 
show that comparing the physicality of Ferenczi’s descriptions of trauma with the depiction 
of psychic injury in Deronda can reveal the manner in which Eliot encodes the processes of 
incest trauma in images that evoke corresponding material and structural registers. 
Through the use of this interpretative framework, I hope to advance our understanding of 
how incest trauma operates in this novel.   
Louise Penner and Judith Wilt were the first to suggest that psychopathology in 
Deronda could be aligned with incest trauma, with Margaret Loewen Reimer subsequently 
elaborating Penner and Wilt’s analysis by providing further evidence of an incest theme in 
the novel. Yet despite Ferenczi’s importance as a theorist of incest trauma and significant 
critical interest in this aspect of the novel, this is the first time a Ferenczian reading of the 
text has been attempted. By situating the text within a Ferenczian framework, this chapter 
seeks to highlight and explore the cultural and societal scope of Eliot’s depiction of incest 
trauma. This chapter argues that Eliot foregrounds parallels between trauma caused by 
incest and trauma caused by certain types of pedagogy in a similar manner to Ferenczian 
theory. Whereas existing criticism of the incest theme in Deronda has confined itself to a 
discussion of the sufferings of Gwendolen Harleth, this chapter seeks to illustrate that the 
incestuous pedagogies suffered by Daniel Deronda play a key role in revealing the wider 
societal implications of Eliot’s representation of incest trauma. This chapter suggests that it 
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is by paralleling the experiences of Gwendolen and Daniel that Eliot portrays incest trauma 
as an endemic feature of the treatment of children in her society.   
This chapter concerns a specific type of incest: a child raped by a parent or an adult 
in loco parentis. This requires clarification, as incest is today generally conceptualised as an 
act between consenting adults. Mariam Alizade has termed this “symmetrical” incest, 
occurring between two individuals whose relationship is characterized by an equal balance 
of power and mutual consent; for instance, two adult siblings (106-107). In contrast, in 
“asymmetrical” incest an individual uses physical force or intimidation to compel another 
individual to perform a sexual act (107-108). When this occurs between an adult and a 
child, this has been more commonly termed in recent clinical practice as child abuse. 
However, in this chapter I conflate Ferenczi’s terms for asymmetrical incest, “incestuous 
seductions” and “rape”, to create the designation of “incestuous rape” (“Confusion” 161). I 
do so in the hope of maintaining a terminology appropriate for both the nineteenth and 
the early twentieth century.  
Incest during the nineteenth century was not prohibited by secular law. A parent 
discovered to have perpetrated a sexual act upon their child could still be indicted for the 
crime, but the charge would be “rape” or “unlawful carnal knowledge”, not incest (Jackson 
14). For instance, Alfred Swaine Taylor’s authoritative medico-legal text The Principles and 
Practice of Medical Jurisprudence (1865) cites “A man charged with a rape upon his own 
child” (441). Another charge that could be brought in lieu of a charge of incest was 
“indecent assault” (Jackson 14). This was a category that “could encompass all sexual acts 
not based on vaginal penetration” (14). Incest eventually became illegal in Britain in 1908 
under the Punishment of Incest Act. The introduction of the Act created a terminological 
shift, leading to a situation in which both terms were maintained. As well as continuing to 
use the designation “rape”, Ferenczi also consciously uses the term incest in a manner not 
possible in Eliot’s nineteenth-century medico-legal discourse (Diary 209). For this reason I 
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wish to foreground the term incestuous rape, in recognition of the terminology of both 
periods and their historical continuity.  
Part of the elusiveness of a stable definition of incest is that despite the canonical 
definition of incest as between those related by blood, incest also possesses an 
extrafamilial dimension. Prohibitions against symbolic incest are present in Leviticus, where 
sexual relations between persons related by marriage are compared with incest between 
close kindred (King James Version, Leviticus 18. 8-18). Ferenczi goes even further, 
comparing seductions by adults placed in loco parentis with incestuous familial seductions 
(“Confusion”161). According to Ferenczi, any adult that undertakes a parental role to a 
child and then forces them into sexual relations perpetrates an act of incest. As I wish to 
avoid the word abuser, as a derivative of abuse and therefore a terminological discrepancy, 
I will use Ferenczi’s term “aggressor” in this chapter (Diary 103).3  
A final terminological note relates to the use of the word “trauma” in this chapter. 
As historian Jill Matus has noted, the use of the word trauma to describe psychic as 
opposed to physical injury was first recorded in 1894, several years after the publication of 
Deronda (59). Matus argues that despite the absence of this term, an “emergent cultural 
discourse of psychic wounding” allowed Eliot to “represent in Gwendolen the hallmarks of 
a traumatised subject” (60). Whereas Matus draws upon the work of psychologists such as 
Alexander Bain and George Henry Lewes to explain how Eliot is able to foreground this 
particular mode of representation, this thesis aims to show that Eliot’s representation of 
trauma shares correspondences with computational models. A primary purpose of this 
chapter is to prepare the ground for this argument by illustrating that psychopathologies of 
fragmentation and inflexibility play a key role in Eliot’s representation of trauma. Although 
my understanding of trauma in Eliot’s fiction is embedded in a very different set of 
                                                          
3 Although the phrase “sexually abused” is recorded in the nineteenth century, its usage 
was rare (Jackson 3). 
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historical contexts to those cited by Matus, my analysis in this thesis is indebted to her 
claim that Eliot’s cultural milieu enabled her to depict the processes of trauma avant-la-
lettre. This chapter also seeks to illustrate that the term “trauma” is appropriate in this 




Sándor Ferenczi was born in Hungary in 1873, and began his career as a neuropsychologist 
in Budapest (Rachman 10). Ferenczi later became one of Sigmund Freud’s (1856-1939) 
most intimate colleagues, although their relationship suffered from tensions arising from 
their divergent psychoanalytic theories (Haynal 27; Kelley-Lainé 167). One of Ferenczi’s 
best known contributions to psychoanalysis is his 1933 paper “The Confusion of Tongues 
Between Adults and the Child”. The genesis of this paper is visible in Ferenczi’s Clinical 
Diary, written principally between January and August 1932 with some significant entries 
added in October of the same year. The Diary stands as a collection of Ferenczi’s most 
original and uninhibited thoughts, in which he synthesises his decades of clinical experience 
in an extraordinary period of analytic creativity and insight. One of the insights that 
emerged from the analytic maelstrom of the Diary was a new interpretation of the 
processes of incest trauma, one which forms the core of Ferenczi’s 1933 paper. Other 
papers relevant to this discussion are “Psycho-Analysis and Education” (1908), “Introjection 
and Transference” (1909), “Trauma and Striving for Health” (1930) and “Child-Analysis in 
the Analysis of Adults” (1931). This purpose of this section is to show that the Ferenczian 
model of incest trauma foregrounds psychopathologies of fragmentation and inflexibility. I 
will conclude this section by situating Ferenczi in the context of other notable theorists of 
incest trauma, with the aim of explaining my selection of Ferenczian theory as an object of 
study in this thesis.  
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Ferenczi claims that incest trauma begins with the aggressor having “‘simulated’ a 
close emotional relationship with the child” (Diary 50). Ferenczi believed that children 
possess a natural tendency to identify and intensify behaviours eliciting a positive response 
from caregivers (“Introjection” 77). In the case of incest trauma this leads the child to offer 
examples of sexualised behaviour to the aggressor as if they were giving them a “present” 
(Ferenczi, Diary 165). Ferenczi observed that through this mechanism, adults are able to 
“project their own passionate character onto children” (165). Ferenczi stressed that 
children want only “passive object-love or . . . tenderness” (“Confusion” 163): if “love of a 
different kind from that which they need is forced upon children . . . it may lead to 
pathological consequences” (164).  He emphasised that the child, wishing only to elicit 
passive tenderness, is unaware of the sexual implication of their actions: “what they 
wanted to seduce the adults to is something quite different to what happened to them” 
(Diary 191). The incestuous rape by the aggressor is therefore utterly unprecedented and 
overwhelming.  
Ferenczi argued that faced with such a devastating occurrence, the child can only 
secure psychic survival through fragmentation. Splintering away traumatised parts of the 
psyche from consciousness enables “the cessation of the interrelation of pain fragments” 
(Ferenczi, “Striving for Health” 230; see also “Confusion” 165). Ferenczi’s descriptions of 
psychic fragmentation are replete with material images, ranging from lacerated skin to 
crystalline shatter. It transpires from the Diary that this physicalized imagery derives from 
the testimony of Ferenczi’s analysands, who compared their trauma to a force that 
“smashes everything inside” (66). These analysands also drew comparisons with being 
hacked to pieces with a saw (135), or being “torn to pieces” until they existed only as a 
“lacerated soul” (107, 155): “the painful part of the psyche is represented in this instance 
materially, as a substance” (107). 
44 
 
Corresponding to the imagination of the pain fragment as material, Ferenczi 
observes that analysands would attempt to mitigate their trauma by visualising a “strong, 
impenetrable covering” sealing up painful fragments of the psyche (107): “the greater part 
of her personality freezes over, like a crust of ice, protect[ing] her from the breaking 
through of the repressed material hidden deep inside and sealed hermetically” (176). In an 
image which corresponds to the dermal register of psychic lacerations, this encrustation is 
also described in the Diary as “scars of shocks” (111, emphasis in original). Because of the 
seal that forms around these psychic fragments, it becomes “extremely difficult to maintain 
contact without confusion with all the fragments, each of which behaves as a separate 
personality” (Ferenczi, “Confusion” 165). Ferenczi claims that an encrusted fragment could 
even be experienced as a separate self, who, in their hermetic isolation, would bear the 
agony of the trauma: “regarding myself no longer as the suffering person but looking at 
myself, or someone who resembles me, from the outside” (Diary 180).   
Ferenczi indicates that psychic fragmentation is aggravated by the fact that “the 
child’s faint references are ignored or even rejected” (25). Ferenczi claimed that the 
incestuously traumatised child feels “innocent and culpable at the same time”, a feeling 
exacerbated by “the harsh behaviour of the adult partner tormented and made angry by 
remorse” (“Confusion” 162). This loss of any certainty regarding the implication of their 
own behaviours, coupled with the aggressor’s denials of their reality, means that their 
“confidence in the testimony of their own senses is broken” (162). This splintering of the 
child’s reality contributes to the ongoing fragmentation of the child’s psyche: “When the 
child recovers from such an attack, he feels enormously confused, in fact, split” (162). 
Another way in which the aggressor fractures the child’s psyche is by effectively removing 
themselves as a caregiver. Ferenczi observes that once the relationship turns “passionate” 
the child is psychically orphaned, having lost its source of passive tenderness (Diary 79, 
201). Ferenczi believed that being deprived of the external psychic scaffolding provided by 
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a caregiver accelerated the child’s internal fragmentation: “Without this support the 
psychic and organic component mechanisms diverge, explode” (210). 
Ferenczi depicts this fragmentation coexisting with areas of pathological 
inflexibility within the psyche.  He claims that faced with the threat of psychic 
fragmentation, the child generates an artificial psyche by “subordinat[ing] themselves like 
automata to the will of the aggressor” (“Confusion” 162). Although this tactic secures 
immediate survival by restoring structure to the psyche (Ferenczi, Diary 10), the ersatz 
psyche formed in this manner exists in a “state of rigidity” (198). Ferenczi articulates the 
inflexibility of this “artificial psyche” by describing it as “a little too precisely- regulated 
mechanism” (10). He states that “the misused child changes into a mechanical, obedient 
automaton” (“Confusion” 163). 
Ferenczi observes that this attempt to completely inhabit the desires of the 
aggressor can lead to the formation of another form of artificial psyche: “completely 
oblivious of themselves they identify with the aggressor” (162). This identification is 
conceptualised in the Diary as a physical imprinting: “the violent force imprints its own 
features on the person” (18). In an image that can be compared with the cutaneous and 
bodily registers used to describe psychic fragmentation, the idiom of the aggressor is 
described by Ferenczi as a “grafted-on element” (75). Following this imprinting of the idiom 
of the aggressor, the child’s psychic functioning is once again characterised by a mechanical 
inflexibility: “The insane ‘superego’, being or becoming imposed upon one’s own 
personality, transforms the previous irony into automatism” (50). 
Ferenczi visualised incest trauma as generating a psychic topography in which 
isolated fragments of the child’s original psychic structures exist alongside an “artificial 
psyche” inflexible in its functioning. It is this omnipresent, multifaceted tension between 
fragmentation and inflexibility that makes Ferenczi’s writings so nuanced and powerful. Yet 
Ferenczi would make even more radical claims still. Ferenczi cited both “passionate love 
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and passionate punishment” as a “method of helplessly binding a child to an adult”; 
specifically, the passionate punishments dispensed by educators (“Confusion” 165).  
Ferenczi suggested that pedagogues are able to generate psychopathologies similar 
to those caused by incest trauma by forcing children to accept inflexible structures of 
thought and behaviour. Achieved through the stimulus of fear, this parallels the imposition 
of the aggressor’s idiom: “The man thus educated . . . impairs considerably his own ability 
for action, because he breeds in his unconscious another- a parasitic- person” (“Education” 
288).  
Here we get light, of some significance for education . . .  instead of . . . 
going on using the great power which grownups have over children to 
stamp upon their plastic minds our own rigid rules as something externally 
imprinted, we might fashion that power into a means of educating them to 
greater independence and courage. (“Child-Analysis” 134, emphasis added) 
These pathological forms of pedagogy are conceptualised as “imprinting” and “stamping” 
upon “plastic minds”, paralleling the “violent force” which imprints the idiom of the 
incestuous aggressor. These correspondences in material registers operate to underscore 
correspondences in pathological experience. In a similar manner to how the imprinting of 
the idiom of the aggressor generates an inflexible psychic organisation in the raped child, 
the inflexible psychic structure that results from such incestuous pedagogies (“stamp[ing] 
upon plastic minds our own rigid rules”) cannot replace the flexible psychic organisation 
that emerges from an optimal process of development.   
According to Ferenczi, susceptibility to incestuous pedagogies was even more 
marked in children previously exposed to incest trauma. Ferenczi believed that complexes 
established by incest trauma could be reawoken by individuals perceived to have a 
similarity to the primary aggressor, including those undertaking a pedagogical role towards 
the child (“Child-Analysis” 134; “Introjection” 71, 80). Ferenczi also claimed that the child 
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would respond to a new aggressor using strategies similar to those used to bear the 
original trauma, including psychic fragmentation: “this same fright is at work still, keeping 
the torn apart contents of the psyche still divided” (Diary 203).  
To conclude this section I wish to explore the relation of Ferenczian theory to 
models of incest trauma foregrounded by other theorists. I also want to explain my 
selection of Ferenczian theory as an object of study. In the early stages of his career 
Ferenczi’s mentor Freud described a model of psychopathology predicated upon the 
experiencing of sexual attacks in early childhood, known as the “seduction theory” 
(Izenberg 25). This is articulated in the papers “Heredity and the Aetiology of the Neuroses” 
(1896), “Further Remarks on the Neuro-Psychoses of Defence” (1896), and “The Aetiology 
of Hysteria” (1896).  Freud also developed the seduction theory via correspondence with 
the physician Wilhelm Fleiss (1858-1928), notably in the 1896 “Draft K”. Freud’s 1894 paper 
“The Neuro-Psychoses of Defence” represents another key context for the seduction 
theory, as it describes the mechanism of repression that Freud would subsequently apply 
to incest trauma. Although Freud would later abandon the seduction theory in favour of 
theories concerning the role of childhood sexuality, its significance continues to be 
discussed by analysts and cultural historians alike (Fletcher 35, 79; Rachman and Klett 18, 
23-27). In what follows, I seek to explain my choice of theorist by drawing distinctions 
between Freud’s “hydraulic” model and the “structural” model found in Ferenczi. I also 
compare the Freudian and Ferenczian models of incest trauma to those found in the work 
of the psychoanalysts Karl Abraham (1877-1925) and Annie Reich (1902-1971).  
Freud’s seduction theory traces the aetiology of hysteria and obsessional neurosis 
to a “passive sexual experience before puberty” (“Heredity” 152, emphasis in original). As 
discussed above, this belief in the asexuality of the child is central to the Ferenczian model 
of incest trauma. In the “Heredity and the Aetiology of the Neuroses” paper Freud claims 
that obsessional neurosis arises from guilt about “act[s] of aggression inspired by desire” in 
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childhood, but explains this by attributing the child’s sexual impulses to precocious sexual 
stimulation (155). As historians Arnold Rachman and Susan Klett have shown, Freud also 
parallels Ferenczi’s emphasis upon “real sexual experiences in childhood as causative in 
psychological disorders” (17). Another comparison with Ferenczi is that Freud emphasises 
the physicalized articulation of the trauma, with sensations “correspond[ing] to the sensory 
content of the infantile scenes” (“Hysteria” 214). Freud also described the asymmetrical 
character of incestuous rape, highlighting the grossly uneven distribution of power 
between the aggressor and the incestuously raped child (Fletcher 84).  
There are even similarities between Freud and Ferenczi’s description of the 
psychical processes triggered by asymmetrical incest, as Freud describes splits in the 
psyche caused by ideas that the ego is unable to process by conscious means (“Defence” 
46-47).4 Freud in the “Aetiology of Hysteria” paper describes “infantile sexual scenes” as 
resulting in “an incompatible idea setting in action a defence on the part of the ego and 
calling up a demand for repression” (210-211, emphasis in original). Difficulties arise, 
however, when this splitting proves incomplete or unsuccessful. I would suggest that it is 
here that the “hydraulic” Freudian model diverges from the “structural” model 
foregrounded by Ferenczi. Whereas Ferenczi is concerned with the organisation of discrete 
psychic fragments, Freud depicts the formation of channels for affective discharge.  
As Freud scholar Simon Boag has noted, Freud believed that an idea must possess a 
certain affective potency in order for it to become available to consciousness (15). Freud in 
“The Neuro-Psychoses of Defence” paper claims that if the initial splitting of consciousness 
is unsuccessful, then the power of the incompatible idea can be diminished by “robbing it 
of the affect-the sum of excitation- with which it is loaded” (48). As Boag observes, this 
weak idea is subsequently “incapable of becoming conscious” (15). In the case of hysteria, 
discharged excitation is directed into the soma, where it takes the form of a motor 
                                                          
4
 I will use the shortened form “Defence” to designate the 1894 paper, and “Further Remarks” to 
designate the paper published in 1896.  
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innervation or a sensory hallucination (“Defence” 49). Freud describes “a passive sexual 
experience before puberty” as “the specific aetiology of hysteria” (“Heredity” 152, emphasis 
in original).  
In the case of obsessional neurosis, the excitation stays within the psyche, but is 
transferred to another idea that “has certain relations to the incompatible idea which make 
it seem as though it could serve as a surrogate for it” (“Defence” 54). This idea then 
becomes an obsessional idea (52). Freud in the “Further Remarks” paper applies this 
concept of “compromise symptoms” to incest trauma (172), observing that 
what becomes conscious as obsessional ideas and affects, and take the 
place of the pathogenic memories so far as conscious life is concerned, are 
structures in the nature of a compromise between the repressed ideas and 
the repressing ones  . . . First, something contemporary is put in the place 
of something past; and secondly, something sexual is replaced by 
something analogous to it that is not sexual.  
(170, emphasis in original) 
These compromise symptoms, however, are ultimately felt to be unsatisfactory as a 
defence: “the ego seeks to fend off the derivatives of the initially repressed memory, and in 
this defensive struggle it creates symptoms which might be classed together as ‘secondary 
defence’” (172, emphasis in original). Chains of symptoms are thus formed that are 
traceable to the sexual trauma in early infancy (“Heredity” 151): “These cases . . . give one 
the impression of a displacement having occurred along a chain of inferences . . . as soon as 
the first link in the chain is repressed, the obsession jumps to the second or third link” 
(“Draft K” 93).   
As Freud scholar John Fletcher has observed, this model of affective discharge 
informs Freud’s chronology of incest trauma (79-80). Although Freud claimed that the child 
experiences revulsion and fright as an immediate result of the trauma (“Hysteria” 208), he 
50 
 
argued that they would not experience hysterical or obsessional symptoms until puberty 
(“Heredity” 154). This is because the child does not fully experience the significance of the 
events in early childhood until puberty brings a development in the “capacity of the sexual 
apparatus for reaction” (“Further Remarks” 167). This leads to the memory possessing “a 
far stronger excitatory effect than the experience did at the time it happened”, resulting in 
the need for affective discharge and repression (166-67). In Ferenczian theory, having been 
immediately fragmented by the incestuous rape, the child’s psyche defends itself not 
through the discharge of affect, but by providing structure for its fragmented psyche by 
operating on the psychic model of the aggressor. The primary reason, then, for selecting 
Ferenczi rather than Freud as an object of study is because this thesis is concerned with 
psychological models based upon the arrangement of discrete units, rather than models 
that describe symptoms linked through a requirement for hydraulic discharge. The 
psychoanalyst John Bowlby, whose work I discuss in subsequent chapters, explicitly 
rejected the model of “energy discharge” described by Freud (Attachment 14).  
Reich’s case history “Analysis of a Case of Brother-Sister Incest” (1932) presents an 
interesting comparison with Ferenczi’s account of incest trauma. Reich describes the case 
history of an analysand, Herta, who entered treatment after suffering “a severe anxiety 
neurosis” (1). The immediate cause of Herta’s symptoms appears to have been the death of 
her child, born as a result of symmetrical incest between Herta and her brother (2-4). Yet 
Reich also records that Herta was repeatedly subjected to asymmetrical incest traumas 
during childhood (5-6). Reich describes splits in the psyche occurring as a result of these 
traumas, but the split she describes is between “a reactive personality, created by guilt 
feelings, and a hidden, wild, instinctual personality” (16). I would therefore suggest that 
Reich in this paper is not describing a psychic fragmentation of the kind described by 
Ferenczi. Reich compares Herta’s violent behaviour towards her brothers with the 
behaviour of her violent and sexually aggressive father (19), yet unlike Ferenczi, Reich 
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regards these behaviours as “compensating for her many frustrations” rather than a means 
of restoring structure to a fragmented psyche (10).  
Also, despite Reich’s sympathetic description of the lack of passive tenderness in 
Herta’s childhood (4-5), Reich’s language would appear to attribute to Herta a degree of 
longing for asymmetrical incest:  “Herta’s anxiety arose mainly in situations which 
awakened the wish to be raped” (8); “Later on, Herta probably looked for such situations, 
but originally, it was her social situation that exposed her to such temptations” (6). A 
further reason I have for distancing myself from these Freudian and post-Freudian accounts 
of incest concerns their claim that the child experiences gratification from either the 
original sexual attack or its hysterical repetition.  
Historian Gerald Izenberg has drawn attention to Freud’s suggestion, 
communicated to Fleiss in December 1896, that the aim of the hysterical attack was to 
experience a species of pleasure retrospectively associated with the infantile experience: 
“the adult (or older child) . . . reproduced the memory of the seduction in order to relive 
the pleasurable contact with the beloved father” (Izenberg 37-38). As Izenberg notes, 
however, this established a conflict in the theory: “if symptoms were largely fantasies, that 
is, hallucinatory wish-fulfilments, the metapsychological model of the Project [for a 
Scientific Psychology] demanded that they have been preceded by prior experiences of 
gratification. And such childhood experiences in turn required a conception of infantile 
sexuality” (38).  
In 1907 Freud’s pupil Abraham published a paper entitled “The Experiencing of 
Sexual Traumas as a Form of Sexual Activity”, in which he claimed that children who suffer 
psychopathologies as a result of sexual trauma do so because they were desirous of sexual 
stimulation (53).  He argues that psychic disturbance arises from the guilt that the child 
subsequently suffers: “This fact of a pleasure-gain is the secret which the child guards so 
anxiously. It alone explains its sense of guilt and the psychological events which follow 
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upon a sexual trauma” (53). I hope to show in this chapter that this attribution of 
culpability to the child for either the original trauma or the psychopathologies it engenders 
is antithetic to the response that Eliot wishes to cultivate towards Gwendolen in Deronda. I 
therefore have two principle reasons for selecting Ferenczi as an object of study in this 
thesis, as opposed to the other theorists discussed in this section. The first is his emphasis 
upon the child’s desire for passive tenderness. The second and most significant reason I 
have for foregrounding Ferenczian theory in this thesis concerns its description of a psychic 




Although Gwendolen’s incestuous stepfather has no physical presence in the novel, having 
died some years before the commencement of the narrative, several critics have observed 
that the behaviour of Gwendolen’s husband, Mallinger Grandcourt, parallels his sexual 
aggression and assailing coercion: “The novel has fashioned this nightmare form out of two 
figures, stepfather and husband, the analogous and repetitive structure of whose lives 
makes them one continuing presence” (Wilt 314); “Grandcourt is a ‘reincarnation’ of the 
dead stepfather” (Herzog 42). This interpretation is commensurate with a Ferenczian 
reading of the text, as Ferenczi argued that complexes established by an archaic aggressor 
could subsequently be reawakened by other figures. This section seeks to elaborate upon 
this scholarship by illustrating that the physicalized representation of Gwendolen’s 
relationship with males who operate in the guise of the incestuous aggressor reveals the 
constituent elements of her trauma to be fragmentation and inflexibility.  
Paralleling Ferenczi’s chronology of incest trauma, during the early phases of their 
relation Grandcourt encourages Gwendolen to view him as an alternative caregiver: “I 
should like to have the right always to take care of you” (Eliot, Deronda 117). Yet Eliot 
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suggests that an inflexible pattern of relating has already been established: Gwendolen 
understands her situation regarding Grandcourt to be “like a dance set beforehand”, 
entirely predetermined (420). I want to show that the origin of this incestuous “dance” is 
visible in an exchange between Gwendolen and her mother. Mrs Davilow is described as 
“not indifferent to the display of her pet” (22), feeling a “tingle” of pleasure when 
Gwendolen presents to her the “attitude” with which she intends to please Grandcourt 
(85). Gwendolen readily recognises and gratifies her mother’s desire for eroticised display, 
indicating that she is accustomed to responding to pressure from caregivers to incorporate 
sexualised elements into her behaviour. This scene conflates a display towards a caregiver 
with a display that could be interpreted as directed towards a potential sexual partner, 
opening up a space in which, as Ferenczi observed, the child’s behaviour can be mistaken 
for adult sexual desire: Grandcourt interprets Gwendolen’s anxiety regarding his advances 
as “all coquetting” (121). Ferenczi asserted that the moment a child is exposed to the 
passion of their caregiver, “she is in effect made into a wife” (Diary 64). Similarly, an ill-
comprehended marriage is for Gwendolen is the tragic consequence of being exposed to 
the passion of her “caregivers”.  
Ferenczi claimed that owing to the fragmentation of the psyche, there was the 
potential for structural distortions caused by incest trauma to be manifested both 
physically and psychically: “at a loss of consciousness, changes in the shape of the body 
(being stretched strained, bent, compressed to the limit of physical elasticity) appear to be 
possible” (“Striving for Health” 230). This chapter aims to illustrate that a similar model of 
psychic distortion can be traced in Deronda, with internal fragmentation and inflexibility 
expressed through violent modification to physical structures. The images of physical 
shatter used by Gwendolen indicate a corresponding psychic fragmentation: “I must break 
my arm or my collar-bone. I must make something happen; unless you will go into 
Switzerland and take me up the Matterhorn” (Eliot, Deronda 9, emphasis added). Ferenczi 
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recorded that victims of incestuous rape frequently somatised their distress as feelings of 
physical compression, corresponding to the sensation of being crushed by the adult 
aggressor (Diary 6). This may explain why Gwendolen draws parallels between her psychic 
experiences and the shattering of bone.  
It is possible to perceive that Gwendolen’s fragmented psyche achieves a 
pathological type of structure through an incursion that extrudes it to a phallic point. One 
of Ferenczi’s analysands experienced the incursion of her aggressor’s psychic structure in 
the following terms: “a fantasy: a gigantic male genital penetrates her and smashes 
everything inside her” (66). As suggested by the fact that Gwendolen discusses the 
Matterhorn in the same breath as her internal fragmentation, it would appear that such 
violent restructuring can only be effected by shattering existing psychic structures.  
In a move that parallels the depiction of trauma in Ferenczian theory, Eliot depicts 
these processes as manifest in physical distortions to the body of the incest victim. It is my 
contention that the internal imposition of a phallic structure is traceable from the tips of 
Gwendolen’s “taper fingers” to the point of her nez retroussé (Eliot, Deronda 5, 8). More 
subtly, her close-fitting drapery- as Eliot reminds us, in defiance of the prevailing fashion 
for the crinoline- renders visible the corsetry of the 1860s Anna Silver has described as 
moulding the body into two conical shapes (Deronda 72; Silver 30). Again, this shaping is 
effected through compression by an external force, one which acts upon the structuring 
“bones” of Gwendolen’s psyche and soma.  
Mary Wilson Carpenter writes that “in the words of Lacan’s theory, she 
[Gwendolen] lives in the belief that she herself is the Phallus, for she is what her mother 
desires” (7, emphasis in original). I would argue, however, that Gwendolen’s phallic aspect 
derives from the internalisation of the idiom of a powerful male aggressor. Eliot associates 
this incursion of phallic structures with Grandcourt when he coerces Gwendolen to climb to 
the highest point of a knoll during one of their early encounters (Deronda 119). Earlier in 
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the novel it is regretted that Gwendolen’s home is not raised upon a knoll, a tacit 
acknowledgment that this would be more commensurate with her extruded internal 
structures (19). This restructuring of her psyche is contingent upon the psychic 
fragmentation that Grandcourt is able to engender: “[it] came back vividly, yet in 
fragments, all that she had gone through in relation to Grandcourt” (271, emphasis added). 
After reaching the highest point of the knoll Gwendolen stands “perfectly silent . . . like a 
statue”, an image that conveys the psychic inflexibility produced by his forcible 
restructuring of her shattered psyche (119).  
This material register of stone, of which the Matterhorn image is another example, 
resurfaces in an episode in which Gwendolen is assigned the part of Hermione as the statue 
in a Shakespearian tableau (53). At the very moment at which Gwendolen is signalled to 
transform from stone to flesh, part of the panelling of the room flies open to reveal a 
portrait of a “dead face and . . . fleeing figure” (54). Seeing this, “She looked like a statue 
into which a soul of Fear had entered . . . Gwendolen fell on her knees and put her hands 
before her face. She was still trembling” (54). Reimer claims that “the picture has released 
the memory of a childhood trauma” (45), whilst for Penner, it “insinuates that a memory, 
suppressed from both Gwendolen’s mind and, to an extent, Eliot’s text, lies at the root of 
her distress” (90).  
I would argue that what disturbs Gwendolen about this painting is the way in which 
it parallels the mechanics of her trauma. The fleeing figure can be interpreted as the 
remains of the child’s real (traumatised) self, violently tearing themselves from the scene in 
such a manner that the idiom (or face) of the aggressor comes to dominate the internal 
landscape. Ferenczi’s Diary indicates that the image of an “an evil, peering face” figures 
frequently in the testimony of incestuously raped analysands (22), with one individual 
describing “a man oppressing her with his face” (242). This interpretation lends support to 
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Matus’ claim that this image forms “part of Gwendolen’s psychic vocabulary, speaking for 
her in ways she cannot consciously articulate” (67). 
 The materiality of this scene has yet to be addressed in existing scholarship. 
Gwendolen here is a statue carved from the inside out by an alien “soul”, her statuesque 
rigidity corresponding to the inflexibility within her psyche. Carolyn Dever claims that whilst 
portraying Hermione Gwendolen is struck by the realisation that “wives and mothers are 
turned into statues . . . for the functional use of their husbands and children”: “the 
immediate effect of this revelation is to make Gwendolen into an actual statue” (166). It is 
my contention that situating the materiality of this episode in the context of Ferenczian 
theory can reveal the manner in which Eliot associates this statuesque inflexibility with 
violent shatter. Gwendolen appears to splinter- rather than her collapse being flaccid, she 
fragments into angular shards, knees and elbows protruding. This splintering stone 
emerges as the parallel of Gwendolen’s shattered bones: despite her “dread[ing] giving 
way”, there is no protection for her even in mineral hardness (Eliot, Deronda 246).  
I want to show that these images of fragmentation and inflexibility also reveal the 
psychic consequences of Gwendolen’s strategies to mitigate her trauma, strategies 
corresponding to those depicted in Ferenczi. Her defensive desire to anticipate a hostile or 
punitive reaction to her behaviour allows the aggressor’s idiom to restructure her psyche. 
As Annabel Herzog observes, “Gwendolen has no independent point of view . . . she 
answers according to what she ‘imagines’ or ‘interprets’ or ‘recalls’ or ‘wonders’ or 
‘speculates’ might seduce her interlocutor” (53). Gwendolen’s behaviour can be compared 
with that of the incestuously raped child described by Ferenczi, who attempts to “to divine 
each one of his [the aggressor’s] desires and gratify these” (“Confusion” 162):  
‘Am I altogether as you like?’  
. . . 
‘No.’, said Grandcourt.  
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. . . 
‘Oh, mercy!’ she exclaimed, the pause lasting until she could bear it no 
longer. ‘How am I to alter myself?’ (Eliot, Deronda 397) 
Paralleling the behaviour of the incestuously traumatised child, Gwendolen’s cognitive-
behavioural restructuring (“alter myself”) is a defensive reaction: she alters herself because 
she can “bear it no longer”. Gwendolen realises that whatever the outcome of such a 
question, “Her husband would have power to compel her” (561).  
 As Ferenczi observes, this defensive strategy is associated with a defence in which 
the child internalises the aggressor’s idiom. Citing Gwendolen’s tendency to behave in a 
similar manner to the “unscrupulous male” (Eliot, Deronda 36), Wilt identifies Gwendolen’s 
“solution to the problem of powerlessness before the primal man in her life” as “not only 
to surrender, to evade, but more tragically, to imitate him” (327-28). Wilt, however, 
represents this as an “additional basis for rage and self-loathing” rather than a direct 
consequence of incestuous rape (327). Eliot throughout the novel emphasises similarities in 
the demeanour and appearance of Grandcourt and Gwendolen (Deronda 291, 503): in the 
early stages of their relationship, Gwendolen observes prophetically that “We shall match 
each other” (287). This causes a further splintering of the parts of her psyche associated 
with the painful reality of her experiences: “she would match her husband in ignoring any 
ground for excitement” (560, emphasis added). To ensure that the reader understands the 
thrust of this declaration, Eliot compares this “excitement” to psychic and physical agonies: 
“strong excitement, which will sometimes come even from pain” (326).  
As a result of the testimony of his analysands, Ferenczi situates the physicality of 
incest trauma in a number of material registers. Sometimes it is experienced as shatter 
comparable to that of splintering bone, and at other times it is compared with a tear in a 
continuous surface, such as fabric or skin. Psychic fragmentation in Deronda is also 
compared with tears in fabric and skin, images which allow Eliot to elaborate her 
58 
 
representation of trauma in the novel by articulating the scarification of psychic fragments. 
One of Gwendolen’s earliest memories is a desire to “rescue drowning insects and watch 
their recovery”, delighting in the possibilities of wing-repair (20). Because all membranes 
were once termed hymens (Blank 44), even the wings of insects (Derrida 165), 
Gwendolen’s interest in such healing can be interpreted as a reparative image of her 
delicate hymen, damaged in another form of structural attack. It was claimed that hymens 
had a remarkable capacity to heal from trauma: physician William Cummin wrote in 1836 
that “it is generally known the sexual parts have an amazing facility in throwing off, after a 
time, the semblance of lesions” (326). I would suggest that the physicality of Gwendolen’s 
psychic experiencing is intimated to be the result of real physical attacks. This would 
appear to offer another comparison between Eliot’s depiction of psychic trauma and the 
portrayal of incest trauma in Ferenczi.  
Gwendolen is described in the novel as resembling a Nereid or Lamia (7, 8). Reimer, 
referring to the mythological “snake-temptress who uses her sexuality to lure men to their 
downfall”, writes that this image signifies the role of the “desirable woman . . . she 
[Gwendolen] inherited as a child” (37). I would suggest that these images attribute to 
Gwendolen a toughened skin: watching her, one observer notes that “she has got herself 
up as a sort of serpent” (Eliot, Deronda 8). As Steven Connor notes, there are imaginative 
correspondences between scaled and scarred skin. He observes that tattoos frequently 
“display images of reptiles, shields or metal to suggest a kind of cicatrisation, a toughening 
through the ordeal of exposure” (63). A similar dynamic can be traced in Deronda: as a 
result of her internal cicatrisation, Gwendolen develops a psychic carapace that can be 
sensed by other characters.  
Referencing the work of Michael Serres, Connor illustrates that skin possesses a 
corresponding “physics of the imagination” to textiles (40, 47). I want to show that the 
“physics of the imagination” that Eliot ascribes to textiles in this novel is the physicality of 
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cicatrized skin. Gwendolen develops a sudden interest in needlework after her engagement 
to Grandcourt, perhaps seeking comfort in the reintegration-through-incursion this 
dramatizes (Eliot, Deronda 299). In a similar manner to how scar tissue “stitches” together 
points at which incursions have been made in the body, Gwendolen’s stitching thickens and 
stiffens the surface of the cloth at the point at which it has been penetrated. 
This depiction of Gwendolen’s auto-scarification corresponds to the psychic “scars 
of shocks” described by Ferenczi. Gwendolen is described as possessing a “hidden wound”, 
a phrase which has been interpreted as alluding to psychic injuries caused by incest 
(Reimer 36; Penner 90-91). What has been overlooked, however, is the extent to which this 
wounding is “hidden” by the process of forming a psychic crust or seal over the wounded 
fragment. Gwendolen is described as seeking a “hardening effect . . . that would make her 
indifferent to her miseries” (Eliot, Deronda 394).  This quote suggests that this encrustation 
of Gwendolen’s trauma is intended to diminish its felt intensity: as Connor writes, “The 
armoured skin is anaesthetised” (54).  
Eliot also indicates that this psycho-physical hardening is in Gwendolen’s case 
seized upon as a protection against sexual attack: the advances of one of her suitors are 
described as making her “curl up and harden like a sea-anemone” (Eliot, Deronda 73). 
Reimer writes that “an obvious sign of Gwendolen’s early sexual abuse is her violent 
reaction to a man’s touch”, but she makes no allusion to the specific material registers 
surrounding this rejection of tactility (41). Wilt observes that Gwendolen reacts to being 
touched by “trying to turn herself to stone”, but an absence of evidence prevents this 
assertion from developing into a serious commentary upon the text (329-30).  
As both Reimer and Penner have noted, Gwendolen attempts to articulate her 
painful experiences to her mother through vague references such as “Why did you marry 
again, mamma?” (Eliot, Deronda 20; Reimer 38, 40; Penner 90): “These scenes dance 
painfully around the issue of abuse” (Reimer 40). Her mother’s distress at such questions 
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ensures that such “collisions” are avoided whenever possible: “Not that the collisions had 
often been repeated at the same point; for in the memory of both they left an association 
of dread” (Eliot, Deronda 87). Penner identifies this “inability to ask questions” as a factor 
contributing to Gwendolen’s “psychic repression” (90). This chapter is intended to show 
that attending to the physicality of various encounters in Deronda can enable us to 
determine their psychic significance with greater precision. Unable to make contact with 
these sites of “collision” and shatter, Gwendolen effectively establishes a cicatrized “seal” 
by avoiding contact with the sensitive point: Gwendolen’s mother laments to her that “You 
have no feeling, child”, a “no feeling” that is depicted as both psychic and cutaneous (Eliot, 
Deronda 20). This can be compared with the statement of one of Ferenczi’s analysands that 
“I know that there is a pain there, but I cannot feel it” (Diary 23).  
There is evidence of a similar defence being deployed in Gwendolen’s relationship 
with Grandcourt. With his lips and fingers searching out her intimate crevices, Gwendolen 
reacts by violently severing herself from the experience. This separation is depicted as both 
cutaneous and psychic: “he [Grandcourt] had kissed not her cheek but her neck a little 
below her ear; and Gwendolen . . . started up with a marked agitation” (Eliot, Deronda 
299). This defence can be observed several times in the novel: “holding the garment close 
to Gwendolen, he said ‘Pray, permit me?’ But she, wheeling away from him . . . glided onto 
the ottoman” (108).  
If this line of defence is obstructed, Gwendolen employs a skin-defence that 
parallels the mechanics of her archaic trauma. Unable to deflect Grandcourt’s touch any 
longer, she subsumes herself in such “febrile . . . excitement” that when “her husband . . .  
for the first time kissed her on the lips, she hardly knew of it” (328, 329). Gwendolen’s 
reaction can be compared with Ferenczi’s description of “a child whose self-defence is 
paralysed by fright . . . so sensitive to the emotional impulses of the person it fears that it 
feels the passion of the aggressor as its own” (Diary 91). Gwendolen identifies so 
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completely with Grandcourt’s sexual excitation that she is able to circumvent the 
perception of an external stimulus. However, this lack of differentiated sensation only 
underscores the fragmentation occurring within her psyche: when Grandcourt touches her 
for the first time in an overtly sexual manner, her psychic defences mean that she “hardly 
kn[ows] of it”. I want to suggest that the complexity of skin-sensation in Deronda can reveal 
the manner in which Gwendolen severs psychically from painful fragments of her 
experience through identification with the aggressor.  
The Lamia and Nereid images provide a further indication that a “grafting on” of 
the aggressor’s idiom and sensations forms part of Gwendolen’s psychic experience. Hers is 
a hybrid psyche in which at least two distinct idioms have been joined together, a state 
expressed through the image of a contiguous skin: Gwendolen understands herself to 
possess a kind of “centaur-power” (Eliot, Deronda 63). Gwendolen tentatively articulates 
the damage to the integrity of her own idiom that this has caused when she states “I was 
like two creatures- I could not speak” (574, emphasis added). This image of a continuous 
skin is invoked in relation to Grandcourt: one of the onlookers at Gwendolen’s wedding 
comments that the similarity in the appearance of their skins makes the “match . . . the 
more complete” (325). Gwendolen also dreams her future husband with the “extraordinary 
face of a magnified insect” (86), and Grandcourt is described as a “handsome lizard” and 
“serpent” (122, 626). Reimer claims that these images are intended to “kee[p] before the 
reader the realm of brute sexuality” (40), but their significance appears to me to be more 
subtle. The hardened or scaled skin evoked by these images indicates that the hardened 
carapace that putatively defends Gwendolen corresponds to the perceived materiality of 
the aggressor.  
Eliot emphasises that Gwendolen’s appearance as “Nereid” is heightened by her 
garments (Deronda 7). Reinforcing the effects of the drapery that reveals her psychic 
moulding and suggests the presence of toughened skin, the fabric veils she wears cause her 
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silhouette to resemble the phallus (566). These parallels in her experience of textile and 
skin are again invoked when Eliot observes that the “meshes” that entrap Gwendolen are 
“woven within more closely than without” (622). Gwendolen realises to “insist on 
separation” from Grandcourt would be as impossible as giving him a “pliant disposition” 
(561). It appears that the elements of Grandcourt’s idiom are too enmeshed with her own 
to tease them apart, their psychic components too “closely” interwoven to “insist on 
separation”. This does not produce a supple psychic fabric, but a mesh, suggesting 
something far more inflexible. Although Grandcourt has an adamantine will, I would argue 
that it is Gwendolen’s internalisation of his idiom that ultimately cannot be given a “pliant 
disposition”: as Eliot emphasises, these are meshes that are woven more closely within 
than without.   
 
Educating Gwendolen  
 
A key purpose of this chapter is to focus attention upon the pathological fragmentation and 
inflexibility generated by incestuous pedagogy in Deronda. It is my contention that Eliot’s 
representation of pedagogy in this novel can be situated within the context of a wider 
critique of educative methods at mid-century, as illustrated by this passage written by 
Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), a close friend of Eliot:  
What with perceptions unnaturally dulled by early thwarting, and a 
coerced attention to books—what with the mental confusion produced by 
teaching subjects before they can be understood, . . . what with making the 
pupil a mere passive recipient of other's ideas, and not in the least leading 
him to be an active inquirer or self-instructor . . . there are very few minds 
that become as efficient as they might be. (30)  
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Written in 1859, this parallels key elements of Ferenczi’s description of incestuous 
pedagogies. Spencer critiques a forcible education into adult knowledge, one which it is 
beyond the capacity of the child to process. This in turn precipitates a “mental confusion” 
that makes the child the “mere passive recipient of other’s ideas”. This chapter argues that 
where Eliot extends the critique of her contemporaries- and displays similarities with the 
complexity of Ferenczi’s thought- is by drawing comparisons between the psychic effects of 
punitive pedagogy and those of incestuous rape.  
I want to illustrate that the pathological consequences of incestuous pedagogies 
are depicted in the episode in which Gwendolen seeks assistance from the pianist-maestro 
Herr Klesmer. Wishing to support herself through a career as a professional singer and 
actress, she entreats Klesmer to assist her by means of a specifically pedagogical 
intervention: “I could be better taught; I could study” (Eliot, Deronda 234). As Penner has 
observed, this desire to go on the stage is intended to circumvent exposure to the kind of 
pathological relationships that have marred Gwendolen’s psychic history: “If she can 
become a successful actress, she will never have to live with someone she does not like” 
(91). 
By this stage in the novel Klesmer has already apprised Gwendolen of the defects 
of her previous education: “you have not been well taught” (Eliot, Deronda 42). He 
observes that she has not been trained to exert adequate agency over her own mind and 
body: “Singing and acting . . . require a shaping of the organs towards a finer and finer 
certainty of effect” (238). The implication is that Gwendolen’s internal “organs” are 
somehow misshapen, paralleling both the mutilation of Gwendolen’s immature psyche and 
the damage to her immature genital organs. As a result, she lacks one of the “choice 
organisations- natures framed . . . to endure” (236).  
It transpires that in Gwendolen’s case, an education in achieving such an internal 
organisation would entail subjecting herself to a rigid pedagogical regime:  “I will tell you 
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the steps . . . that will be forced upon you . . . you must subdue your mind and body to 
unbroken discipline. Your mind, I say” (237, emphasis added).  The “unbroken discipline” 
Klesmer prescribes consists of the forcible imposition of an inflexible structure upon 
Gwendolen’s “mind and body”, paralleling her entreaty for guidance as to how she must 
“alter herself”: “Your mind, I say”. In an image that can be compared with Ferenczi’s 
description of the psyche of a victim of incestuous rape as a “too precisely- regulated 
mechanism”, Klesmer tells her that the aim of this pedagogical regime is to enable her to 
“go like a watch” (238). This machinelike precision corresponds to Gwendolen’s mechanical 
performance in the role of “Mrs Grandcourt”: “it was remarked that she carried herself 
with a wonderful air . . . It would by-and-by become a sort of skill in which she was 
automatically practiced” (411). 
I want to suggest that Eliot underscores correspondences between incestuous rape 
and incestuous pedagogy by according them a similar materiality. Eliot in this episode 
therefore employs a similar representational strategy to Ferenczi. Gwendolen compares 
the sensation of Klesmer’s teaching to that of a “lacerating thong”, the psychic 
fragmentation that he engenders visualised as incisions into her skin (244). 
Correspondingly, Gwendolen’s recollections of the encounter are fragmentary: 
“mortifications- people no longer feigning not to see your blunders- glaring insignificance” 
(244). Gwendolen is intent upon violently detaching from these “pain fragments”. When 
Gwendolen’s mother questions her about what has transpired between her and Klesmer, 
she replies that “There is really nothing to tell now” (245); “Mamma, don’t speak to me . . . 
Help me to be quiet” (245-46). I would suggest that this silencing is comparable to her 
tactic of physically severing from painful fragments of her psyche: these entreaties to 
silence are accompanied by Gwendolen “biting her inner lip” (245).  
65 
 
I want to show that Klesmer’s pedagogy also generates psychic fragmentation as a 
result of its similarity to another pathological consequence of incest trauma, the child’s loss 
of faith in “the testimony of its own senses”:   
Herr Klesmer played a composition of his own . . . it gradually turned her 
inward sob of mortification into an excitement which lifted her for the 
moment into a desperate indifference about her own doings, or at least a 
determination to get a superiority over them by laughing at them as if they 
belonged to somebody else. (43)  
Klesmer’s composition is played as a didactic-corrective example to overwrite Gwendolen’s 
own vocal idiom, which he represents to her as “faulty”. This is a judgment for which she is 
entirely unprepared: “Her song, determined on beforehand, was a favourite aria . . . she 
felt quite sure of herself” (42). Paralleling the case of the incestuously raped child, 
Klesmer’s pedagogy warps the testimony of Gwendolen’s senses as she is forced to affirm 
that what she feels to be “bad” is in fact “good”, and vice versa. In the case of incestuous 
rape the child is made to believe that sexual passion, which the child instinctively 
understands to be bad, is in fact desirable, thus undermining its confidence in the 
testimony of its senses (Diary 16). This confusion is heightened when this behaviour is 
subsequently identified as requiring punitive control. Gwendolen is punished in order to 
teach her the undesirability of behaviours that she had been led to believe would coerce 
attention from potential caregivers. Klesmer’s pedagogy can therefore be regarded as 
corresponding to the pattern established by Gwendolen’s experiences of incest trauma. 
Gwendolen reacts to Klesmer’s pedagogy with a “desperate indifference about her 
own doings, or at least a determination to get a superiority over them by laughing at them 
if they belonged to somebody else” (Eliot, Deronda 43, emphasis added). It would appear 
that Klesmer’s pedagogy triggers a defensive fragmentation similar to that experienced by 
the incestuously raped child described by Ferenczi: “the mechanism of projection . . . is also 
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represented in the displacement of the events from herself onto ‘a girl’” (Ferenczi, 
“Revision” 242).   
In the previous section it was argued that Gwendolen not only attempts to mitigate 
the shock of incestuous rape through psychic fragmentation, but also by internalising the 
idiom of the aggressor. When Klesmer plays one of his compositions, he does so by 
“send[ing] a nerve-thrill though ivory key and wooden hammer . . . compel[ling] the strings 
to make a quivering lingering speech for him” (Eliot, Deronda 43, emphasis added). As a 
result of Klesmer’s pedagogy, Gwendolen is compelled to function as another instrument 
that can “make a . . . speech for him”. When she is complimented on her singing, she 
responds by admonishing her interlocutor in a similar manner to how she was admonished 
by Klesmer: she claims that they only admire her singing because they “are in a puerile 
state of culture, and have no breadth of horizon” (43). This can be regarded as another 
instance in which pedagogical methods generate an effect similar to that of the incestuous 
aggressor. Grandcourt is described as having “wonderful little tongue. Everything must be 
done dummy-like without his ordering” (326, emphasis added). The manner in which 
Klesmer speaks through the dual instruments of Gwendolen and the piano can be 
compared with the manner in which the incestuous aggressor ventriloquizes their idiom 
through their victim.  
Ferenczi claimed that another obstacle to meaningful learning encountered by the 
incestuously traumatised child was a difficulty in maintaining object relationships. For 
instance, Ferenczi records an incestuously raped analysand unable to finish a book (Diary 
123). The idiom of the aggressor fills the psyche so completely that nothing further can 
enter to modify the structure (48). Ferenczi suggested that this psychic experience lends 
itself to parallels with a physical sense of being “filled up”: “with a colossal effort the 
‘intelligence’ swallows the whole hostile power . . . his person consists of a devoured, over-
great (fat) aggressor and a much smaller, weaker person, oppressed and dominated” 
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(“Fantasies” 228). Ferenczi observed that this “colossal . . .  swallow[ing]” would be re-
enacted in later life through pathological overeating (228). It is my contention that Eliot 
articulates a similar sense of being “filled up” by the idiom of the aggressor by emphasising 
Gwendolen’s reluctance to eat after her marriage to Grandcourt. Whenever Gwendolen is 
depicted at table she is either mounting a symbolic structural attack upon the aggressor’s 
projections by macerating her food, or attempting to use food as a screen against further 
physical or psychic incursion (Eliot, Deronda 304): “she turned her eyes away from his 
[Grandcourt’s], and lifting a prawn before her, looked at the boiled ingeniousness of its 
eyes as preferable to the lizard’s . . . having devoured her mortification” (546-47).  
These pathologies are manifested in Gwendolen’s abortive attempts at self-
education. It appears difficult for her to find space for the additional object-relations 
necessary for learning: she is consistently torn away from attempts at independent study 
by Grandcourt’s intrusive and inflexibly unnegotiable demands (509). Similarly, Gwendolen 
finds the books she wishes to study to be “unreadable” (508), a fulfilment of Klesmer’s 
prophecy that “You would find . . . great difficulties in study” (240). These failures in self-
education lead Gwendolen to wish that she could write a book for herself to read, a 
statement which communicates her difficulties in absorbing additional psychic material 
(39). It would appear that Gwendolen is able to accommodate Grandcourt because he 
occupies a similar psychic space as the previous aggressor: “before meeting him, 
Gwendolen imagines Grandcourt as someone ‘she has seen already’” (Herzog 39).  
Ferenczi claimed that subsequent violations would correspond to the pattern of 
trauma established by the archaic incestuous rape. Similarly, Gwendolen’s adult 
experiences of education correspond to patterns established in childhood: “In the 
schoolroom her quick mind had taken readily that strong starch of unexplained rules and 
disconnected facts” (Eliot, Deronda 34, emphasis added). The “disconnected facts” and 
“unexplained rules” that are forced into her developing mind can be compared with the 
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psychic fragmentation caused by incestuous rape. In an image similar to those which depict 
Gwendolen’s toughened skin, this education has also caused the natural flexibility of 
Gwendolen’s psyche to become artificially rigid. This section has sought to illustrate that 
Eliot in Deronda portrays a similar dynamic to that described in Ferenczi, in which 
incestuous pedagogies generate psychopathologies of fragmentation and inflexibility 




This section seeks to illustrate that an awareness of correspondences between 
psychopathologies of incestuous rape and incestuous pedagogy in Gwendolen’s narrative 
can reveal the incestuous strands in Daniel’s history. As far as I am aware, this depiction of 
Daniel as an incestuously traumatised subject has not been addressed in existing 
scholarship. This section is designed to show that a comparison of the ways in which 
Deronda’s protagonists have been damaged by incest trauma can advance our 
understanding of the representation of trauma in this novel. 
 As Herzog has noted, Daniel’s earliest memory parallels the loss of his mother with 
the loss of his foreskin through circumcision (45): “Daniel . . . had a dim sense of being 
kissed very much, and wrapped in thin, cloudy, scented drapery, till his fingers caught in 
something hard, which hurt him” (Eliot, Deronda 150). I agree with Herzog that Daniel’s 
circumcision is both essential to the novel’s plot and closely related to Gwendolen’s 
narrative (37). Yet whereas Herzog sees Daniel’s circumcision and Gwendolen’s “hidden 
wound” as wounds traceable to patriarchal culture (47-48), this chapter seeks to compare 
these wounds with the damage caused by incestuous rape and incestuous pedagogy. It 
transpires that Daniel’s mother insisted on their separation so that he could be educated to 
become an English gentleman (Eliot, Deronda 585). I want to show that this archaic trauma- 
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a trauma with a pedagogical rationale- is depicted as generating psychopathologies similar 
to those I have argued are experienced by Gwendolen as a result of incestuous rape.  
It would appear to be the case that the physical injury to Daniel’s body corresponds 
to his psychic suffering. In an image that once again compares textile with skin, these 
maternal touches that enfold like drapery are torn away at the same time as another piece 
of delicate tissu(e). Ferenczi claimed that a child’s psyche, being “barely consolidated, does 
not have the capacity to exist . . . without being supported on all sides . . . without this 
support the psychic and organic mechanisms diverge, explode” (Diary 210, emphasis 
added). These correspondences between the tear made in his body and the tearing from 
his caregiver generate a psychic fragmentation that is paralleled in the immemorial quality 
of his wound, expressed through its various figurations in the novel as a bitten “finger” 
(Eliot, Deronda 349), a “deformed foot doubtfully hidden by the shoe” (160), and a 
“maimed . . . limb” (155). K.M. Newton has identified the “deformed foot” and “maimed 
limb” images as ciphers for Daniel’s trauma, but he does not elaborate further upon their 
materiality or psychic significance (324-25).  
I would suggest that by comparing the material expression of Daniel and 
Gwendolen’s trauma, Eliot highlights similarities in their psychic experiencing. Gwendolen’s 
fantasies of shattered limbs and collarbones can be compared with Daniel’s fantasies of 
shattered bones and crushed fingers. The image of the “deformed foot doubtfully hidden 
by the shoe” indicates that Daniel visualises these wounded fragments of his selfhood 
protected by cicatrized, leathery skins. Gwendolen’s narrative indicates that the purpose of 
this cicatrisation is to diminish the intensity with which wounds are felt. As I have argued is 
often the case in this novel, this psychic experiencing can be traced to physical sensation: 
Daniel’s desensitised “skin” in this image corresponds to a belief, widespread in the 




There is evidence that Daniel’s imagination of his wounding encompasses a sense 
of the isolated, traumatised fragment of the self being simultaneously “me” and “not-me”, 
a state described by Ferenczi’s analysands: “looking at myself, or someone who resembles 
me from the outside”. Daniel feels “the injury done him as the maimed boy feels the 
crushed limb” (Eliot, Deronda 155). He also describes “a grief within, which might be 
compared in some ways with Byron’s susceptibility about his deformed foot” (158, 
emphasis added). Daniel experiences his wound as belonging to his body- “the injury done 
him”- and simultaneously displaced onto the body of another, with the image of the 
maimed boy with a damaged “limb” particularly suggestive in this context. This 
displacement highlights similarities between the psychic effects of Daniel’s pedagogical 
experiences and the psychic fragmentation suffered by Gwendolen as a result of her 
attempt to mitigate the trauma of Klesmer’s incestuous pedagogy by regarding “her doings 
as if they belonged to someone else”.  
One possible explanation for the displacement of this wounding is that it 
represents an attempt to relieve the agony of “pain fragments” associated with the archaic 
trauma: “Pain . . . is relatively pain-relieving, when its location is displaced to a morally less 
significant and obviously unreal part of the body” (Ferenczi, Diary 23). Yet this 
displacement and cicatrisation is also a strategy for concealment, with Daniel fearing the 
exposure of this “doubtfully hidden” wound. His shifting sense of his trauma having 
alighted on a fear of illegitimacy, Daniel assents to the offer of a public school education in 
order to excise these tainted parts of his selfhood: “I should like to be a gentleman . . . and 
go to school, if that is what a gentleman’s son must do” (Eliot, Deronda 157). This decision 
can be regarded as commensurate with a desire for psychic cicatrisation, as the belief that 
public schooling “toughened” boys up in a similar manner to the cicatrisation of skin after 
exposure was pervasive in this period (Shrimpton 12): “This is the plea put in by some for 
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the rough treatment experienced by boys at our public schools . . . they are introduced to a 
miniature world whose hardships prepare them for those of the real world” (Spencer 111).  
Daniel is disgusted at Sir Hugo’s suggestion that he might become a public singer, 
as this reference to the profession of his mother raises the spectre of his illegitimacy (Eliot, 
Deronda 153-54). Instead of developing his own (vocal) idiom, Daniel provides scaffolding 
for his fragmented psyche by imposing upon it an inflexible comprehension of “what a 
gentleman’s son must do”. It appears that what a “gentleman’s son must do” is risk 
subjecting themselves to the rigid and externally imposed regime of public school 
discipline: Spencer wrote in 1859 that “the discipline which boys meet with at Eton, 
Winchester, Harrow, &c., is much worse than that of adult life- much more unjust, cruel, 
brutal . . . accustoming boys to a despotic form of government” (111). 
 This “despotic form of government” corresponds to the type of incestuous 
pedagogies that Ferenczi regarded as generating psychopathologies similar to those caused 
by incest trauma. As is the case with the incestuously raped Gwendolen, Daniel’s psychic 
defences cause him to exchange psychic fragmentation for psychic inflexibility, his reliance 
on inflexible external regulation reinforcing the effect of his cutaneous “toughening up”. 
When Daniel finally meets his mother, Leonora, she tells him that they separated so that he 
could be taught how to be an English gentleman (Eliot, Deronda 585). Daniel is incensed at 
hearing this, failing to see how he has enacted similar pedagogical traumas. A further 
comparison with Gwendolen’s history is Daniel’s discovery that incest trauma creates an 
inflexible psychic structure that engenders a series of corresponding traumas.  
I want to show that Daniel’s auto-traumatisation highlights another aspect of 
Eliot’s culture: the use of familial fragmentation as a pedagogical method. During the 
nineteenth century, circumcision gained widespread acceptance in the medical 
establishment as a “cure” for masturbation (Darby 296-99). Yet, as Daniel’s archaic trauma 
implies, the severing of sensitive and intimately connected skins as a means of disciplining 
72 
 
bodily and psychic life was not only reserved for the foreskin. Parental separation was 
regarded as part of the “toughening-up process”: “a ‘wholesome neglect’ was assumed to 
foster self-reliance” (Shrimpton 12). Yet Spencer felt that this- in concert with the harsh 
discipline in schools- only fitted children for “intercourse regulated by brute force” (111), 
an effect comparable to the damage caused by “barbarous parents” and “the barbarous 
methods which such parents spontaneously employ”  (117). 
In addition to forcing pupils to suffer this “wholesome” neglect, nineteenth-century 
public schools also had a reputation for producing devastating examples of asymmetry, 
with older pupils able to expose younger children to a form of verbal incest through 
pornography and threats of sexual contact, or to intimidate them into actual sexual acts. 
Incestuous rape by adult educators was also not unheard of. This was the case in boarding 
schools for both sexes (Upchurch 56; Delamont and Duffin 136). This suggests that 
nineteenth-century schooling paralleled the mechanics of Ferenczian incest trauma by 
combining separation from the tenderness of caregivers with asymmetrical incest trauma. 
It is my contention that the amputations from her mother that Gwendolen endures 
in the service of “education” leave her vulnerable to retraumatisation. In the midst of her 
childhood Gwendolen is sent away to a “showy school, where on all occasions of display 
she had been put foremost” (Eliot, Deronda 19). Gwendolen thus learns to conform both 
physically and psychically to these lessons in eliciting adult approval through eroticised 
display. Later, the idea of being sent away to school, this time as a schoolmistress, 
reawakens painful memories: “‘You might not have a bedroom to yourself.’ Gwendolen’s 
memories of school suggested other particulars which forced her to admit to herself that 
this alternative would be no relief” (251). The euphemistic vagueness of “other particulars” 
suggests that Gwendolen has experienced traumas comparable to incestuous rape during 
these periods of separation. It would seem from this quote that the nineteenth-century 
practice of separating upper- and middle-class children from their families in order to 
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submit them to punitive educational regimes was felt by Eliot not only to be devastating, 
but incestuous.  
This chapter has sought to illustrate that Gwendolen suffers the consequences of 
incestuous pedagogies into adulthood. Similarly, the potential for pedagogical incest 
resurfaces for Daniel in his relationship with Mordecai Cohen, his instructor in the Jewish 
religion. In a similar manner to how Daniel’s archaic trauma is displaced onto the figure of a 
“maimed boy”, the incestuous character of Mordecai’s teaching is demonstrated by his 
relationship with Jacob. This is a young child to whom Mordecai fulfils a pedagogical and 
quasi-paternal role, “the teacher’s fatherhood” (443): “he had given Jacob his first lessons” 
(443). Mordecai is depicted forcefully dictating to the child, whilst “he stood trembling with 
a sense that the house was tumbling in and they were not going to have dinner any more” 
(446). Jacob instinctively understands this teaching to be performing a type of structural 
fragmentation: “the house was tumbling in”. Mordecai’s description of his teaching of 
Jacob as “a kind of printing” indicates that this internal fragmentation could be 
accompanied by the permanent structural imposition of his idiom (444): “the boy will get 
them [Mordecai’s words] engraved within him”; “My words may rule him someday” (444, 
emphasis added). This physicalized understanding of the pedagogical role as “printing” or 
“engraving” can be compared with Ferenczi’s disgust at forms of education whose aim is to 
“to stamp upon . . . plastic minds our own rigid rules as something externally imprinted”. 
Amanda Anderson has observed how the kind of spiritual imprinting that Mordecai 
desires to perform upon Daniel is characterised by a “disregard for his informed consent” 
(50). Similarly, Adela Pinch describes Mordecai’s relation to Daniel as “a form of thought-
transfer, or file-sharing”, in which Mordecai’s thinking operates as “a form of ‘coercive’ 
action” (146). Referencing Anderson’s work, Pinch writes that “the transparent ‘mind-meld’ 
between Daniel and Mordecai . . . is not truly held up as an ideal by George Eliot” (147). 
Interpreting this “mind-meld” as symptomatic of incestuous pedagogies offers a rationale 
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as to why Eliot depicts such “thought-transfer” negatively, and why it is associated with 
“‘coercive’ action”.  
Although Pinch claims that Gwendolen desires this kind of thought transfer as a 
result of an infantile wish to be passively read (147), this chapter has sought to illustrate 
that it is rather that Gwendolen finds this kind of thought-transfer irresistible as a result of 
her traumatic history. It has also argued that Eliot highlights parallels between the psychic 
consequences of incestuous rape and those of incestuous pedagogy by attributing to these 
experiences a comparable materiality. In similar manner to how Grandcourt’s hold upon 
Gwendolen is registered through the corresponding pallor of their skin, when Mordecai 
adopts the “grasp and speech which assume to dominate” (Eliot, Deronda 469), the 
appearance of the emphatically “pink” Daniel becomes similar to that of his teacher: 
“Deronda had become as pallid as Mordecai” (466).  
I want to show that Daniel’s mother Leonora provides him with the most painful 
cautionary tale about the dangers of incestuous education.  She recalls how her father, 
punitive in his moral pedagogy, sought to establish in her a complete identification with his 
structures of belief: “he only thought of fettering me into obedience . . . I was to feel 
everything I did not feel” (587). Leonora’s father engineers a system of didactic commands 
and prohibitions similar to the pedagogical framework that threatened to “subdue” 
Gwendolen’s “mind and body to unbroken discipline”: “Teaching, teaching for everlasting- 
‘this you must be’, ‘that you must not be’” (588, emphasis added). Through this inflexible 
pedagogical regime Leonora’s father effects an imposition of his idiom similar to that which 
Ferenczi associated with incest trauma: “I was to feel everything I did not feel”.  
This pedagogy possesses a physicality that makes it comparable to depictions of 
incest trauma in the novel. Leonora experiences his teaching as tantamount to being 
“fetter[ed] into obedience”: “my father’s strictness . . . pressed on me like a frame that got 
tighter and tighter as I grew” (588). The violent crushing of Leonora’s psyche emerges as 
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the parallel of Daniel’s imaginatively displaced wound, corresponding to the “damaged 
foot” produced by his experiences of incestuous pedagogy: “To have a pattern cut out . . . a 
woman’s heart must be of such a size and no larger, or else it must be pressed small, like 
Chinese feet” (588). The parallel that Leonora draws between the obstruction of her 
psychic development and the crushing of bone can also be compared with the pressure 
that Gwendolen feels to break her arm or collarbone, an internal fragmentation similar to 
that generated by incestuous rape.  
As this chapter has argued is the case for Gwendolen, this “crushing” of Leonora’s 
idiom can be interpreted as paralleling the physical crushing by the adult aggressor: the 
pedagogical system devised by Leonora’s father enables him to “throw all the weight of his 
will” upon her (589). In a similar manner to how Gwendolen’s internal shatter is bound by 
her corset, these fragments of bone are subsequently contained by an artificially rigid, 
superimposed fabric “skin”. I would suggest that this image offers additional confirmation 
that Eliot understood fragmentation and inflexibility to work in concert to generate the 
totality of psychic trauma caused by incest.  
The image of the bound foot is also a reminder that this artificial remoulding 
cripples the sufferer, preventing them from achieving subsequent independence. Leonora 
is prevented from achieving independence through an incestuous binding to her father’s 
idiom as wife and daughter: “such men turn their wives and daughters into slaves” (589). 
Even when superficially liberated from her father after his death, Leonora continues to 
carry the taint of his incestuous education. A recurring motif in the novel represents the 
destruction of an individual’s idiom as the suppression of their singing voice. Leonora’s 
unique voice inevitably fails her, and in its place comes the idiom of the aggressor:  
I have after all been the instrument my father wanted. - ‘I desire a 
grandson who shall have a true Jewish heart. Every Jew should rear his 
family as if he hoped that a Deliverer might spring from it’ . . .  [Leonora] 
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spoke slowly with a new kind of chest-voice, as if she was quoting 
unwillingly. (617)  
Eliot once again alerts the reader to the psychic presence of the incestuous aggressor by 
depicting them ventriloquizing their victim. Wilt notes this “speaking through”, but appears 
unsure of its significance: “Is this a daughter mock-imitating her father, an actress 
recreating an arresting role, or a woman possessed by the male demon who fathered her    
. . . ?” (324). Dever states that Leonora ventriloquizes both a patriarchal and a Jewish 
heritage, but remains vague as to the mechanics of this process (156). I want to argue, 
however, that this scene parallels the dynamics of Gwendolen’s incestuous pedagogical 
encounter with Klesmer. Instead of developing into artists in their own right, both 
Gwendolen and Leonora are reduced to functioning as a speaking tube for the idiom of the 
incestuous aggressor: Leonora articulates this when she says “I have been the instrument 
my father wanted”. 
Another way in which Leonora functions as the “instrument” of the incestuous 
aggressor is by implementing similar pedagogical methods: her decision to marry her 
cousin, Daniel’s father, was based upon the fact that she could “rule” him (Eliot, Deronda 
590). This mode of relating, however, further subsumes her in her father’s idiom: “My 
father had no other child than his daughter, and she was like himself” (589). Rather than 
enabling the incestuously raped individual to achieve independence, operating on the 
aggressor’s behavioural model emerges as an insidious means of capitulating to their 
inflexible psychic structure: Leonora identifies this paradox when she states that “I meant 
to have my will in the end, but I could only have it by seeming to obey” (589).  
Leonora is painfully aware that as a result of her father’s pedagogy, his idiom 
continues to determine her responses as an inflexible structure forced upon her: “I have 
been forced to obey my dead father” (588). In what would appear to be a further 
comparison of incestuous rape and incestuous pedagogy, Leonora makes recourse to the 
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language of sexual violence to express this: “I don’t consent . . . I obey” (588); “things that 
were thrust on my mind” (594). Daniel’s response to Leonora’s suffering is to entreat her to 
“take us all into your heart- the living and the dead”, not yet realising what this 
internalisation of the aggressor signifies to his mother (591).  
Lenora, however, refuses to concede, her own painstaking attempts at self-
formation allowing her to retain a vestige of resistance even as her internal structural 
integrity is destroyed. As the image of the bound foot implies, the wounded fragments 
persist underneath their stiffened coverings, bloodied and festering: “here within me is the 
same desire, the same will, the same choice, but  . . . I obey something tyrannic . . .  I am 
forced to be withered, to feel pain, to be dying slowly” (588, emphasis added). It is my 
contention that through her tenacious resistance Leonora forces Daniel to confront the 
dangers of incestuous pedagogy, including the potential slippage from victim of incestuous 
pedagogy to its perpetrator.  
The final part of this chapter is intended to show that Gwendolen forces Daniel to 
confront his own history of incest trauma when she asks him to teach her what she can do 
to relieve the psychic distress caused by her marriage. Daniel responds to Gwendolen’s 
entreaty for him to “guide her” by taking a repressively pedagogical stance (420), 
compelled to “not . . . let himself be tender, and flinch from implying a hard opinion” (415). 
As Eliot observes, Daniel has developed a “certain inflexibility of judgment” (295). Daniel 
operates in a similar manner to the incestuous aggressor here, substituting aggression for 
tenderness and punishing her for a marriage that was hardly comprehended, and so could 
hardly be resisted. Daniel’s pedagogy also consists of imposing an inflexible behavioural 
structure upon Gwendolen, as suggested by his imposition of a “hard opinion”.  
Owing to her history, Gwendolen can do nothing but capitulate: “You must tell me 
then what to think and what to do” (415). Penner writes that Gwendolen becomes 
“completely dependent on Daniel’s words and teachings for her sense of worth” (91). 
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Rather than just depending on Daniel for a “sense of worth”, however, Daniel’s incestuous 
pedagogy leaves Gwendolen dependent upon him for the most basic cognitive-behavioural 
scaffolding: “tell me what to think and what to do”. Gwendolen tells Daniel that his 
teaching has “scourged” her, thus attributing to his pedagogy psychic lacerations similar to 
those I have argued are associated in the novel with incestuous rape (Eliot, Deronda 643). 
 Daniel’s pedagogical “scourging” of Gwendolen parallels a nineteenth-century 
ambivalence towards the child victim of rape. As Jackson has shown, the raped child was 
frequently subjected to questioning as to his or her “morality”, with the implication being 
that they had either fabricated or encouraged the attack (93). The child could expect to be 
subjected to “a rigorous cross-examination in court about the origins of her statement, her 
truthfulness, her malleability or suggestibility in the hands of others, and her sexual 
reputation” (93). Even for those children exonerated as innocent “witnesses of truth” (93), 
“the act of sexual abuse was deemed to have corrupted the girl and effected her ‘fall’ from 
innocence . . .  The sexually abused girl was seen as a polluting presence” (6).  
Matus claims that “George Eliot is ultimately less interested in Gwendolen’s 
wounded psyche than in her potential guilt and responsibility for her own pain and 
suffering” (72). Another possibility that emerges, however, is that Eliot is critiquing 
contemporary attitudes to child victims of incest, who were accorded- explicitly or tacitly- 
responsibility for their sufferings. As Reimer has noted, several of the characters in the 
novel regard Gwendolen as a corrupting influence, especially upon their children (70, 76). 
The repulsion that Eliot engenders for Grandcourt’s character makes the reader complicit 
in these attitudes toward the nineteenth-century victim of incest, as his scaled skin implies 
that he too has suffered a similar trauma that has caused him to occupy the locus of the 
incestuous aggressor.  
The nineteenth-century solution to the child victim of incest can be summarised as 
“isolate and educate”. Jackson has documented the nineteenth-century practice of sending 
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child victims of rape or indecent assault to institutions where they could be “reformed” 
through education: “Girls who lost their innocence could no longer be deemed ‘children’ 
and, instead, became social misfits who needed retraining and reforming in a specialist 
institution” (6). Daniel’s attempt to reform Gwendolen through pedagogical means is 
therefore commensurate with the attitudes of his society. Through Daniel’s teaching, Eliot 
indicates that this type of pedagogical intervention might only serve to perpetuate of the 
effects of the archaic trauma. Subjecting the child to “perfect discipline” was the stated aim 
of these institutions, a phrase which in several cases functioned as a euphemism for 
punitive regimes (139).   
I want to show that Daniel also places himself in danger in this pedagogical 
encounter. Ferenczi suggests that once their idiom is integrated with the child’s psyche, the 
aggressor becomes predominantly part of the child’s internal rather than external reality 
(“Confusion” 162). Because Grandcourt forms part of “meshes woven within more closely 
than without”, his death as part of the external reality becomes inevitable, as was the 
death of Gwendolen’s incestuous stepfather before the opening of the novel. Grandcourt 
lives on instead as Gwendolen’s structuring internal reality: “His face will not be seen above 
the water again . . . Not by anyone else- only by me” (Eliot, Deronda 642).  
Ferenczi also claimed that the child’s desire to reject the idiom of the aggressor 
was felt to have murderous consequences: “when the fragment of evil is not accepted or is 
rejected, it returns to the “donor’s” person, exacerbates his tensions and sensations of 
unpleasure, and may even result in the spiritual and bodily annihilation of that person” 
(Diary 59). From the description given in the text, this would appear to be another 
contributing factor in Grandcourt’s death. In the passages leading up to this event, Eliot 
observes that “the intensest form of hatred is that rooted in fear, which compels to silence 
and drives vehemence into a constructive vindictiveness, an imaginary annihilation of the 
detested object” (626-67, emphasis added).  Grandcourt’s death is subsequently framed in 
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such a manner that the murderous object that strikes him could be interpreted as a piece 
of shrapnel originating from Gwendolen’s psyche: “I don’t know how it was . . .  he was 
struck- I know nothing- I only know that I saw my wish outside me” (648, emphasis added). 
As a result of his pedagogical intervention, Daniel risks Gwendolen tearing his 
psyche to shreds. This is apparent when he returns one of her psychic fragments, a pawned 
necklace imbued with memories of her deceased father, wrapped in a large piece of his 
own handkerchief. Gwendolen begins to tear away parts of his psyche to contain painful 
fragments of her own, in the process tearing a large piece of psychic tissu(e) away from 
Daniel. Daniel barely manages to cling onto the monogrammed section of the 
handkerchief, holding back the essential parts of his identity (16). Daniel conceptualises 
these unbidden effects of his pedagogy in terms of a physical enmeshing, similar to the 
mesh that incest trauma weaves between Gwendolen and Grandcourt: “he saw a coming 
wrench, which all present strengthening of their bond would make the harder” (718). 
Unsurprisingly, Daniel comes to fear “the weight of this woman’s soul flung upon his own” 
(642). This quote suggests another facet of the Lamia image, one reinforced by the 
description of Gwendolen as “Calypso” (91): Gwendolen’s trauma makes her capable of 
ensnaring and devouring the aggressor’s selfhood. Whilst Reimer conjectures that 
“Deronda flee[s] Gwendolen precisely because of her revelation of incest”, this reading 
offers another interpretation of Daniel’s anxiety regarding Gwendolen (49).  
There is evidence towards the close of the novel that Daniel’s encounters with 
Gwendolen and Leonora have taught him about the mechanics of their shared trauma: 
“Those who trust us educate us . . . in that ideal consecration of Gwendolen’s, some 
education was being prepared for Deronda” (Eliot, Deronda 401).  When Gwendolen 
stretches her arms out to him as if wishing to envelop him entirely, Daniel “seize[s] her 
outstretched hands and held them together” (749). This gesture can be seen as an 
encouragement to Gwendolen to bring these fragments of her skin surface- and thus her 
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psyche- back into contact: Connor writes that “the hand (like the face) can be an 
alternative body, a second skin” (141, emphasis added).  
Daniel consolidates this gesture by pressing Gwendolen’s own handkerchief to her 
face, providing further encouragement to integrate psychic and skin fragments belonging 
to her, rather than grafting parts of his idiom onto hers:  “Deronda would not let her hands 
go- held them still with one of his, and himself pressed her handkerchief against her eyes. 
She submitted like a half-soothed child” (Eliot, Deronda 749, emphasis added). Several 
critics have observed that Gwendolen recovers memories of her stepfather in this scene in 
which she is reduced to a “half-soothed child”. Reimer writes that “Gwendolen’s task after 
Deronda is gone is to get to the root of her trauma and exorcise her demons” (48-49); 
whilst Penner suggests that “watching Grandcourt drown causes Gwendolen to recover her 
traumatic memories of her stepfather” (85-86). This chapter has argued that Eliot 
associates Gwendolen’s psychic fragmentation with a refusal to touch certain areas of her 
skin-surface. With Daniel grasping her hands, Gwendolen is forced to touch her own skin, 
precipitating a re-joining of psychic fragments. This would suggest that it is this contact that 
results in the recovery of her traumatic past. 
As Reimer has observed, Gwendolen’s prognosis for recovery seems uncertain (50). 
Gwendolen initially experiences the joining of her hands as “something like the return of 
consciousness after fainting” (Eliot, Deronda 749), an image similar to the comparison that 
Ferenczi makes between the severed parts of the psyche and a fainted child. Yet 
Gwendolen later suffers “hysterical crying” that threatens to parallel the primary 
fragmentation: “a ‘hysterical crying’ that unsettlingly duplicates the ‘hysterical shrieking’ of 
her wedding night with Grandcourt” (Wilt 333). Ferenczi wrote that bringing psychic 
fragments back into contact could produce a conscious re-experiencing of trauma. This 
could be almost unbearable for the analysand, tantamount to the analyst “repeat[ing] with 
his own hands the act of murder” (Diary 52). A similar dynamic could be said to underlie 
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the “intolerable” anguish that Daniel experiences on witnessing the suffering produced by 
exhuming these painful fragments of Gwendolen’s psyche (Eliot, Deronda 749).  If we 
accept the logic of this model, then Gwendolen’s sufferings implicate Daniel as her 
incestuous aggressor: “‘I am cruel too, I am cruel’, he repeated” (749). Daniel in this 
moment is alive to the manner in which he is operating in a similar manner to the 
incestuous aggressor, an awareness entirely lacking in his earlier pedagogical interventions.  
This awareness allows Daniel to take steps to avoid destruction like Grandcourt and 
Gwendolen’s stepfather. Drawing upon descriptions of Gwendolen’s ego as a “pit in the 
flesh” only to be removed with “blood and pain”, Carpenter and Penner have argued that 
such imagery serves to parallel Gwendolen’s trauma with Daniel’s circumcision (Eliot, 
Deronda 237). Carpenter claims that Gwendolen experiences a parallel of this cutting in the 
symbolic castration of her phallic egoism (7), whilst Penner argues that what is excised is 
Gwendolen’s independence (91). I would suggest that with their (psychic) skins partially 
fused by incestuous pedagogies, this severing is necessary to separate them from each 
other before there is any further “strengthening of their bond”. When Daniel detaches 
from Gwendolen he feels an archaic, “crushing pain” similar to that of his crushed “fingers” 
(Eliot, Deronda 715). Yet because he has developed an understanding of the mechanics of 
pedagogical incest, this is an amputation he is able to survive.  
Connor writes that “Marking is at the heart of Judaic religious thought. A marked 
man is one who is a target (a mark means a target). But a marked man is also a protected, 
reserved man” (82). Drawing upon Newton’s reading of Daniel’s circumcision, Penner 
relates this dual nature of “marking” to discourses of sexual purity, writing that “the 
ambiguous sign of his [Daniel’s] circumcision serves as both self-policing mechanism for 
him until he learns that it does not signify ‘impure’ or ‘tainted’ birth, but is instead a sign of 
the ‘purity’ of his Jewish blood” (89). It is my contention that Daniel’s circumcision also 
operates as an “ambiguous sign” within the context of incestuous pedagogy. With 
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Gwendolen and Leonora challenging him to confront the various ways in which he been 
“marked”, Daniel can use this knowledge of himself as a “marked man” to avoid again 
becoming an instrument of pedagogies that generate psychopathologies of fragmentation 
and inflexibility similar to those caused by incestuous rape.  
This chapter has sought to illustrate that comparing the work of Eliot and Ferenczi 
can reveal how Deronda represents pathologies of psychic fragmentation and inflexibility 
as endemic in nineteenth-century society. The following chapter explores how this 
understanding of psychopathology was shaped by the influence of computing technology. 
The purpose of this chapter is to trace correspondences between a model of computational 
efficiency based on fragmentation and inflexibility and depictions of the cognitive-


















The Difference Engine and Incestuous Pedagogies: Babbage, Eliot and the Factory System 
 
Fig. 1. Trial Piece of the Difference Engine, 1832. Charles Babbage. Passages from the Life of 
a Philosopher. (London, 1864; Internet Archive; Web; 26 August 2015).  
 
Beginning in the early 1820s, the British polymath and inventor Charles Babbage designed a 
series of calculating Engines capable of arithmetical computation. Babbage designed and 
constructed the first of these, the Difference Engine, from the early 1820s until the early 
1830s. Babbage did not complete the construction of a full-scale Difference Engine, but an 
operational trial piece was completed in 1832 (see Fig. 1). Babbage’s other major 
contribution to knowledge in this period was a treatise on the factory system, On the 
Economy of Machinery and Manufactures (1832). This chapter aims to show that Babbage 
in Economy associates optimal efficiency with a system in which the cognitive-behavioural 
capacities of the factory worker share correspondences with the architecture of the 
Difference Engine. This chapter claims that this results in the worker in Economy suffering 
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cognitive-behavioural pathologies similar to those that Ferenczi associated with incest 
trauma: fragmentation, decontextualisation, and cognitive-behavioural inflexibility.  
Several historians have identified the Difference Engine as a substitute for a 
routinized form of subdivided mental labour in which human computers execute simple, 
repetitive calculations (Berg 189; Otis 31; Wise 174-75). Historians Lorraine Daston, Jessica 
Kuskey, Harro Maas and Louise Purbrick identify parallels between this “routinisation and 
then mechanisation of computing” and “the routine labour executed in factories” (Maas, 
Jevons 101; see also Daston 197; Kuskey 256; Purbrick 21). As I explain below, historians 
Maxine Berg and Maas also perceive affinities with factory labour in the timing cycle and 
precise operation of the Engine.5  
This chapter seeks to contribute to the historicization of intersections between 
computing technology and the organisation of human labour by offering an interpretation 
of how the Difference Engine shaped Babbage’s perception of the cognitive-behavioural 
effects of factory work. Although, as discussed in this chapter, historians Simon Schaffer 
and Joseph Shieber have identified a cognitive dimension to Babbage’s thinking concerning 
labour organisation, the specific comparisons I draw between computing, Ferenczian 
theory and the cognitive-behavioural attributes of the worker in Economy represent new 
contributions to scholarship in this regard.   
As discussed in the introduction to this thesis, I understand the terms “psyche” and 
“cognitive” to be allotropes, simply different languages for speaking about mental 
processing. This chapter seeks to transition from a twentieth-century psychoanalytic model 
                                                          
5 Maas also writes that “Babbage’s own description of the working of his calculating engine 
in Machinery and Manufactures reads like a Taylorised scheme of labour organisation” 
(Jevons 101). It is possible that training schemes associated with Taylorism might prove 
comparable to those which I argue characterise Economy. Although this is an area that 
would merit further study, my focus upon attachment theory means that I am unable to 
pursue this here.  
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to a nineteenth-century pre-psychoanalytic framework, whilst highlighting similarities in 
how these models depict a specific register of pathological experience. Although the word 
“cognitive” is used in this thesis in order to demarcate between this latter approach and 
that of Ferenczi, this chapter is also intended to highlight and explore correspondences 
between these two models.  
Despite some consternation in the press caused by Babbage referring to the 
Edinburgh and Quarterly reviews as “the advocate of despotic principles . . . fast receding 
from the advancing intelligence of the age” (Economy 269), Economy proved to be both 
influential and commercially successful (Maginn 171; Bizup 53). This chapter aims to show 
that as a result of Economy, a computational understanding of the cognitive-behavioural 
effects of the factory system influenced its portrayal in mid-nineteenth-century culture. In 
this chapter I focus upon contemporary accounts of a pedagogical system employed in 
factories at mid-century known as the “half-time system”. I argue that as a result of the 
computational foundations of Economy, the explanations in these sources as to why 
pedagogies employed in factories are detrimental to cognitive-behavioural development 
are similar to Ferenczi’s critique of incestuous pedagogies. Whereas the narrative in 
Economy is technophilic, stressing the increase in worker efficiency generated by 
computationally-derived modes of labour organisation, I suggest that these sources are 
implicitly technophobic in their attitude towards the cognitive-behavioural traits that 
Babbage assigned to the worker as a result of computing technology.   
This chapter concludes by offering a reading of Silas Marner (1861) that claims that 
Eliot in this novel critiques the factory system and its pedagogies, exploring their 
relationship to computing technology. I want to show that Eliot in Marner examines the 
computational origins of a model of cognitive-behavioural pathology that she deploys in a 
number of her texts, including, as argued previously, Daniel Deronda. This approach is 
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designed to allow Marner to be situated for the first time in the context of a specifically 
computational mode of representing the factory system at mid-century.  
 
The Difference Engine and Economy 
 
The “factory system” emerged in the nineteenth century as a theory of labour organisation: 
“The very purpose and meaning of a factory is the division and combination of labour” 
(Cooke-Taylor 31).  Babbage’s text was an important contribution to this body of theory, 
refining Adam Smith’s theory of division of labour to meet the demands of rapid 
industrialisation (Rosenberg 49-50; Zimmermann 10-11). Babbage indicates that computing 
influenced his depiction of the labour process in Economy, describing this text as “one of 
the consequences that have resulted from the Calculating-Engine” (iii). The association 
between Economy and the Difference Engine was also highlighted by his contemporaries: 
“it seems . . . to have owed its birth to the fecundating influence of the ‘calculating engine’” 
(Maginn 171).   
This section sets out to show that the Difference Engine provided Babbage with 
both explanatory model and theoretical justification for cultivating cognitive-behavioural 
pathologies in the worker. To my knowledge, this is the first time that Ferenczi’s writings 
have been used to consider the cognitive-behavioural pathologies that characterise the 
worker in Economy. I hope to illustrate that by using this theoretical framework it is 
possible to identify mechanisms of pathology in Economy not yet addressed in existing 
scholarship, such as the manner in which fragmentation and inflexibility function in tandem 
to generate cognitive-behavioural pathologies judged necessary for worker efficiency.  
The Difference Engine is named after the mathematical principle upon which it is 
based. “Differencing” is the principle that numerical tables can be calculated by finding a 
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numerical constant that allows a table of values to be formed by an inflexible addition 
routine. The following table contains a sequence of square numbers: 
 
 
Fig. 2. Table of Differences. Luigi Menabrea. “Sketch of the Analytical Engine.” Charles 
Babbage and his Calculating Engines: Selected Writings by Charles Babbage and Others. Ed. 
Phillip and Emily Morrison (New York: Dover, 1961; Print; 228).  
 
If you have the initial terms of a numerical sequence you can use these to calculate 
additional values. Subtracting each square number from the following term in the 
sequence (4-1= 3, 9-4=5, 16-9=7, et cetera) generates a second column of values. These are 
the first differences. These are then subtracted from one another in a corresponding 
manner. This process continues until the difference between each of the numbers is equal. 
In this case, this occurs after the second round of subtractions, in the column of second 
differences. This number is the “constant”.  
Once the constant is found, other values in the table can be calculated by addition 
alone by reversing the process, with higher orders of differences added to lower orders of 
differences. For example, to calculate the next value in the table above: 2+11= 13. 
36+13=49 (7 x 7). The result of each calculation is one tabular value. Because the 
mathematical laws governing a function can change, it is also necessary at intervals to 
89 
 
compute “pivotal” values using the fundamental mathematical formulae (Wilkes, 
“Expectations” 142). The Difference Engine computes between these pivotal values, 
subtabulating using the method described above (143). Babbage’s collaborator Dionysius 
Lardner (1793-1859) states in in his 1834 description of the Engine that it “has . . . literally 
thrown this mathematical principle into wheel-work” (184). 
 The Difference Engine comprises a series of vertical columns composed of metal 
gearwheels (see fig. 1). Each column represents an order of differences and holds a 
number, with the leftmost column containing the tabular value. Each individual numerical 
digit is associated with three gearwheels. One of these gearwheels displays a digit between 
0 and 9, and is called a figure wheel (Bromley, “Evolution” 117).  The other two allow the 
figure wheel to transfer digits to another figure wheel during addition. The lowest figure 
wheel in a column represents the units place value, the one above the tens, and so forth 
(Lardner 202). The trial portion of the Difference Engine contains two order of differences 
columns and the tabular value, each six figure wheels high. Lardner describes how cranking 
the Difference Engine’s drive handle generates “two systems of waves of mechanical action 
continually flowing from the bottom to the top; and two streams of similar action 
constantly passing from the right to the left” (195). The first of these “waves of mechanical 
action” passes horizontally across the Engine, adding numbers in higher order of 
differences columns to those on lower order of differences columns (189-90). If a figure 
wheel stands at 3, for example, and the one adding to it stands at 4, during this wave it will 
be pushed on 4 digit places to stand at 7. The second, vertical wave performs any carries 
required (192-93).6  
It is possible to perceive that the routine of the Difference Engine has a hierarchical 
structure, with the addition and carry “wave” composed from sequences of inflexible and 
                                                          
6 Babbage invented a method of effecting addition in two half-cycles in order to increase 
efficiency. This is why Lardner describes “two systems of waves”. 
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elementary machine behaviours. The following description is of the elementary actions 
which comprise the addition wave. The diagram below depicts the three gearwheels 




Fig. 3. Gearwheels associated with a single digit in the Difference Engine. Allan G. Bromley. 
“The Evolution of Babbage’s Calculating Engines” (Annals of the History of Computing 9.2 
(1987): 113-136. IEEE Xplore; Web; 5 Jan 2014; 117). © IEEE 1987 
The adding axis- the central wheel- carries a bolt. At the beginning of the adding cycle, this 
effectively “bolts” the adding axis and the toothed adding wheel together. The adding axis 
then rotates through 360 degrees, carrying the adding wheel with it. At some point in the 
cycle the bolt encounters a wedge on the figure wheel, forcing the bolt to release the 
adding wheel at the 0 position (Bromley, “Evolution” 117; Lardner 192-93). In the diagram 
above, by the time it is released the bolt has carried the adding wheel forward four digit 
positions. The adding wheel subsequently remains stationary, but the adding axis 
completes its cycle. The adding wheel has teeth cut in its face that mesh with those cut into 
the figure wheel in the next lower order of differences. Moving the adding wheel through 
four digit positions, for instance, pushes the lower order figure wheel forward four digit 
positions (Bromley, “Evolution” 117; Lardner 192-93). Addition therefore consists of a 
sequence of inflexible units of machine behaviour: “bolt adding axis to adding wheel”, 
“rotate adding axis” “release bolt”. 
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Babbage invented a means of specifying sequences of machine behaviours in the 
Difference Engine using “a series of cams onto which control surfaces could be screwed in 
any desired pattern” (Bromley, “Evolution” 117). The relationships specified by this 
mechanism can be understood to consist of the next relation: “bolt adding axis to adding 
wheel” next “rotate adding axis”, and so on. This results in an inflexible and deterministic 
routine with a “simple sequential flow” (115). This pattern repeats at the higher 
hierarchical level: the inflexible carry wave invariably follows the inflexible addition wave. 
The architecture of the Difference Engine can therefore be interpreted as consisting of an 
inflexible arrangement of inflexible units that is modular and hierarchical.7  
Examining the sequence of inflexible actions that comprise addition can reveal the 
extent to which Babbage made inflexibility a property of the Difference Engine. The lower-
order figure wheel may be pushed forward any number of digit positions between one and 
nine, yet the sequence of elementary actions used to encompass this range of 
contingencies (“bolt adding axis to adding wheel”, “rotate adding axis”, “release bolt”) 
remains inflexible. In addition to possessing an inflexible operating cycle composed from 
discrete units, the Difference Engine itself can be regarded as a discrete and inflexible 
fragment of a larger process, having been designed as an efficient producer of numerical 
data for use in more complex calculations (Lardner 176). The Engine is unable to perform 
these calculations itself, being capable of only one limited and inflexible routine: it can only 
compute what is stated in a form calculable using the method described above.  
 
 
                                                          
7 As discussed in the introductory chapter, the term “architecture” is used to refer to the 
structure of a computer’s instruction set. 
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Fig. 4. Difference Engine, 1830.  Charles Babbage. (Science Museum, London).  
 
Another significant feature of this Engine is the separation that is maintained 
between the mechanisms that guide the routine and those that execute the computations. 
In the trial portion the directive mechanism consists of interlocking gearwheels situated 
above and below the calculating portion, whilst in a design drawing dated 1830, the 
separation of calculating portion on the left and control mechanism on the right is clearly 
visible (see fig. 1 and fig. 4). This can be viewed as corresponding to the external origin of 
the Difference Engine’s routine with human programmers.  
The remainder of this section seeks to explore how, as a result of these features of 
the Difference Engine, Babbage came to associate worker efficiency with pathologies 
similar to those that Ferenczi attributed to incest trauma. Babbage in Economy identifies 
division of labour as “the most important principle on which the economy of a manufacture 
depends” (131). Division of labour consists of decomposing a production process into a 
series of discrete tasks, “each . . . the sole occupation of one individual” (135). Babbage in 
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Economy extends the Smithian division of labour, offering a rationale for increased 
fragmentation of the production process now known as “Babbage’s principle” (Braverman 
81): “The master manufacturer, by dividing the work to be executed into different 
processes, each requiring different degrees of skill and force, can purchase exactly that 
quantity of both which is necessary” (Babbage, Economy 137-38, emphasis in original). 
Although entrepreneurs had experimented with larger textile mills from the late-
eighteenth century, the factory system continued to evolve throughout the 1830s (Hudson 
78-79; Gray 15).  The Babbage principle represented an aggressive division of labour as a 
rational approach for manufacturers wishing to maximise productivity and minimise costs 
(Zimmermann 10-11).8 Although Babbage’s principle still imaginatively locates a number of 
skilled labourers in factories, it facilitates the use of cheap unskilled or semi-skilled labour 
for the majority of production: “Such labour can always be purchased at an easy rate” 
(Babbage, Economy 157).   
I want to show that focusing upon specific features of the Difference Engine can 
explain how the efficiency of unskilled or semi-skilled workers in Economy is secured 
through cognitive-behavioural pathologies. Babbage writes that the “operation” performed 
by each worker should be as “limited and simple” as possible (Economy 173), leading 
historian Bernard Cronin to equate the Babbage principle with “job fragmentation” (65-66). 
This execution of a fragment of the labour process can be regarded as corresponding to the 
capacities of the Difference Engine as “the embodying of one particular and very limited set 
of operations” (Lovelace 249, emphasis in original). The inflexibility of each component 
movement of the Difference Engine and its inflexible progression from one instruction to 
the next allows its entire routine to be regarded as a discrete fragment within a more 
complex process (as “one . . . set of operations”). Similarly, the worker in Economy executes 
                                                          




a deterministic sequence of actions whose inflexibility enables the entire sequence to be 
regarded as a discrete fragment.  
For Babbage, the Difference Engine could perform its calculations with a rapidity 
that justified its existence as a fragment of the calculating process: 
a machine to execute the mere isolated operations of arithmetic, would be 
comparatively of little value . . .  unless it executed not only accurately, but 
with great rapidity, whatever it was required to do . . . the method of 
differences supplied a general principle by which all Tables might be 
computed through limited intervals, by one uniform process.  
(Passages 42-43, emphasis added) 
It is possible to identify a parallel with how, in Economy, the “constant repetition” of a 
fragment of the labour process is understood to produce “excellence and rapidity” in the 
labour force (134). This can be compared with the way in which the inflexible or “uniform 
process” of the Difference Engine allows it to operate as a discrete fragment that can be 
executed with “great rapidity”.  
This quote suggests that Babbage regarded efficient calculation in the Engine as 
contingent upon not only fragmentation, but also decontextualisation: its productivity 
derives from its performance of “isolated operations”. Similarly, Babbage in Economy 
indicates that the “scattered arts” generated by division of labour are not only “scattered” 
spatially, but cognitively: “there are a hundred and two distinct branches of this art, to each 
of which a boy may be put apprentice . . . [he] is unable, after his apprenticeship has 
expired, without subsequent instruction, to work at any other branch” (162). This is similar 
to how, in the narrative of incest trauma that Ferenczi describes, shattered fragments exist 
in a decontextualised state. Referring to Babbage’s description of the production of 
numerical tables in the French bureau de cadastre, Shieber argues that the opacity of other 
processes in the system confines the worker’s attention to the execution of one function 
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(272-73). He does not, however, consider how this principle operates in the wider factory 
system that Babbage depicts in Economy, or its relationship to the Difference Engine.  
Purbrick also mentions this “lack of knowledge” of other processes, but places 
emphasis on the physical rather than the cognitive capacities of the worker: “The discipline 
of repetition of the same function and a lack of knowledge of other functions produced a 
body that was faster and more accurate” (21). I would suggest that the Difference Engine 
not only underpins the fragmentation and decontextualisation of cognitive-behavioural 
capacities in Economy, but it also determines the relevance of these pathologies for the 
factory system that Babbage describes. 
This interpretation of Economy using principles derived from the Difference Engine 
suggests that the cognitive-behavioural pathologies that secure worker efficiency in this 
text are predicated upon inflexibility at the level of the individual operation, but at the 
same time fragmentation and decontextualisation at the macroscopic systemic level. 
Applying these computational principles not only allows this apparent paradox to be 
identified as a feature of the factory system that Babbage portrays in Economy, but also 
indicates how inflexibility and fragmentation operate in concert in this text to produce 
cognitive-behavioural pathologies deemed necessary for worker efficiency.  
I would argue that these pathologies function to generate a cognitive division of 
labour between worker and manufacturer. As historian Joseph Bizup states, the 
manufacturer in Economy is no longer involved in physical production, which is given the 
status of making. Instead, he takes on a new role organising and overseeing systems of 
production (60). Accordingly, Babbage observes that “if the maker of an article wish to 
become a manufacturer . . . he must carefully arrange the whole system of his factory” 
(Economy 99, emphasis in original):  
it requires far other habits to combine into one machine these scattered 
arts. A previous education as a workman in the peculiar trade, is 
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undoubtedly a valuable preliminary; but in order to make such 
combinations with any reasonable expectation of success, an extensive 
knowledge of machinery  . . . are [sic] essentially requisite.  
(136-37, emphasis added)  
Referring to the distribution of cognitive capacities within an organisational grouping, 
Shieber observes that “the skills required for the completion of the cognitive tasks that are 
the responsibilities of the individuals making up the network are likely very different than 
the skills that would be required to design, track, and assess socially distributed cognitive 
networks” (273). Shieber is concerned, however, with how Babbage depicts the distribution 
of cognitive tasks in the eighteenth-century bureau de cadastre rather than in the 
nineteenth-century factory (275).  Shieber also does not align Babbage’s thinking in this 
regard with the Engines, aside from observing that the labour of unskilled human 
computers was susceptible to mechanisation (270).9  
Schaffer, meanwhile, argues that the “algebra of machine analysis” that Babbage 
“designed to describe the engine’s work” led him to envisage a manufacturing elite with 
the skills to codify and thus manage the discrete “components” of the factory system, 
including the labour of the worker (“Intelligence” 207-208). As such, the Difference Engine 
“embodied the intelligence of theory”: “Only the superior combination and correlation of 
each component guaranteed efficient, economical, planned and therefore intelligent 
performance” (210, emphasis in original). Schaffer equates the capacity of the carry 
mechanism in the Analytical Engine to remain vigilant for the occurrence of carries with the 
superintendent role in factories: “the qualities attributed to this intelligence were just 
those required from this form of superintendence- anticipation and meticulous scrutiny” 
                                                          
9 Shieber quotes a section from Economy in which Babbage refers to the The Times 
newspaper office as a “factory”, but he does not offer detailed analysis of the cognitive 
division of labour that characterises this system (276).  
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(224).  Although I share Schaffer’s concern with how Babbage represents the division of 
cognitive labour in factories, my focus upon comparisons between the architecture of the 
Difference Engine and cognitive-behavioural pathologies suffered by the maker-worker in 
Economy seeks to offer a new approach to this subject.  
The Difference Engine indicated to Babbage that computational efficiency was best 
served by performing a decontextualised fragment in an inflexible manner, thus allowing it 
to function as a discrete component within a wider system of computation. Similarly, the 
efficiency of the worker in Economy is contingent upon the fragmentation and 
decontextualisation generated by their inflexible functioning. This mode of operation 
enables their unit of the labour process to function as a discrete unit suitable for 
combination by manufacturers.  I suggest that these architectural features of the 
Difference Engine underpin the division of cognitive labour that Schaffer identifies, with the 
capacities of the Difference Engine in Economy corresponding to those of the maker-
worker rather than the manufacturer. It is possible to conjecture that Babbage was thinking 
of the Difference Engine when he described the labour of maker-workers as that “which 
may almost be termed mechanical, requiring the least knowledge” (Economy 157, 
emphasis added).  
There is evidence that operating in the manner of a Difference Engine militates 
against the maker-worker in Economy developing the combinatorial “habits” of the 
manufacturer. As a result of possessing an understanding of systems that is comprehensive 
rather than fragmentary (“an extensive knowledge of machinery”), the manufacturer can 
develop cognitive-behavioural skills, or “habits”, that enable them to organise discrete 
units as functional systems: “The watch-finisher, whose business is to put together the 
scattered parts, is the only one . . . who can work in any department than his own” (162-
63). Unlike the majority of maker-workers, who function as decontextualised fragments 
within the system in which they operate, the watch finisher does not regard the processes 
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that created these “scattered parts” as “scattered arts”. This knowledge forms the 
foundation of habits that enable him to modify his own operations.  
I would argue that the discrete separation between executive and directive 
mechanisms used to improve efficiency in the Difference Engine confirmed to Babbage that 
it was not necessary for operatives to understand the coordination of their task at a 
systemic level. This offers a rationale for the belief that Shieber attributes to Babbage that 
“reflect[ing] upon the properties of the network would be an extraneous task for members 
of the network” (272). This external imposition of an inflexible routine can be compared 
with how the fragmented psyche of the incestuously traumatised child is left reliant upon 
the idiom of the incestuous aggressor for structure. This structure, having been externally 
dictated rather than developed through a process in which the individual has exerted 
agency, is experienced as inflexible.  
This adds to the complexity of the cognitive-behavioural paradoxes that 
characterise the factory system in Economy. The labour of the maker-worker consists of 
performing a decontextualised fragment of the labour process. However, this 
fragmentation and decontextualisation is simultaneously generated by the inflexibility of 
their individual operation. The inflexibility of this fragment subsequently enables it to be 
organised as part of a larger structure, which is in turn experienced by the maker-worker as 
inflexible. Once again, a combination of inflexibility and fragmentation constitutes the 
totality of cognitive-behavioural pathology in Economy. It is my contention that this 
paradox results from the status of the Difference Engine as an inflexible and 
decontextualised fragment of a wider process of computation. 
As Schaffer observes, debates about where specific intellectual capabilities were 
located in the factory system were freighted with political meaning (“Intelligence”, 209). 
Doubtless with the division between maker and manufacturer in mind, Babbage argues 
that maker-workers are incapable of judging when it is appropriate to form “combinations” 
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to force a change in the organisation of a factory (Economy 244). For Babbage, a 
combination is where workers “interfere with their employers in the mode of carrying on 
their business” (252): such “improper” combinations violate the discrete division of labour 
between manufacturer and maker he foregrounds (252). This can be interpreted as an 
instance of cognitive-behavioural pathologies arising from the computational origins of the 
factory system being utilised to rationalise the control of manufacturers over production.  
The disciplinary apparatus that Babbage derived from computing would appear to 
challenge dominant perceptions of how a disciplinary apparatus is structured, as 
fragmentation within a disciplinary structure might more readily be conceptualised as a 
source of anarchy and chaos. However, this section has argued that the Difference Engine 
led to fragmentation being figured as an integral part of a disciplinary schema. It is one of 
the aims of this thesis to show that the paradoxes contained within this computational 
model are fundamental to its expression. A similar situation is represented in Ferenczi’s 
writings, where pathologies resulting from incest trauma lead the traumatised individual to 
believe that unless they submit to their aggressor’s control, they will suffer uncontrollable 
psychic fragmentation (Diary 175). Pathologies of fragmentation and decontextualisation 
thus lay the groundwork for aggressive structures of external regulation.  
If the Difference Engine is the theoretical justification for Babbage’s model of 
labour organisation, then machinery represents the means of its practical implementation. 
As historian Nathan Rosenberg writes, Economy was the first text to offer precise 
explanations of how labour could be organised to maximise efficiency in mechanised 
factories (49). Babbage observes that “One of the most singular advantages we derive from 
machinery is the check which it affords against the inattention, the idleness, or the knavery, 
of human agents” (Economy 39). According to historian Andrew Zimmermann, Babbage’s 
rationale of efficiency is contravened by “undisciplined” actions: machinery “sets limits to 
the variety of human actions, which Babbage believes disrupt production” (9). The 
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regularity of machines is figured as paring off all extraneous movements in the operative, 
confining them to an inflexible sequence of predetermined actions. Babbage also highlights 
several instances of mechanisation enabling a greater division of labour, further 
exacerbating the fragmentation and decontextualisation experienced by the worker 
(Economy 13, 48). 
The discipline of machinery, in conjunction with the external regulation of the 
manufacturer, effectively pre-programs the worker in Economy to execute an inflexible 
sequence of actions in the manner in which the Difference Engine is preprogramed to carry 
out an inflexible sequence of mechanical motions: the factory becomes characterised by 
“an emphasis on the replication of many parts on automatic machines which could be pre-
set . . . close supervision of work set out in advance and in great detail” (Cronin 65).  The 
functioning of machinery in Economy can therefore be compared with the role of the 
incestuous aggressor in Ferenczi, a figure with the capacity to “stamp upon their 
[children’s] plastic minds . . . rigid rules as something externally imprinted” (“Child-
Analysis” 134).  
Maas argues that Babbage’s aim was to enable workers to “reach the highest level 
of precision attainable” (Jevons 185). As Maas observes, functioning with this degree of 
precision is to approach the mechanical, to be regulated in the manner in which a “precise 
order of wheels and gears fits precisely to the exact timing of different manual activities” in 
the Engine (186). According to Berg, Babbage in Economy was “bringing to bear the 
mathematical precision and predictability of his machine on the factories” (182). Whereas 
Berg and Maas see this “mechanical” precision in terms of temporal accuracy, I would 
suggest that it could be also be read in terms of external regulation. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, Ferenczi identifies a “mechanical” quality in the incestuously traumatised 
child that results from the execution of inflexible cognitive-behavioural schemata derived 
from the incestuous aggressor. 
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Correspondingly, Babbage appears to have perceived a mechanical quality in the 
worker whose cognitive-behavioural capacities have been delimited by the factory system. 
There is little extraneous commentary in Economy, but the subtleties of Babbage’s 
language are revealing. The use of the word “knavery” in the above quote allows interplay 
between the connotations of knavery as a carnivalesque or disruptive freedom, the figure 
of the servile knave, and “knave” as a machine part, a segment of a spool or spindle (OED). 
Machines in Economy turn knaves (individuals possessing a disruptive freedom) into knaves 
(servants), by forcing them to become knaves (machine parts).  
The tightly circumscribed routine produced by the inflexible and routinized 
operation of machines also reinforces the sense of the individual operation as a discrete 
unit: Babbage describes the factory system as consisting of “a multitude of separate 
machines, each complete in itself” (192). Tamara Ketabgian argues that although it initially 
appears that machinery in Economy is augmenting the powers of the worker, it ultimately 
renders “all machine-workers . . . in effect, disabled” (33-34). Because Babbage locates part 
of the skill necessary to perform a given task in the machine, the worker in Economy is left 
handicapped without the prosthetic appendage that enables him to function within the 
factory (31). Yet the limitations machinery imposes upon workers in Economy would 
appear to exceed even this partial apportioning of skill, with machines forming part of an 
apparatus of labour management designed to generate specific cognitive-behavioural 
pathologies in the worker. These were pathologies intended to increase both the efficiency 
of the worker and their reliance upon management. This section has sought to show, 
however, that the form that these pathologies take in Economy is not so much the product 






Industrial Education and Cognitive-Behavioural Pathologies 
 
The following two sections focus upon a range of mid-nineteenth-century accounts of half-
time education, beginning with descriptions of the “industrial education” that constituted 
one half of the “half-time” system. The purpose of these sections is to illustrate that, as a 
result of the influence of Economy, the cognitive-behavioural pathologies attributed to the 
half-time system by its contemporaries are similar to those that Babbage sought to 
attribute to the worker as a result of the Difference Engine. Although these mid-century 
sources do not possess the conceptual framework that would allow them to identify the 
pedagogies of the half-time system as “incestuous”, I want to show that they depict their 
pathological consequences in a similar manner to Ferenczian theory. Historian Clark 
Nardinelli has identified concern amongst nineteenth-century reformers that factories 
“destroyed the future prospects of children” (89). This section seeks to elaborate upon 
Nardinelli’s claim by providing analysis of specific cognitive-behavioural pathologies 
attributed to factory workers, contextualising this body of representation by highlighting 
parallels with the computational model depicted in Economy.  
I wish to begin this discussion with the caveat that the following represents a 
critique of a body of representation, rather than an attempt to ascertain the real effects of 
the educational apparatus in mid-century factories. The sources discussed here are 
contemporary responses to the condition of child workers in the textile industries of 
Lancashire and Yorkshire during the 1850s and 1860s. A half-timer at mid-century would 
typically have formed part of the workforce of a medium-to-large, steam-powered mill 
(Walton 203; Timmins, 183). By mid-century, textile production had become highly 
stratified in its organisation, with subdivided processes engendering a range of tasks 
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capable of being performed by children (Honeyman 1-2; Samuel 29).10An additional reason 
for focusing upon this particular regional and socioeconomic demographic is that the half-
time system was firmly established in these counties by 1850.  
The experience of the child textile worker was by no means ubiquitous. At mid-
century, of the 30 percent of English and Welsh children aged ten to fourteen recorded as 
having a job, only 15 per cent of males and 24 per cent of females were employed in large 
factories (Kirby 544; Tuttle 142). Nevertheless, child textile workers were still a significant 
demographic, especially in the counties studied here (Walton 202; S. Rose 161-62). 
Assistant Commissioner J.S. Winder reported in 1859 that in Rochdale alone, in excess of 
3,500 children worked in textile factories (177), and in 1850 13, 500 half-timers were 
recorded in sample districts in Lancashire and Yorkshire (Horner 15).  
The Factory Acts had since the 1830s stipulated that the working hours of children 
employed in textile manufacture should not exceed a statutory limit, and that child textile 
workers of both sexes should be provided with elementary education (Silver 142). Nassau 
Senior in Suggestions on Popular Education (1861) summarised the law as it stood in 1860:  
No child under eight years can be employed, and no other child under 
thirteen years can be employed for more than six hours and a half in a day, 
or ten hours on alternate days. A child working every day must attend 
school for three hours, a child working alternate days must attend school 
for five hours. (175) 
                                                          
10
 The internal organisation of textile factories was, of course, subject to regional and 
individual variations (Walton 199-200, 203; Timmins 182). However, a stratified division of 
labour is agreed upon by historians as a common feature of mid-century textile factories 
(Galbi 364). It is beyond the scope of this thesis to provide a comparative survey of textile 




This was known as the “half-time system” (Akroyd 3). Although the primary function of 
half-time education was to defend the child against overwork, during the 1860s the system 
was studied as the model for a national system of popular education, one which would 
protect the interests of employers whilst palliating demand for working-class education (4).  
Babbage in Economy advises that it is necessary for workers to learn the physical 
and cognitive attributes required for factory work in a factory setting (133). This view was 
paralleled at mid-century: Leonard Horner, an inspector of education in factories, wrote in 
1850 that the half-time system provided “the double advantage of school and of that most 
valuable industrial education” (15). This “industrial education” consisted of performing 
tasks that were understood to result from the application of Babbage’s principle in textile 
factories: “This tendency to employ merely children . . .  shows how the scholastic dogma 
of the division of labour into degrees of skill has been exploited” (Gaskell 365).  Typical 
employments included a “doffer”, removing full bobbins from spinning machines, a “little 
piecer” re-joining broken threads, or a “scavenger” cleaning under machinery (Great 
Britain, Children’s Employment Commission 164; Society for Promoting Christian 
Knowledge 138-9).11  
Inculcating certain cognitive-behavioural attributes, or “habits of industry”, was 
identified as a key purpose of industrial education (Dawes v). I would suggest that this 
understanding of “habit” as cognitive-behavioural traits is similar to that found in Economy: 
“the spirit of order and discipline which pervades our factories, is not the mere restraint 
which is imposed on the labourer whilst he is within the walls of the factory itself . . . it is 
the formation of a habit” (Gladstone 769). Several mid-century critics, however, intimated 
                                                          
11 There were, however, many others. A survey is provided in Tuttle (104). Although 
conditions in factories varied, it is without doubt that many half-timers suffered appalling 
privations (Cruikshank 52; Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge 138, 143). This is not 
meant to imply, however, that conditions in textile factories were worse than in other 
forms of child labour. 
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that these “habits of industry” were synonymous with cognitive-behavioural pathologies. In 
addition to concerns regarding the half-timer’s physical wellbeing, it is also possible to 
identify anxieties regarding the cognitive detriment caused by industrial education. The 
Children’s Employment Commission at mid-century described the “pressure of work upon 
the child’s mind as well as body”, claiming that “industrial education” resulted in the 
“injury of their children’s health by early labour, and . . .  the certain injury of their minds” 
(qtd. Senior 213, 33).  
In the previous section it was argued that in the system that Babbage derived from 
the computational capacities of the Difference Engine, the inflexibility of the movements 
performed by the worker enables their task to be regarded as a discrete fragment. In a 
statement that can be compared with Babbage’s principle, Babbage claims that not only 
can the required quantity of skill be purchased, it can also be taught: “confined to one 
operation, a very small portion of his time will be consumed unprofitably at the 
commencement [of labour]” (Economy 132).  
It is my contention that these mid-century sources represent the “habits” resulting 
from this fragmentation of industrial education as a tolerance for fragmented and 
decontextualised tasks. In 1850 an anonymous contributor to the London Journal of Arts, 
Sciences and Manufactures claimed that 
when they [children] have acquired habits of industry, combined with 
quickness of perception (however limited in degree), and a kind of 
mechanical dexterity . . . they have imbibed all the good they are likely to 
receive within the mill. (“Factory Labour” 262, emphasis added) 
The inflexibility of its routine results in the half-timer being regarded as a discrete 
component of the factory system. This parallels the status of the Difference Engine as a 
discrete and inflexible fragment in the process of knowledge production: “already to feel 
that he is but a portion of a mighty machine” (Gaskell 143-44); “The child instinctively feels 
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that it is used as a mere bit of machinery” (Children’s Employment Commission, qtd. Senior 
213). Imagining the half-timer as a “portion” or “mere bit” depicts them as a fragment of 
the global mechanism of the factory. In an image that can be compared with the portrayal 
of the worker in Economy, this worker-as-fragment is understood to be non-functional if 
decontextualised from the stratified organisation of the factory: “if it [a child] is to work in 
the mill at all, it must become an integral part of the machinery of that mill . . . subject to 
the general economy” (Gaskell 173).  
 Performing fragmented and decontextualised tasks is portrayed as preventing 
workers from acquiring the knowledge that Babbage claimed was necessary in order to 
develop the cognitive capacities of the manufacturer: “It is not, indeed, improbable that 
the exclusive attention which is required to one particular employment, may, in some 
degree, limit and confine the general capacity for acquiring diversified knowledge” (Gaskell 
166); “monotony of occupation . . . is very detrimental to the development of the mental 
powers of the child” (“Factory Labour” 263). These sources suggest that a failure to acquire 
“diversified knowledge” results in an inability to develop the “mental powers” required for 
a comprehension of various units within the factory system: the “exclusive attention” upon 
“one particular employment” confines such a “general capacity”. These quotes suggest that 
half-time education was felt to render the factory system inflexible yet fragmented from 
the worker’s perspective: mid-century sources speak of workers desiring “to have their 
minds set in order about their own operations” (Maurice 151).   
A further comparison with Economy is that cognitive-behavioural habits were 
figured as central to the “discipline of work” that industrial education sought to cultivate 
(R. Baker 1866 101). Assistant Commissioner Henry Lord claimed in 1862 that the benefit to 
the manufacturer of the half-time system was the “supply of trained hands growing into 
full-timers under his control” (Great Britain, Children’s Employment Commission, 164). 
Although there are numerous accounts of violence being used to discipline child textile 
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workers, many mid-century observers instead chose to highlight the disciplinary effect of 
labour organisation (Humphries 246; “Woman and Womankind” 218).  In the previous 
section, it was claimed that the origin of Babbage’s principle can be traced to computing 
technology. By mid-century, this principle was identified as a disciplinary strategy in 
sources differing in their attitudes towards the factory system:  
with the growth of the factory system, [emerged] that organisation and 
division of labour requiring a subordination of ranks in every mill according 
to capacity and skill. Hence grew habits of punctuality, order . . . and exact 
obedience to discipline. . . . it has included more gradations of rank, and a 
still more complicated system of submission to authority.  
(Kay-Shuttleworth, qtd. “Psychological Quarterly Retrospect” iii) 
Franklin Baker, an apologist for the factory system, declared approvingly in 1850 that “the 
order and regularity enforced upon the operatives are so nearly akin to moral habits” (15). 
In contrast, William Dodd, writing in 1849, deplored how Babbage’s principle of 
“subordination of ranks in every mill” had stripped workers of their agency: “she [the 
worker] has no voice in making conditions, but must submit to such as are offered” (108). 
Despite the conflicting perspectives of these sources, the parallel between Babbage’s 
principle and a “complicated system of submission to authority” remains consistent. 
Another point of comparison with Economy is that machinery in these sources is 
interpreted as a form of labour discipline. Reports highlighted the horrific penalties that 
machines exacted for lapses in “efficiency”: “the child who shall be behind in doing its 
allotted work . . .  [their] fingers will be bruised and skinned” (Fielden 138); “if [fingers are] 
placed with hesitation or carelessness, they are sacrificed” (Redgrave 1866 9). Machines 
are depicted as habituating the worker’s cognitive-behavioural capacities to the routinized 
performance of a deterministic sequence of inflexible actions. It is possible to conceptualise 
this in terms of the worker functioning in a similar manner to the Difference Engine. The 
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behaviour of the half-timer in these accounts can also be compared to the automatism of 
the incestuously traumatised child in Ferenczi’s writings, with the child performing work 
that is “for the most part mechanical” (Winder 195).  
 
Half-Time Schooling and Cognitive-Behavioural Pathologies 
 
This section aims to provide further evidence that the computational representation of the 
cognitive-behavioural effects of the factory system in Economy played a role in shaping 
mid-century thinking concerning pedagogical systems associated with factories. In this 
section I focus upon contemporary depictions of the other facet of the half-time system, 
the school education received by the factory child. I hope that the analysis in this section 
can advance our understanding of discourses relating to half-time schooling, an important 
forerunner of the 1870 Elementary Education Act.  Again, this section is intended as a 
critique of a certain body of representation rather than as an attempt to judge the actual 
cognitive-behavioural effects of this system.  
Although evasion of the educational clauses of the Factory Acts was common, the 
majority of half-timers received a school education that was effectively compulsory 
(Bremner 309). The largest provider of half-time education in the Lancashire and Yorkshire 
districts inspected by Alexander Redgrave were schools established by the Anglican 
National Society for Promoting the Education of the Poor in the Principles of the 
Established Church, known as “National schools” (Redgrave 1861 18). Along with those 
operated by Dissenting organisations, these were known as “public schools”. “Private 
schools” designated schools run by private individuals, often in their homes, whilst “factory 
schools” were maintained by manufacturers for the education of their workers (Purvis 91). 
In a representative sample in 1861, 11, 611 half-timers attended National or similar Church 
schools, 6, 559 Dissenting, 5, 046 factory schools, and 3, 617 private schools (Redgrave 
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1861 18). Reflecting the employment demographics of an area, some schools were entirely 
populated by half-timers, and in others they comprised as little as ten percent of the school 
population (Redgrave 1861 18; Lamb 12).  
 The general consensus at mid-century was that poor standards were the norm 
across all classes of schools for half-timers: Winder claimed in 1861 that many were “a 
complete fraud upon the Factory Acts” (231). Interestingly, private schools were frequently 
judged to be no worse than public schools, the condition of which Horner describes as 
“lamentable” (Horner 12; see also Redgrave 1861 19-20). Nevertheless, thirty-two private 
schools in Redgrave’s district were judged to be unsatisfactory without hope of 
improvement, but “not so obviously inefficient as to justify . . . annulling the Certificate of 
the Teacher” (Redgrave 1861 19-20). Factory schools reportedly fared no better in 
inspections, with complaints of pupils “scarcely knowing their alphabet after some months” 
(R. Baker 1866 107).  
 The aim was that half-timers would leave at thirteen able to read, write and 
perform arithmetic, with perhaps some basic knowledge of geography and history (R. Baker 
1866 222; Lamb 129). Winder claims, however, that half-timers often departed the system 
“unable to read a simple narrative with understanding . . . incompetent to do more than a 
simple addition or subtraction sum” (230-231).  The Rev. F. Richardson, a superintendent of 
factory schools, observed in 1861 that many half-timers were “incapable of receiving more 
during the five years they remain at school than the mere A B C of knowledge” (qtd. R. 
Baker 1861 32). A range of factors was blamed for low attainment amongst half-timers, 
including exhaustion, inadequate funding, and the limited duration of schooling (“National 
Schoolmaster”, qtd. Chadwick 11; Horner 14; “Headmaster of Parochial School” qtd. 
Chadwick 10). A major subject of criticism, however, was the use of inefficient teaching 
methods: the “methods of teaching some of the common subjects” are described as 
“frequently most ineffectual and stupid” (Winder 219).  
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I want to show that these “ineffectual” teaching methods are portrayed as 
generating cognitive-behavioural pathologies similar to those I have argued Babbage 
attributed to the worker in Economy as a result of computing technology. This is 
exemplified by Winder’s appraisal of a teaching method he had “frequently seen adopted”: 
When the child comes to a word he does not know, he simply spells it out 
letter by letter, and then, without making any attempt to find it out for 
himself, looks up at the teacher, who forthwith to save trouble pronounces 
the word. (227)  
The pupil taught using this method executes a discrete task (reading a word) as a 
deterministic sequence of inflexible actions (“he . . . spells it out letter by letter”). 
Paralleling the operation of the Difference Engine, the child is able to complete this task 
because there is no ambiguity as to how he proceeds from one inflexible action to the next.  
This process corresponds to how, in Economy, the inflexibility of a sequence of actions 
generates a task that can be regarded as a discrete unit. The child, however, does not 
understand the significance of this process any more than the Difference Engine 
comprehends the significance of the data produced by its discrete and inflexible routine of 
calculation: a Lancashire schoolmaster admitted in 1861 that “letters and monosyllables” 
described the level of comprehension amongst his pupils (R. Baker 1861 35). The discrete 
task of “spelling a word” thus remains a decontextualised fragment, similar to the tasks 
performed by the half-timer in the factory.  
The concern was that even when half-timers read narrative rather than fragments 
of text, they did so without understanding the relation of what they were reading to other 
words, concepts or even syllables: “reading mechanically without any apparent notion that 
the words have a meaning” (Winder 222). The inflexible combinations generated by these 
methods are simultaneously represented as decontextualised fragments, similar to the 
inflexible and fragmented processes I have argued were understood to characterise factory 
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labour in this period as a result of Economy.  Because this body of representation draws 
upon a corresponding model of cognitive-behavioural pathology to that found in Economy, 
it anticipates the construction of psychopathology in Ferenczi. That this model is used here 
to formulate a critique of pedagogical methods further intensifies the Ferenczian flavour of 
these sources. 
Cognitive-behavioural pathologies are depicted in these sources as besetting the 
dominant pedagogical methodologies of the period. W.F. Richards, a National school 
headmaster, wrote in 1856 that the catechetical method constituted a key element of the 
teaching in elementary schools: “instructing his pupils by questioning the meaning into 
them, and then examining them by questioning it out of them” (40). Richards observed that 
to do this well required significant skill. He emphasised that questions should be organised 
as a connected series to prevent the material taught from becoming too fragmented (41-
42). Whilst educationalist William Ross cautioned against the practice of regurgitating 
formulaic questions and answers directly from textbooks (83), Richards emphasised that 
pupils should not be forced to provide answers in a prescribed form of words (41).  The 
units of knowledge produced by these methods are depicted in these sources as both 
fragmented and inflexible. I would therefore suggest that these sources regard a 
combination of fragmentation and inflexibility as constituting the totality of trauma, 
making them comparable with both Ferenczian theory and Economy. 
The manner in which the catechetical method is depicted by Ross and Richards 
portrays it as similar to rote learning, in which pupils are required to answer in a 
“prescribed form of words”. Rote learning was a method that exerted a continued grip 
upon schools in this period, often for pragmatic reasons: Ross advised in 1858 that causing 
“the pupils to repeat after him [the teacher]” would be necessary in order to teach large 
classes of half-timers (111).  Writing at the end of the 1850s, the educator H.G. Robinson 
claimed “many lessons are nothing more than a recital of names, dates, technical terms, 
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&c.” (qtd. Senior 337). In 1859 Herbert Spencer observed that teaching rules and facts in 
this manner left them “lying isolated in the mind . . . a confused heap of materials” (61).  
These pedagogies are portrayed as generating effects that parallel the status of the 
Difference Engine as both a self-contained, inflexible routine and a fragment in a wider 
economy of knowledge production. By habituating the child to the routinized performance 
of inflexible, fragmented and decontextualised units, these pedagogies can be thought of 
as causing pupils to function in a similar manner to the Difference Engine. It is my 
contention that a cognitive-behavioural model paralleling the architecture of the Difference 
Engine entered nineteenth-century culture via Economy, informing the representation of 
the conditions of factory labour and the pedagogical systems associated with it. This claim 
would appear to be supported by the fact that Ross compares the rote-type methods 
discussed above with the conditions of labour in factories: “confined rigidly and 
mechanically to his text-book, he ceases to be, in the higher sense of the term, a teacher; 
he is rather a task-master” (83); “attainments thus made are altogether too much a matter 
of mechanism and routine” (99).  
The failure to possess a comprehensive knowledge of various units is depicted by 
Babbage as preventing the maker-worker from developing habits that in Economy 
characterise the manufacturer. Spencer wrote that even if pupils were taught a range of 
facts and rules, their existence as isolated fragments would mean that the pupil would 
ultimately be left with a paucity of knowledge: “the greater part of what has been acquired, 
being unorganised, soon drops out of recollection” (30). For Spencer, the acquisition of 
knowledge alone is not enough: “the art of applying knowledge” must also be taught (30). 
There seems to have been growing consensus amongst mid-century educationalists that in 
order for complex subjects to be communicated effectively, they should be broken down 
into their “simplest elements” (Wayland, qtd. Sullivan 96; see also Drew 5). Equally 
important, however, was ensuring that pupils could form connections between these 
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elements. Ross advises teachers to “connect the newly acquired with the previously 
acquired” (33, emphasis in original), whilst educationalist Thomas Morrison stated in 1863 
that if left without a sense of the connections between units of knowledge, “there is a 
danger of disgusting the child altogether” (98).  
It was emphasised that, wherever possible, pupils should be assisted in discovering 
associations between units of knowledge for themselves. An article in the National 
Society’s Monthly Paper stated in 1858 that “in place of being told the pronunciation of 
words . . . the scholar should be made to discover it for themselves, by applying their mind 
to the sound of the letters placed in connection” (“Lessons on Geography” 148). 
Educationalist George White admitted in 1862, however, that little progress had been 
made in implementing these improved methods in schools for the working classes: “he [the 
child] seems to say . . . ‘Give me a little help in the art of disentangling these elements, and 
of redisposing them, so that I may form words for myself’” (17). According to White, this 
help to disentangle and redispose various “elements” was rarely forthcoming: “It is 
somewhat humiliating . . .  to find so little improvement in school methods” (3).  
The “mechanical” teaching methods described above involve an external authority 
dictating to the child exactly how various units should be organised. I would suggest that 
this corresponds to the separation between executive and directive portion in the Engine 
that this chapter has argued informs the distinction between maker and manufacturer in 
Economy. Winder observes that rather than teaching the half-timer how to construct a 
word from its component units, teachers instead pronounced complete words to “save 
trouble”. White complained that as a result of provision of complete words and formulaic 
answers, “when the same literal elements are found together, the little learner will insist 
on one collocation of them” (17). Through such methods the half-timer is effectively 
programmed to execute one predetermined sequence. This makes the behaviour of the 
half-timer in these sources comparable to that of the Difference Engine.  
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These sources suggest that the teaching of fragmented and decontextualised units 
of knowledge left the pupil reliant on external organisation of these fragments. This can be 
compared with Ferenczi’s claim that the shattered psyche of the incest victim is left 
dependent on the structure provided by the idiom of the incestuous aggressor. Robinson 
claimed that as a result of methods comparable to rote learning, pupils, “if thrown upon 
their own mental resources and required to apply their knowledge, to make new 
combinations, or to draw inferences, immediately are at a loss” (qtd. Senior 335). 
A further point of comparison with Economy is that the ability to exert 
organisational agency within factories continued to be associated with a “good school 
education”. Engineer William Fairbairn observed in 1841 that “[i]t appears to require 
mental training in early life to enable a man to arrange a sequence of operations in the best 
manner for clear and efficient practical efforts” (“Should Working People Be Educated?” 
75). It was implied, however, that preventing the development of these capacities was the 
very purpose of half-time education. Maurice claimed in 1855 that rather than a concern 
for the development of the child, the implicit consideration was how children “might be 
made into the handiest tools for their [the manufacturer’s] purposes” (10). Although 
historian Simon Frith claims that parallels between nineteenth-century factories and 
schools arise from a “shared rational solution to a similar organisation problem” (78), I 
would argue that the cognitive preparation of the pupil for factory work was interpreted as 
a conscious agenda in mid-century texts. Educationalist Robert Sullivan claimed in 1863 
that educators should “impress upon the minds of their pupils the great rule of regularity 
and order . . . subordination to superiors” (100-101, emphasis in original), whilst working-
class poet Elijah Moss wryly observed that “Our masters are determined to care well for 
their hands/if only they will come to school, and there obey commands” (qtd. Robson 106). 
 As in factories, “subordination to superiors” was enforced through scolding and 
corporal punishment (Humphries 359-60). However, some mid-century educationalists saw 
115 
 
this submission as encoded more subtly in teaching methodologies. Historian Leopoldo 
Mesquita observes that rote learning “worked as a ‘pedagogical solution’ to the dilemma 
faced by the upper classes when carrying out the education of the masses and 
simultaneously considering their intellectual development as pernicious” (669-70). This 
section has sought to explain how cognitive habits capable of underpinning disciplinary 
structures were understood to derive from pedagogical methods.  
Spencer claimed that teaching fragmented and inflexible units of knowledge 
engendered susceptibility to external organisation: “Such and such are the meanings of 
these words, says the teacher . . . So and so is the rule in this case . . . By the pupil these 
dicta are received as unquestionable” (49). Spencer goes on to imbue this with political 
significance, arguing that such methods “increase the already undue respect for authority” 
(56). Meanwhile, Winder implies that these subtle disciplinary methods heightened the 
similarities between schools and factories. In an image that can be compared with 
contemporary depictions of the half-timer as machine part, he describes encountering “600 
children present at one time, all under the most perfect command, moving with the 
rapidity and precision of a machine” (Winder 224-25). 
It has been argued in these sections that a body of representation existed at mid-
century that attributed specific cognitive-behavioural pathologies to the child as a result of 
the half-time system. I wish to stress that this is a representational strategy in these texts, 
and thus a potentially distorting lens. For instance, modern historians have shown that half-
timers received myriad influences from their peers and families to counterbalance the 
discipline and teaching in schools (Goldstrom 106). There are also several historiographies 
that illustrate how elementary schooling enabled male textile workers to take advantage of 
subsequent educational opportunities such as mutual improvement societies and 
Mechanics’ Institutes, supporting a rich and often subversive intellectual and political life in 
these communities (J. Rose 62-67; Simon 245; Walton 188-89). What these sections have 
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sought to demonstrate, however, is that many mid-century observers believed there to be 
a correlation between the cognitive-behavioural traits inculcated by schooling and 
increased subservience to the demands of factory work: “educated workers are the most 
controllable, the most efficient” (R. Baker 1866 230). This chapter has argued that these 
mid-century depictions of the cognitive-behavioural effects of factory pedagogies can be 
compared with the computational understanding of the factory system in Economy.  
 
Silas Marner and Factory Pedagogies 
 
This final section offers a reading of Silas Marner that compares this novel with the body of 
mid-century representation discussed above. Whereas critics have previously viewed 
industrial England in the novel as confined to “the outskirts of the landscape” (Horowitz 
175), this section argues that Eliot in Marner explores the relationship between the factory 
system and cognitive-behavioural pathologies. Although critic Susan Stewart observes that 
Silas begins the novel in a proto-industrial setting, she claims that “[a]s Silas’ body moves 
forward in time . . . his practice as a weaver moves backward into earlier and earlier phases 
of weaving artisanry” (523). Rather than the factory, Stewart links Silas’ habitual weaving 
with mythic archetypes such as the Fates (522). This section seeks to illustrate that through 
the experiences of her eponymous protagonist, Eliot portrays modes of labour and 
cognitive-behavioural habits similar to those depicted in Economy and the mid-century 
sources discussed above. I hope to illustrate that by depicting these habits as exacerbated 
by the pedagogical systems that Silas is exposed to, Eliot draws attention to similarities 
between computing and the half-time system.  
As detailed above, by mid-century textile manufacture was firmly associated with 
both child labour and half-time education. Eliot’s decision to make her eponymous 
protagonist a weaver from “North’ard” would have evoked these associations for her 
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contemporaries (Marner 6). Silas’ weaving in his northern town occurs within a system 
known as “putting-out”, a form of labour organisation Babbage identifies as a prototype of 
the factory system he describes in Economy (181). Dealers, or “factors”, supplied materials 
on credit to weavers from a warehouse, or “factory”, and weavers wove cloth in their own 
homes (Zimmermann 7). Finished cloth was returned to the factor, who would arrange for 
its sale (M. Rose 3-4). Silas weaves in his own home (Eliot, Marner 13), but is paid a wage 
by a “wholesale dealer” (16).  
Putting-out, however, was not yet the highly subdivided factory system of 
Economy. Weavers exerted agency over the work carried out within their own homes, 
ordering its component tasks independently (Cronin 2, 106). Because of this relative 
autonomy hand-loom weavers were regarded as superior to common labourers, even if 
their living conditions were often equally wretched (Rule 112). I want to show, however, 
that Eliot regarded even the lesser degree of stratification and less intensive use of 
machinery within the proto-factory system as sufficient to generate cognitive-behavioural 
pathologies in the worker.  
Marner suggests that the forms of machinofacture described in Economy 
exacerbated an existing tendency towards cognitive-behavioural pathology in the proto-
factory system. In combination with division of labour, weaving by machine allows Silas to 
spend the majority of his time “moving with . . . even repetition” (Eliot, Marner 20). Eliot 
emphasises that this form of labour organisation generates certain cognitive-behavioural 
habits: “His loom, as he [Silas] wrought in it without ceasing, had in its turn wrought on 
him” (40). Paralleling Eliot’s representational strategy in Deronda, Silas’ habits are made 
visible by inscribing them onto his body. He is depicted “bent . . . into a constant 
mechanical relation” to his loom (19): “he produced the same sort of impression as a 
handle or a crooked tube, which has no meaning standing apart” (19). His habits 
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determined by labour organisation and loom, Silas functions as a fragmented unit, a 
“component” similar to a handle or tube.  
In an image similar to those that depict the half-timer as machine part, Eliot depicts 
Silas’ fragmented unit of behaviour as vulnerable to decontextualisation: his unit of labour 
and, by extension, his cognitive-behavioural capacities, have “no meaning standing apart”. 
This image of Silas as machine part also parallels mid-century accounts of the factory 
system in its suggestion that fragmentation and decontextualisation result in the cognitive-
behavioural capacities of workers becoming machinelike: “like all objects to which a man 
devotes himself, they had fashioned him into correspondence with themselves” (40).  
I would argue that Silas’ cognitive-behavioural capacities share correspondences 
with one machine in particular: the Difference Engine. It is functioning in a similar manner 
to this computer that for Silas exacerbates the pathologies of the proto-factory system. 
This can be compared with Babbage’s intervention in shaping an emergent factory system. 
Written in consultation with Babbage, a series of articles detailing the mathematical and 
mechanical principles of the Engines were published during the 1830s and 1840s by 
Lardner and the mathematicians Ada Lovelace (1815-1852) and Luigi Menabrea (1809-
1896). It is my contention that the influence of these accounts can be traced in Marner. 
Silas habitually arranges coins in piles in order to compute his earnings, creating an 
arrangement similar to the columns of stacked discs in the Difference Engine (18). He then 
uses these metal discs to form a numerical sequence:  
Do we not wile away moments of inanity or fatigued waiting by repeating 
some trivial movement or sound, until the repetition has bred a want, 
which is incipient habit? . . . Marner wanted the heaps of ten [coins] to 
grow into a square, and then into a larger square. . . (18, emphasis added)  
This repetition of a fragmentary and decontextualised unit of behaviour is described as 
generating a “habit”, paralleling Babbage’s terminology in Economy. In a similar manner to 
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the Difference Engine, Silas progresses from smaller to larger “squares” using an inflexible 
and deterministic computational routine: Menabrea highlights the calculation of square 
numbers as a routine particularly suited to this computer (228). By consistently adding ten 
coins Silas engineers a constant difference that generates the sequence. This produces a 
“tabular” value: the money literally arranged on Silas’ table (Eliot, Marner 160). I would 
suggest that the similarity of Silas’ computational routine to those depicted in 
contemporary accounts of the Difference Engine indicates that Eliot was aware of the 
principles underlying this computer. The inflexibility of this routine gives it the semblance 
of a discrete fragment or decontextualised “function”, thus making it comparable to the 
depiction of labour in Economy : Silas executes “mere functions of weaving and hoarding, 
without any contemplation of an end towards which the functions tended” (19).  
Silas’ execution of this computational program exacerbates similar pathologies in 
his weaving routine, generating isolated “functions” of “weaving and hoarding”. Silas’ 
weaving is fashioned into correspondence with his computational routine, with the 
repetition of an inflexible sequence of actions forming successive “squares”: he sees “the 
little squares in the cloth complete themselves under his effort” (15). Silas’ weaving 
therefore parallels Babbage’s computational understanding of the manner in which the 
inflexibility of a sequential routine generates the semblance of a “limited and simple” (as 
opposed to complex) task. Each repetition of this inflexible weaving routine generates a 
single square. This can be compared with the way in which each discrete repetition of Silas’ 
computational program generates a square. As is the case with the Engine, the inflexibility 
of Silas’ weaving routine- its “even repetition”- works to obscure its complexities, allowing 
it to be regarded as a discrete fragment. As it did for Babbage, computing appears to have 
suggested to Eliot a mode of working that intensifies the effect of pathologies of 
fragmentation and inflexibility inherent in the proto-factory system.  
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 These habits impair Silas’ ability to form connections between various discrete 
units, making them comparable to the cognitive-behavioural pathologies in Economy:  
he [Silas] had had a brown earthenware pot . . . One day as he was 
returning from the well, he stumbled against the step of the stile, and his 
brown pot, falling with force . . . was broken . . . The brown pot could never 
be of use to him any more, but he stuck the bits together and propped the 
ruin in its old place for a memorial. (19-20) 
Throughout the novel Silas’ behaviours are portrayed as a collection of fragmented and 
decontextualised units. His computations are described as “another element of life, like the 
weaving” (16). Eliot describes these “elements” as “subsisting quite aloof” from one 
another (16). Juxtaposing these discrete behavioural units only emphasises their 
decontextualisation: “the money had come to mark off his weaving into periods” (18, 
emphasis added). Silas lacks the ability to take various “elements . . . and blend them with 
his new impressions, till he recovered a consciousness of unity” (138).  
Although the fragments of Silas’ pot are placed together in a constellation that 
superficially gives the semblance of a whole object, on closer inspection it emerges that 
because the fragments are not adequately connected, the whole is rendered non-
functional. I would suggest that Silas’ pot can be regarded as another material embodiment 
of his cognitive-behavioural capacities, symbolising his inability to construct a functional 
“unity” between various “elements”. This leaves him vulnerable to the collapse of any 
system that undertakes the role of the manufacturer in organising his fragmentary 
behaviours: the “immediate purpose, which fenced him in from the wide, cheerless 
unknown” (74).  
The point at which this fragmentation occurs would appear to be significant. A stile 
functions as a type of “lock” whose “key” can be interpreted as the cognitive and 
behavioural capabilities of an individual. This image suggests that Silas’ cognitive-
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behavioural habits have locked him out from the possibility of negotiating change without 
suffering fragmentation; a fragmentation symbolised by the shattering of his pot. The 
image of the stile forms part of a semantic field surrounding keys and locks in the novel. 
These images are similar those used at mid-century to describe the cognitive-behavioural 
pathologies of the factory worker. The Children’s Employment Commission saw the plight 
of metalworkers left unable to forge both locks and keys as exemplifying the defects of 
industrial education: “They serve their time . . . with a locksmith, and they cannot make a 
key; the keymaker cannot make a lock, &c” (qtd. Senior 214).   
A lock and key form two discrete, but intimately associated units. For these units to 
achieve functionality there must be an understanding of the way in which they are linked. 
As fragments with “no meaning standing apart”, they can be compared with the image of 
Silas as machine part. What is signified by locks and keys in this image, however, is a set of 
cognitive-behavioural capacities. It emphasises that in the factory system, the habits 
necessary to construct a lock, and those necessary to construct a key, are isolated in 
individual workers. Unless these are brought into relation by the manufacturer, nothing 
functional can result. Paralleling the division between maker and manufacturer in 
Economy, the worker who does not possess the habits of both lock and key is understood 
to relinquish their personal agency to one who understands the relation of these units, in a 
similar manner to how a person who only owns one unit of a lock and key loses agency 
over physical space. 
When Silas tries to explain one of the “elements” of his former life to his neighbour 
she is unable to understand him, as “experience gave her no key” (Eliot, Marner 138). Silas’ 
system of weaving and computing undergoes total fragmentation when he is deprived of 
one of its components through the theft of his gold. This occurs when Silas uses his key as a 
part of a makeshift roasting-jack, one composed of “a string passed through a large door-
key” (37).  This key is similar to Silas in that it is isolated from a functional constellation of 
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interrelated units and forced to operate as a fragmented and decontextualised machine 
part. Failing to maintain these interrelated units in contact, Silas leaves his front door 
unlocked, placing him at the mercy of those who would aggressively reconfigure and 
exploit his working environment. 
Eliot compares the loss of Silas’ gold to the forcing of a lock, a species of damage 
that prevents this unit from again operating as part of a functional combination: “his heart 
had been as a locked casket . . . but now the casket was empty, and the lock was broken” 
(79).  Although he does not provide specific textual evidence, critic Walter Francis Wright 
claims that Eliot felt that a reduction in the division of labour was necessary, and that 
workers should be capable of “shifting to a related type of labour” (1113-14). I would 
suggest that the pathologies described in this chapter offer a rationale for Eliot’s belief that 
preventing excessive fragmentation of the labour process enables workers to adapt to 
industrial change.  
The final part of this chapter aims to show that Eliot represents the cognitive-
behavioural pathologies generated by Silas’ pedagogical experiences as similar to those 
generated by his proto-factory labour. Silas is a member of a religious fellowship, referred 
to as “the church assembling in Lantern Yard” (Eliot, Marner 8). “[E]arly incorporated” into 
this sect, it is here that Silas receives his elementary education (8). This section argues that 
the pedagogy Silas receives at Lantern Yard corresponds to descriptions of mid-century 
teaching methods: 
the pulpit where the minister delivered unquestioned doctrine, and 
swayed to and fro, and handled the book in a long-accustomed manner; 
the very pauses between the couplets of the hymn, as it was given out, and 
the recurrent swell of voices . . . these things had been the channel of 
divine influences to Marner . . . (14)  
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The way in which this “unquestioned doctrine” is delivered can be compared with the 
repetition of predetermined responses criticised by Ross and Richards, with multiple voices 
answering the minister in “recurrent” chorus. This pedagogy also corresponds to Winder’s 
description of the “stupid” methods used in mid-century schools, where the teacher 
pronounces the word to “save trouble”: “A weaver who finds hard words in his hymn-book 
knows nothing of abstractions” (14). The pronunciation of the words is provided for Silas by 
the congregation, and he therefore absorbs this “teaching” without actually understanding 
what he is reading: he is left “know[ing] nothing”. Because Silas reads these “hard words” 
without understanding, they remain fragmentary and decontextualised.  
These methods are depicted as habituating Silas to the organisation of cognitive-
behavioural units by external authority: 
To people accustomed to reason about the forms in which their religious 
feeling has incorporated itself, it is difficult to enter into that simple, 
untaught state of mind in which the form and the feeling has never been 
severed by an act of reflection. (13) 
Silas has not been taught the “reason[ing]” skills that would enable him to connect various 
units of knowledge. Paralleling Ferenczi’s portrayal of the effects of cognitive-behavioural 
pathologies, this leaves Silas vulnerable to the imposition of inflexible structures (“forms”) 
of behaviour. In an image that can be compared with White’s description of pupils 
mechanically executing one “collocation” of letters, these “forms” generate a type of 
preprogramed action similar to that found in the Engine. These structures persist in the 
inflexible form in which they were taught, as Silas has no skills that would enable him to 
reconfigure their components. These cognitive-behavioural limitations cause Silas’ 
cognitive-behavioural capacities to parallel the preprogramed routine of the Difference 
Engine, and by extension, the capacities required of the worker in Economy. The 
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description of Silas as “untaught” suggests that Eliot considered such pedagogies to hardly 
constitute an education at all.  
As a result of these pedagogies the fragmentary knowledge imparted to Silas at 
Lantern Yard exists as an inflexible structure, epitomised by the monolithic “principles of 
the Church” (12). Their inflexibility can be compared with White’s assertion that teaching 
methods led half-timers to insist upon one fixed “collocation” of units. Yet after Silas’ faith 
in one of these principles is shattered, the drawing of lots as a means of judgment, he 
realises that this element of Lantern Yard practice cannot be questioned without 
experiencing the fragmentation of the whole: “if she did not believe the testimony against 
him, her whole faith must be upset as his was” (12). Because Silas lacks the habits 
necessary for flexible cognition and behaviour, any forcible alteration to an inflexible unit 
results in the total atomisation of the system. This suggests that Eliot in Marner depicts a 
model similar to that which characterises Economy, in which imparting knowledge as an 
inflexible structure generates pathologies of fragmentation and decontextualisation.  
Eliot, like her contemporaries, implies that the purpose of these pedagogies was 
not cognitive-behavioural development but social control. It initially appears that the 
ordinary members of Lantern Yard possess a degree of agency: it is described as a place 
“where the poorest layman . . . has, at the very least, the weight of a silent voter in the 
government of his community” (8).  I want to suggest that the “silent” vote of the 
“poorest” in Marner is meaningless because they lack habits that would enable them to 
disentangle themselves from externally imposed structures of control. It emerges that the 
Lantern Yard authorities do not tolerate deviation from prescribed “principles”, preventing 
individual members from acting upon dictates of “reason” that are not “sanctioned by the 
feeling of the community” (10). Eliot depicts these pedagogies as literally preparing the 
ground for the structures of the factory system: when Silas returns some decades later to 
what has become a “great manufacturing town” (171), Lantern Yard has been replaced by a 
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“large factory” (173).  Eliot, like her contemporaries, represents the factory system as an 
edifice built upon cognitive-behavioural pathologies.  
This chapter has sought to explore correspondences between computing 
technology and the factory system portrayed in Economy. It has claimed that drawing 
parallels between computers and the factory system led Babbage to depict workers with 
cognitive-behavioural habits comparable to the psychopathologies that Ferenczi associated 
with incest trauma. This chapter has also focused upon contemporary sources relating to 
the operation of the half-time system in Lancashire and Yorkshire in the 1850s and 1860s, 
with the aim of exploring how cognitive-behavioural habits similar to those depicted in 
Economy are portrayed in mid-century depictions of factory pedagogies.  This chapter has 
argued that Eliot engages with this body of mid-century representation in Marner, 
highlighting correspondences between factory pedagogies, cognitive-behavioural 
pathologies, and nineteenth-century computing technology.  
The purpose of these first two chapters has been to highlight and explore a model 
that depicts cognitive-behavioural pathology in terms of fragmentation and inflexibility. 
This chapter has argued that this model was shaped in the nineteenth century by the 
computational architecture of the Difference Engine. The next chapter seeks to illustrate 
how a tradition of representing normative cognition as a flexible arrangement of inflexible 
units was given a specific computational expression as a result of a second computer 
designed by Babbage. Another key purpose of this chapter is to draw attention to a 
corresponding expression of this tradition in mid-twentieth-century attachment theory.  
This chapter intends to show that, as a result of their basis in computational 
models, both the mid-nineteenth-century and mid-twentieth-century expressions of this 
tradition figure normative flexible behaviour as composed from states possessing 
correspondences with those found in incest trauma. I argue that these correspondences 
between pathological and normative states arose in the nineteenth century from 
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similarities between the Difference Engine and a second, more flexible computer designed 
by Babbage. This chapter seeks to demonstrate that this resulted in the narrative of 
normative cognitive-behavioural development that Babbage derived from the 
developmental trajectory of his mechanical computers retaining similarities with 
incestuous pathologies and pedagogies associated with nineteenth-century factories. I also 
hope to show that by considering the cultural implications of the computational expression 
of this tradition in the nineteenth century, it is possible to uncover similar pathological 
connotations in modern attachment theory. This movement between the second and third 
chapter therefore represents a transitional moment in my thesis, one in which 














Teaching Children and Computers: Constructing Flexible Behaviour from Babbage to 
Bowlby  
 
This chapter seeks to draw attention to similarities between computational models of 
mental processing in mid-twentieth-century cognitive science and attachment theory, and 
computational models of mental processing in the mid-nineteenth century. This chapter 
aims to show that these models are corresponding computational expressions of a tradition 
of depicting flexible cognition as a flexible arrangement of inflexible units.  Another 
purpose of this comparison is to show that this computational model depicts flexible 
cognition and behaviour as constructed from states of inflexibility and fragmentation 
similar to those found in Ferenczian incest trauma. This is a transitional chapter that seeks 
to identify parallels between the pathologies of incest trauma and the factory system 
discussed in the first half of this thesis, and the normative structures of cognition and 
behaviour I now address in the second.  
This chapter is characterised by a reverse chronological movement, with twentieth-
century computing and cognitive science used as an interpretative framework for 
nineteenth-century models of computing, cognition and behaviour. This approach is 
controversial: historian Doron Swade cautions that “backward projection[s] from the 
modern computer age” are “fraught with the known historiographic hazards of 
anachronical interpretation” (“Construction” 70). Although I understand these concerns, I 
hope that this chapter will demonstrate that a comparison of mid-twentieth and mid-
nineteenth-century computing can offer a rigorous means of comparing not only 
computational models, but also the cognitive-behavioural models that derive from them. 
This chapter aims to show that these correspondences can reveal previously overlooked 
aspects of both nineteenth- and twentieth-century thought.  
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This chapter begins with a discussion of concepts from mid-twentieth-century 
computing. It then proceeds to explore similarities between these computational concepts 
and the cognitive-behavioural model in Plans and the Structure of Behaviour (1960), a text 
written by the American cognitive scientists George Miller (1920-2012), Eugene Galanter 
(1924-) and Karl Pribram (1919-2015). A foundational text of cognitive science, Plans was 
instrumental in disseminating computational models of mental processing (Gardner 32; 
Migone and Liotti 1075). I argue that the model of cognitive-behavioural flexibility in this 
text parallels the computational model of flexibility as a flexible arrangement of inflexible 
units within modular hierarchies. This reading interprets Plans as a specifically 
computational expression of the tradition described in this thesis, in which flexible 
cognition and behaviour are constructed from states similar to those found in Ferenczian 
incest trauma. This interpretation of Plans is also intended to illustrate that pedagogies 
depicted in this text as normative share similarities with the incestuous pedagogies 
described in previous chapters.  
The next part of the chapter seeks to trace correspondences between the model of 
computational complexity and flexibility found in mid-twentieth century computing and 
that found in Babbage’s second computer, the Analytical Engine. This computer was 
intended as a general-purpose machine for arithmetical computation. The major design 
work for the Analytical Engine took place during the 1830s and 1840s, although Babbage 
continued to produce designs for this Engine until his death in 1871 (Bromley, “1838” 196). 
A trial portion of the Analytical Engine was assembled circa 1870, but a full-scale version 
was never constructed. This section aims to show that flexibility in the Analytical Engine 
consists of the flexible arrangement of inflexible units within modular hierarchies. This 
makes the architecture of flexibility in this computer similar to that found in mid-twentieth 
century computing.  
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I argue that the reason why computational flexibility is structured in this manner is that 
the architecture of the Analytical Engine evolved from that of the Difference Engine as an 
inflexible arrangement of inflexible units within modular hierarchies. It is my contention 
that establishing inflexible routines in the Difference Engine provided Babbage with the 
structural basis for subsequent computational flexibility. As far as I am aware, this is the 
first time that this understanding of the relationship between the Engines has been 
explicitly formulated. This interpretation of the architectural development of the Engines 
seeks to contribute to scholarship regarding their design evolution. Existing scholarship has 
primarily focused upon Babbage’s insight that the Difference Engine could be made to 
function as a differential analyser by altering the arrangement of its columns, thus 
anticipating the increased capabilities of the Analytical Engine (Bromley, “Evolution” 120; 
Collier and MacLachlan 75-76).  
The next part of the chapter is intended to show that the model of human cognition 
and behaviour that Babbage offers in Passages from the Life of a Philosopher (1864) is 
underwritten by specific principles of the Engines. It also seeks to claim that as a result of 
their basis in similar computational models, Passages and Plans represent corresponding 
computational expressions of the tradition depicted in this thesis. Despite the scholarly 
interest in Passages demonstrated by historians including James Essinger, Antony Hyman 
and Laura Snyder, large segments of this text have never been subjected to critical analysis, 
including the “sketch” I consider in this chapter. I want to show that that interpreting these 
understudied segments of Passages in conjunction with close attention to the technical 
detail of the Engines can offer new interpretations of how the structure of human cognition 
and behaviour is depicted in this text. 
As discussed in the introduction to this thesis, several historians remain sceptical as to 
whether Babbage attached cognitive significance to his machines. Most Babbage historians 
acknowledge that he regarded his Engines as a substitute for certain cognitive processes, 
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particularly routinized calculation (Green, “Mechanical Model” 42; Kuskey 256). As Swade 
observes, “by exerting a physical force, you could for the first time achieve results that up 
to that point in history could only have been arrived at by mental effort” (Difference Engine 
83). Claiming that the Engines are capable of replacing certain human mental processes, 
however, is not the same as asserting that Babbage understood the operation of his 
machines to correspond to human mental processing. Although a number of historians 
have argued for the latter, a perceived shortage of evidence from Babbage’s own writings 
has given critics limited scope to assess how Babbage conceptualised the cognitive 
significance of the Engines.  
William Ashworth, along with Snyder and Swade, cites Babbage’s biographer Henry 
Wilmot Buxton, who observed that “the marvellous pulp and fibre of a brain had been 
substituted by brass and iron. He [Babbage] had taught wheelwork to think, or at least to 
do the office of thought” (qtd. Snyder 88; see also Ashworth 649; Swade Difference Engine 
85). These historians interpret this as a claim for equivalence between human and machine 
processing, but Buxton’s wording is far more equivocal than this, speaking in terms of 
“substitut[ion]” and the Engine performing the “office of thought”. Similarly, historians 
Simon Schaffer and M. Norton Wise refer to phrases such as “the engine knows” and 
references to the “foresight” of the carry mechanisms as evidence that Babbage perceived 
similarities between the Engines and human mental processing (Schaffer, “Intelligence” 
207; Wise 175). However, without additional substantiation, such phrasing has been 
dismissed as convenient descriptive shorthand (Cook 346; Green, “Mechanical Model” 42).  
This chapter discusses the work of several historians who have offered suggestions as 
to various similarities that Babbage might have perceived between human and machine 
intelligence. In an elaboration of Schaffer’s argument that Babbage saw machine 
intelligence as subject to formal rules, Harro Maas and Herbert Sussman conjecture that 
Babbage may have figured equivalence between human and machine processing in these 
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terms. As discussed below, historians have also considered parallels between the Engines 
and the symbol manipulation carried out by the mind in algebraic reasoning. Although the 
theories advanced by these historians are both intelligent and plausible, I would suggest 
that the absence of any sustained attempt to map technical features of the Engines onto 
material drawn from Babbage’s own writings has made it difficult to assess their validity. 
This shortage of technical detail has also, on occasion, resulted in imprecise statements as 
to how relationships are foregrounded between the Engines and human mental processing. 
This chapter seeks to address these issues by explaining how specific features of the 
Engines correspond to the model of human cognition and behaviour in Passages. 
I want to show that Passages not only contributes a computational model of 
human cognition and behaviour, but also a computational model of human development 
corresponding to the developmental trajectory of the Engines. I claim that because of 
architectural similarities between the Difference and Analytical Engines, normative flexible 
cognition and behaviour is depicted as encompassing states found in incest trauma. This 
interpretation of Passages forms the basis for my argument that the developmental model 
depicted in this text is comparable to that found in Plans. A further similarity with Plans is 
that the computational model of cognitive-behavioural development in Passages is also a 
pedagogical model. I wish to illustrate that architectural correspondences between the 
Engines generated parallels between the normative pedagogies of Passages and the 
incestuous pedagogies of Economy. As detailed in the introduction to this thesis, historian 
Tamara Ketabgian identifies a dual register of the psychically vital and psychically 
deadening machine in nineteenth-century culture. This chapter suggests that nineteenth-
century computing resulted in these registers sharing fundamental similarities, considering 
for the first time these implications of Babbage’s thinking. 
This chapter concludes with a discussion of similarities between the model of 
human cognition and behaviour found in Passages and Plans, and that found in modern 
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attachment theory.  A primary reason for my selection of Plans as an object of study is its 
influence upon the work of the British psychologist John Bowlby (1907-1990), who cited 
this text as an influence upon some of his most important theoretical work. I want to show 
that as a result of Plans, concepts deriving from mid-century computing can be traced in 
Bowlby’s seminal text Attachment (1969) and subsequent theoretical volumes including 
The Making and Breaking of Affectional Bonds (1979) and A Secure Base (1988).12 I offer 
this as an intervention into current scholarship concerning the history of psychoanalytical 
thought, as a detailed study of how the attachment model shares correspondences with 
models from mid-century computing. 
 Having argued that as a result of their basis in similar computational models the 
cognitive-behavioural model in Passages corresponds to that found in Plans, I claim that 
the model of flexible behaviour in attachment theory represents another comparable 
computational expression of the tradition described in this thesis. This chapter also argues 
that an additional reason for similarities in the expression of this tradition in Passages, 
Plans and attachment theory is the intersection of this computational model with 
pedagogical discourses. I hope to show that tracing these intersections can reveal 
correspondences between the normative pedagogies foregrounded by attachment theory 
and the incestuous pedagogies described in previous chapters. As well as seeking to 
contribute to existing historiographies of mental science and pedagogical theory, I wish to 
foreground these correspondences as a means of supporting the claim of attachment 
theory to be a historically sensitive framework with which to interpret nineteenth-century 
literature and culture.  
 
 
                                                          
12 Bowlby also published a revised edition of Attachment in 1982. All the material from 
Attachment referenced in this chapter, however, can be found in the 1969 edition. 
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Mid-Twentieth-Century Computing  
 
This account of mid-century computing synthesises the work of several individuals whose 
influence upon Plans is cited by Miller, Galanter and Pribram: the British computer scientist 
Alan Turing (1912-1954), and the American computer scientists Marvin Minsky (1927- ), 
Allen Newell (1927-1992), John Clifford Shaw (1922-1991), and Herbert A. Simon (1916-
2001). Further to these sources, John Haugeland’s Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea 
(1985) provided me with an invaluable point of entry into the computer science of this 
period. By the mid-twentieth century the computer had been formalised as an information 
processing system (IPS). An IPS has properties that make it describable as an automatic 
formal system. This section aims to explain these statements and to discuss their 
implication for the type of flexibility achievable within computers.  
An IPS is designed to interpret and operate upon “symbol tokens” (Newell and 
Simon 23). Symbol tokens are the discrete entities manipulated by the IPS, for instance, 
numerical or binary digits. There are two broad categories of symbol tokens: symbol tokens 
that are interpreted within the IPS as instructions, and symbol tokens that are interpreted 
as data. Each symbol token is identified by the formal rules acting upon it within a specific 
IPS. Newell and Simon state that if two symbol tokens are acted upon by the same rules, 
then they are of the same “symbol type” (31). There is no ambiguity in this designation: any 
properties of a symbol token that do not have a bearing upon the formal rules of the IPS 
are treated as irrelevant (29).13 This ability to precisely identify symbol tokens is what 
makes computers digital (Haugeland 53).  
                                                          
13 These meanings may be relevant, however, to how the eventual output of the system is 
interpreted. Yet because an IPS is self-contained, any interpretation beyond that specified 
by the rules of the system is beyond its remit (Haugeland 50).  
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 As Haugeland writes, an automatic formal system is one capable of operating upon 
symbol tokens without external intervention (76). An IPS has the ability to execute a finite 
set of elementary operations, each perfectly definite and simple enough to be automated 
using known mechanism (Newell and Simon 151, 29; Minsky 27). These inflexible 
operations are referred to as “elementary information processes” or “primitive 
process[es]”(Newell and Simon 20; Newell, Shaw and Simon 151). The ability to automate 
primitive processes allows an IPS to be automatic. Each primitive process must be specified 
by an inflexible “primitive instruction”: “Symbols that designate elementary information 
processes, so that these eip’s [sic] can be executed by means of these symbols” (Newell 
and Simon 25). An IPS must also possess a mechanism capable of bridging between 
primitive instructions and primitive processes. Newell and Simon call this mechanism an 
“interpreter” (37), whilst Turing terms it a “control mechanism” (“Computing Machinery” 
437). This mechanism interprets the current instruction and then locates the next in the 
sequence: “it is the duty of the control to see that these instructions are obeyed correctly 
and in the right order” (Turing, “Computing Machinery” 437). A tripartite organisation thus 
emerges of primitive instructions, control mechanism, and primitive processes.   
Newell and Simon write that “The entire behaviour of an IPS is compounded out of 
sequences of these elementary processes” (29). The simplest way to generate complexity is 
to have one primitive process follow directly after another. Because each corresponds to a 
primitive instruction, a chain of primitive processes requires a corresponding chain of 
primitive instructions. A chain of primitive instructions is formed by specifying their 
relationship to one another using the “the single relation next (with sometimes the inverse 
relation, prior)” (28). Newell and Simon refer to such chains as “list structures” (28). Joining 
sequences of primitive instructions using specified relationships generates an algorithm, a 
“recipe” with the potential to infallibly attain a specified outcome in a finite number of 
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steps (Haugeland 65). Its construction means that an algorithm possesses a “composite” or 
hierarchical structure (Newell and Simon 22).  
Newell and Simon observe that “it might be thought that the possible variation in 
[the order of] elementary processes . . . would still be essentially unlimited. This proves not 
to be the case” (29). Legal combinations are circumscribed by “a set of rules . . . that 
describe sequences of eip’s [sic] as a function of the informational context” (31). Because 
of this, computer science at mid-century focused upon “well-defined” fields such as chess 
and mathematics “in which the rules are defined with absolute clarity” (Minksy 9, 21). As 
Minsky observes, because the components of an algorithm are defined by their relationship 
to formal rules, they are a species of symbol token (25). The ability to designate 
relationships between symbol tokens according to formal rules is another feature of an 
automatic formal system (Haugeland 48). Combinations conforming to the rules of an IPS 
are referred to as “symbol structures” (Newell and Simon 21). Turing termed symbol 
structures designating instructions “instruction tables” (“Computing Machinery” 438), but 
the name given to them by Newell and Simon will be more familiar: programs (21).  
The problem with list structures is that they cannot encompass contingencies. It is, 
however, possible to stipulate a rule that allows the machine to “branch” between two or 
more instructions when a specified contigency arises: for instance, if the symbol token 
arrived at is x, then execute instruction A, if the symbol token arrived at is y, then execute 
instruction B (Turing, “Heretical Theory” 437-38). This rule must be precisely stated: “The 
machine interprets whatever it is told in a quite definitive manner” (Turing, “Lecture” 392). 
Newell and Simon term this a “tree structure” (26), but I will use the more familiar 
“conditional branching”.  
Although he does not use either term, Turing identifies iterative loops as an use for 
conditional branching. He observes that a typical conditional branch of this type specifies 
that if a certain condition is attained, then the control should locate the next instruction, 
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but if it is not, then the current instruction should be repeated (“Lecture” 388-89). This 
allows a process to be repeated a number of times unknown to the human programmer at 
the time of composing the program. Branched programs share similarities with list 
structures that make them both describable as algorithms. They are hierarchically-
structured routines for infallibly attaining a specified outcome within a finite number of 
steps, constrained by a “definite set of rules for combining processes into whole programs” 
(Newell, Shaw and Simon 151). The key difference, however, is that a branched algorithm 
achieves a degree of flexibility through the flexible arrangement of inflexible units.   
Relationships specified between primitive instructions act as a form of “algorithmic 
glue” binding the component units of an algorithm together (Haugeland 70). This allows an 
entire algorithm- including any conditional branches it contains- to be treated as a discrete 
instruction within a more complex routine (Newell and Simon 28). It also enables an 
algorithm to be designated by a single symbol token at a higher hierarchical level: 
“hierarchical structures of lists may be built up, in which some lists contain symbols that 
name other lists” (28). Turing calls these “subsidiary tables” (“Lecture” 389), whilst Newell 
and Simon term them “subprograms” (37). A subprogram can function as a standardised 
component  when constructing programs: Turing observes that routines are largely 
composed of instructions “taken off the shelf” (“Lecture” 390).  
Specifying rule-determined relationships between sequences of subprograms joins 
them using the “algorithmic glue” used to join together primitive instructions: “As new 
symbol structures are stored . . . they are designated by symbols . . . These new names can, 
in turn, be embedded as symbols in other symbol structures” (Newell and Simon 792). 
From this it is possible to visualise the complexity that can be constructed. Sequences of 
subprograms can be treated as a single, discrete subprogram in a more complex 
instruction, and so forth (Newell and Simon 729; Haugeland 80). These units, once 
constructed, can also be specified as part of a conditional branch (Haugeland 74). The 
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architecture of computational flexibility therefore consists of the flexible arrangement of 
inflexible units at multiple levels within a hierarchical structure.  
The emphasis at mid-century upon using computers to solve problems in fields 
such as mathematics, logic and chess made it imperative to find a means of allowing an IPS 
to make nondeterministic choices (Garnham 134). Problem solving in these sources is 
typically figured as a search through a space of potential solutions, with an important 
category of search identified as the search for the right sequence of primitive processes or 
subprograms to attain a desired outcome (Newell and Simon 82; Minsky 9): “the problem is 
clearly equivalent to that of finding a program” (Turing, “Intelligent Machinery” 430).  
However, multiple sequences can be identified as legal responses to a specified 
contingency: the rules of an IPS can state “what sequences may legitimately be 
constructed, not what particular sequence should be constructed” (Newell, Shaw and 
Simon 159). The choice between routines is nondeterministic, but an algorithm must be 
deterministic. One way to resolve this difficulty is to trial all sequences consecutively, but 
as Minsky points out, this approach is usually uneconomical (9). There must be a means for 
the IPS to (a) generate routines as solutions and (b) select between solutions without 
needing to trial every possibility.  
A property of programs that facilitates the generation of solutions is that as a 
species of symbol structure, programs can be generated and modified by other symbol 
structures, or programs: “If the IPS wishes . . . [to] construct or modify a program, then it 
must deal with the program as a symbol structure” (Newell and Simon 36). Newell and 
Simon observe that this ability to treat a symbol structure as data to be operated upon and 
as a program to be executed allows a program to compose or manipulate another program: 
“algorithms should exist for the component processes for selecting, evaluating and 
analysing operators” (192). Newell, Shaw and Simon term programs used to operate upon 
other programs “master routines” (153).  
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The difficulty of nondeterministic choice was solved by incorporating “rules of 
thumb” or general principles into master routines. Newell and Simon term these principles 
“methods” (91). Methods consist of precisely stated rules: “machines can be made to do 
any rule of thumb process by remembering suitable instructions” (Turing, “Lecture” 385). In 
a similar manner to branched or list structures, these deterministic methods can only 
operate upon symbol tokens within the rules governing a particular IPS (Newell and Simon 
91-92). Another point of comparison with branched and list structure algorithms is that the 
flexibility afforded by these programs consists of the flexible ordering of inflexible 
subprograms or primitive processes. The crucial difference is that these programs cannot 
guarantee that a specified result could be achieved in a finite number of steps: “there must 
always remain some core of search, or ‘trial and error’” (Minsky 9). Potentially fallible 
programs of this type are described as “heuristic” (Newell and Simon 116).  
But are heuristic programs algorithms? The intuitive answer is no, as an algorithm 
is an infallible routine. However, if we define “specified result” as determining an optimal 
choice according to well-defined rules and within a specified time frame, then an IPS is able 
to do this infallibly: “the same inner system could be regarded from one point of view as 
performing an algorithmic calculation . . . and from another point of view as making 
somewhat clever (though fallible) heuristic decisions” (Haugeland 114). Like the majority of 
programs in an IPS, heuristic programs are generally provided by human programmers: 
“One must therefore not expect a machine to do a great deal of building up of instruction 
tables on its own” (Turing, “Lecture” 394). It was hypothesised, however, that by operating 
upon programs using preprogramed master routines, an IPS could modify its behaviour 
whilst remaining within the parameters of deterministic rules (393). Again, this consists of 
manipulating inflexible units (symbol tokens) at multiple levels within a hierarchical 




Computational Models and Plans and the Structure of Behaviour 
 
The purpose of this section is to show that the model of cognition and behaviour described 
by Miller, Galanter and Pribram corresponds to the structure of automatic formal systems. 
In Plans, the tripartite structure of instructions, control mechanism and executable 
behaviours found in an IPS is mapped straightforwardly onto human cognition and 
behaviour. Miller, Galanter and Pribram claim that each cognitive or behavioural action 
must have corresponding “instructions . . . that could guide the action described” (16). They 
term these instructions “Plans”, capitalising to distinguish from ordinary usage (16). These 
Plans are explicitly compared with computer programs: “we are reasonably confident that 
‘program’ could be substituted everywhere for ‘Plan’” (16). The parallel of the control 
mechanism is envisaged as a feedback loop that interprets an instruction, confirms it has 
been executed, and then passes control to the next instruction (26-28): “This concept 
appears most frequently in the discussion of computing machines, where control of the 
machine’s operations passes from one instruction to another” (28). This mechanism 
mediates between instructions and executable processes: “we shall say that a creature is 
executing a particular Plan when in fact that Plan is controlling the sequence of operations 
he is carrying out” (17).  
Paralleling the structure of computational complexity in an IPS, cognitive-
behavioural complexity is achieved by constructing hierarchies of “elementary unit[s]” (21). 
Miller, Galanter and Pribram describe the construction of a hierarchically-structured 
behaviour that they term X. This behaviour is represented at the lowest hierarchical level as 
the sequence of elementary behaviours a, b, c, d, and e (13). These can be compared with 
the primitive processes in an IPS: “A Plan is . . . essentially the same as a program for a 
computer, especially if the program has the sort of hierarchical character described” (16). 
As historian Hunter Crowther-Heyck states, “To Miller, the most important feature of 
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Newell and Simon’s program was that it combined the idea of feedback with the principle 
of hierarchical organisation” (55, emphasis in original). In describing the structure of Plans I 
follow the terminological conventions set out by Miller, Galanter and Pribram, in which the 
component units of a Plan are termed subplans (96).  
Miller, Galanter and Pribram also apply a computational logic to the construction of 
hierarchically-structured Plans.  Sequences of subplans are generated by specifying rules 
for their combination, so that “complicated phenomena are then describable as lawful 
compounds” (21). Crowther-Heyck writes that “he [Miller] saw the chunks of information 
produced by recoding as symbolic representations formed, organised and related to one 
another using a set of rules akin to a grammar- or a program” (53).  
Considering the architecture of mid-century computing described above can reveal 
the extent to which this logic is applied in Plans. An immediate similarity with computing is 
that the simplest way to generate complexity is depicted as “chaining one activity to the 
next” (Miller, Galanter and Pribram 84, emphasis in original). The inflexibility of a rule-
determined sequence is consolidated through repetition, inflexibility being defined as a 
state in which “component parts . . . cannot be rearranged or reordered” (74). This is 
figured in terms of skill acquisition: “skills are Plans . . . that have become relatively 
inflexible” (82). In the above example, the subplans a, b, c, d and e are chained together as 
two stable sequences, (ab) and (cde). Through repetition, these sequences are consolidated 
as the inflexible units A and B. Although a,b,c,d,e  continues to function as a description of 
the Plan guiding behaviour X, (A =(ab)) + (B =(cde)) reveals much more about its structure 
(13).  
In a similar manner to how a sequence of primitive processes can operate as a 
discrete, inflexible subprogram, an entire Plan can be treated as a discrete, inflexible 
subplan in a more complex Plan: “The entire pattern . . . can then be represented in other 
Plans as if it were a unitary, independent act” (89). Miller, Galanter and Pribram draw 
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parallels between this hierarchical structure and the work of Newell, Shaw and Simon: 
“Newell, Shaw and Simon have explicitly and systematically used the hierarchical structure 
of lists” (16). In a comparable manner to how complex programs are generated, they claim 
that “The same procedure of welding these new units together to form still larger skilled 
units may repeat at the higher level” (89). Cognitive-behavioural complexity in Plans 
emerges as “a hierarchy of behavioural units, each unit guided by its own Plan” (85). 
Miller, Galanter and Pribram use this concept of welding together subplans to 
circumvent a fundamental difficulty that arises when using digital computers as a metaphor 
for human cognition and behaviour. When skill components are discrete and atomic, such 
as those involved in learning to type, there is no difficulty in drawing parallels between 
computing and human mental processing: Plans to type letters are welded into Plans for 
syllables, and Plans for syllables are welded into Plans for words, and so on (86). They 
admit, however, that “Probably most of the skills we have to acquire are much more fluid 
in their execution” (86).  
Miller, Galanter and Pribram claim, however, that mastering an “analogue” skill 
allows it to be represented digitally: “Once the subplan is mastered . . . this program, which 
looks so continuous and apparently analogue at the lower levels in the hierarchy, is itself a 
relatively stable unit that can be represented by a single symbol at the higher levels” (90-
91). The need for such ingenious solutions, however, suggests flaws in this comparison of 
computing and human cognitive-behavioural processing.  These difficulties lead Miller, 
Galanter and Pribram to replicate the biases of mid-twentieth-century computing by 
concentrating upon cognitive-behavioural processing in well-defined fields such as chess, 
language and mathematics (155, 180-81,184-87).  
Miller, Galanter and Pribram observe that “we must have Plans to operate upon 
Plans, as well as Plans that operate upon information to guide motor behaviour” (98). It 
would appear that these “metaplans” correspond to master routines (178): “They 
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[metaplans] not only permit the electronic computer to seem creative . . . they permit men 
to be creative” (178-79). A further comparison with computing is that Plan manipulation is 
figured as symbol manipulation: “In man we have a unique capacity for creating and 
manipulating symbols . . . it becomes possible for him to use language to rearrange the 
symbols and to form new Plans” (38). Several historians have observed that this concept of 
cognition as symbol manipulation was an important way in which the “computational 
metaphor” was expressed in the decades after 1960 (Gigerenzer and Goldstein 136; Kolers 
and Smythe 290-91).  
Miller, Galanter and Pribram observe that it is unusual for an organism to construct 
an entirely new Plan (151). A more typical use of metaplans is to modify existing Plans (178, 
155): “the major source of new Plans is old Plans. We change them around a little bit . . . 
but they are basically the same old Plans” (177). This can be compared with Turing’s 
observation that standard components form the basis of most programs. It is far more 
economical- in terms of both time and (mental) storage- to use “rules of transformation, 
rather than rules of formation” (151): “Often it is a metaplan that is stored- a metaplan 
from which a large number of Plans can be generated” (178). 
 The previous section discussed a tendency in mid-century computing to 
conceptualise the search for a solution to a problem as the search for a program. 
Correspondingly, Miller, Galanter and Pribram claim that “the study of thinking can be 
reduced rather generally to the heuristic Plans people use for generating proposed 
solutions” (167). A means of generating and selecting Plans-as-solutions is therefore 
necessary: “In the more complex kind of problem-solving . . . we must have some way to 
generate alternative Plans and then to operate on them” (169). Miller, Galanter and 
Pribram write that we could attempt to generate every possible solution, and then proceed 
through them sequentially: “This is an algorithm, a systematic Plan for solving the problem” 
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(164).  Like Minsky, however, they observe that this approach generally “take[s] too long, 
or cost[s] too much” (160).   
Paralleling the use of heuristics in mid-century computing, the alternative is to use 
heuristic methods to generate and select between Plans-as-solutions (183). Heuristic 
metaplanning involves “a set of rules for generating moves” that are relevant to a certain 
goal (185). According to Miller, Galanter and Pribram, computing demonstrated that 
“heuristic rules of thumb can indeed be proposed as elements of a serious theory of 
thinking” (183).  Their concept of a heuristic Plan corresponds to that of a heuristic 
program: “A heuristic Plan may be cheap and quick, but it will sometimes fail to produce 
the intended result” (160); “If the heuristic method is ambiguous, the program simply will 
not work” (183).  
This allows Miller, Galanter and Pribram to absorb heuristic Plans into a cognitive-
behavioural model that is algorithmic and deterministic in nature: “heuristic rules can be 
incorporated into completely deterministic programs” (186). Another comparison with 
mid-century computing is that this approach is facilitated by their choice of “well-defined” 
problem spaces (56, 155, 162-65, 180-81, 184-87). Miller, Galanter and Pribram use similar 
logic and examples to those found in mid-century computing in order to have their 
algorithmic cake and eat it heuristically, too. They are ultimately unable, however, to 
determine how this approach corresponds to the generality of human problem solving: “it 
is a challenging task to convert them [human heuristics] into explicit rules that can be 
programmed for a machine” (188).  
The flexible modifications performed by metaplans, including heuristic metaplans, 
consist of altering the configuration of inflexible units within a Plan. Miller, Galanter and 
Pribram consider Plans to be inflexible when “the component parts of the Plan cannot be 
rearranged or reordered” (74). In contrast, a flexible Plan is one in which “the parts can be 
performed in any order” (74). Extrapolating from the computational correspondences 
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already identified in Plans, I would argue that this model of plan flexibility- one predicated 
upon the rearrangement of inflexible component “parts” within modular hierarchies- 
derives from computational models that enact flexibility in a similar manner.  
I would therefore suggest that Plans represents an instance of a tradition of 
conceptualising flexible cognition and behaviour in terms of a flexible arrangement of 
inflexible units within modular hierarchies. I want to illustrate that the specific expression 
that computing gives this tradition in Plans foregrounds processes of partial fragmentation 
and partial inflexibility. A Plan must possess areas of inflexibility, as these are integral to its 
structure. At the very least, there must be inflexible subplans corresponding to the 
primitive instructions in an IPS. At the same time, the ability to modify Plans by 
decomposing and rearranging their constituent parts is essential.  
This even extends to the fragmentation and reconfiguration of sequences that have 
become inflexible in their execution:  
Take a skilled typist who for years has triggered off a muscular pattern for 
writing t, then h, and finally e for whenever he wants to write “the”. Offer 
him money to type a page with the word “the” always transcribed as “hte” 
. . . Probably he will not be able to do it . . . But one word of caution . . . 
habits are not completely resistant to change. Let him practice enough and 
he will build up the action unit needed to win your money. (89)  
This principle of partial inflexibility and partial fragmentation obtains here, as some 
inflexible units (“letter habits”) must remain intact to provide structure during these 
modifications. This example also suggests another feature of this partial inflexibility: 
sequences that are inflexible in their execution can be decomposed and reconfigured, but 
before the new sequence can be executed efficiently, it must have attained the status of an 
“inflexible” unit. Partial inflexibility here means inflexibility that is total yet temporary. 
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The total inflexibility necessary for flexible cognition and behaviour on this model 
can be compared with the pathological inflexibility which for Ferenczi characterised incest 
trauma. It is my contention that the influence of computing upon Plans resulted in a model 
of cognitive-behavioural flexibility predicated upon states of inflexibility and fragmentation 
similar to those found in Ferenczian incest trauma. In order to achieve flexibility Plans must 
be disaggregated to a greater or lesser extent, a process which corresponds to the 
traumatic separations of incest:  
A rule that most people seem to learn, probably when they are very young, 
is: When in the execution of a Plan it is discovered that an intended sub-
plan is not relevant or is not feasible, the smallest possible substitutions of 
alternative tactical subplans are to be attempted first . . . if the person 
becomes planless rather suddenly, marked mood swings are apt to occur… 
(114)  
Miller, Galanter and Pribram explain the distress caused by Plan fragmentation in terms of 
the affront it represents to an individual’s self-image (116). Yet I would argue that there are 
similarities between the distress caused by the fragmentation of Plans and Ferenczi’s 
description of the traumatic fragmentation caused by incest. It would therefore appear to 
be the case that the computational expression of this intellectual tradition in Plans 
foregrounds similarities between normative forms of cognition and behaviour and those 
associated with incest trauma.  
 I want to show that additional similarities between incest trauma and normative 
cognition and behaviour are revealed by tracing the relationship between pedagogical 
discourses and computational models in Plans. Miller, Galanter and Pribram state that 
“communicability is an extremely important property that a program- or a Plan- can have” 
(82). The reason communicability is so important is that “communicable Plans play the 
central role in our educational processes” (82). According to Miller, Galanter and Pribram, 
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we generally acquire Plans via “imitation or verbal instruction” (177): “we are continually 
executing Plans tediously mastered at school” (178). We also acquire the rules that 
determine our metaplanning by such pedagogical means: “Children acquire their store of 
heuristic methods by listening to verbal suggestions” (184). As substantiation for their 
pedagogical model Miller, Galanter and Pribram cite Minsky’s description of the generation 
of non-preprogramed behaviours using deterministic programs: “verbal information 
provides the organism with ‘a set of instructions for constructing . . . out of parts available 
there, a machine to perform a response of the desired kind’” (184).  
Although these pedagogies are figured as normative, they share similarities with 
incestuous pedagogies in which inflexible cognitive-behavioural routines are imposed upon 
a child: historians Paul Kolers and William Smythe have claimed that computing led to 
learning being figured as “a matter of repeating or stamping in wholly identical routines” 
(306). The pedagogue not only provides the child with largely inflexible Plans, but also with 
the deterministic metaplans they will use to make relatively minor modifications to them. 
This suggests that just as flexible cognition and behaviour in Plans share correspondences 
with incest trauma, pedagogies figured in this text as normative can be compared with the 












Nineteenth-Century Computing: The Analytical Engine  
Fig. 5. General Plan 25 of the Analytical Engine, with annotations by Allan Bromley. 
Bromley, Allan G. “Charles Babbage’s Analytical Engine, 1838” (Annals of the History of 
Computing. 4.3 (1982): 196-217. IEEE Xplore; Web; 26 April 2013). © IEEE 1982  
 
This section focuses on parallels between the Analytical Engine and mid-twentieth century 
computing with the aim of using this comparison to reveal previously overlooked aspects of 
this machine. The description below is based upon the stable form of the design that 
emerged circa 1837-8: “later designs can be seen largely as refinements rather than new 
approaches” (Bromley, “Evolution” 134). Reflecting the concerns of this chapter, I focus 
upon programming and control in the Engine, rather than upon how arithmetical functions  
are executed in its central processing unit. My analysis of computational flexibility and 
complexity in this computer draws upon various modern and historical sources, including 
the description of the Analytical Engine Babbage produced in 1837, “On the Mathematical 
Powers of the Calculating Engine”. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the 
mathematician and engineer Luigi Menabrea produced a description of this Engine in 1840. 
His article was subsequently translated by Ada Lovelace, who, in consultation with 
Babbage, produced extensive notes to accompany Menabrea’s article when it was 
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published in the British journal Scientific Memoirs in 1843 (Toole 242). This account of the 
architectural evolution of the Engines also draws upon the modern scholarship of Allan 
Bromley, Subrata Dasgupta, Haugeland and Maurice Wilkes.  
The Analytical Engine consists of two principle structures: the “mill” and the “store” 
(Babbage, “Mathematical Powers” 17). The circular structure to the left of General Plan 25 
(1840) is the mill where arithmetical operations (+ - x ÷) are executed upon signed 
numerals (see fig. 5).14 The linear structure to the right is the store where input data, partial 
products and results are held (Babbage, “Mathematical Powers” 21). Swade identifies this 
separation of mill (central processing unit) and store (memory) as similar to the 
organisation of modern computers (“Construction” 70). On a more fundamental level, 
however, the Analytical Engine is a computer in that it is an automatic formal system 
capable of automatically manipulating symbol tokens according to stored procedural 
instructions: Haugeland describes signed numerals as the “tokens” manipulated by the 
Engine (127), whilst Dasgupta cites Lovelace’s assertion that the Engine possessed “an 
ability to ‘combine together general symbols’” (21).  
In developing the Analytical Engine Babbage was not transitioning from simple 
“calculator” to sophisticated “computer”, as several historians have suggested, but rather 
from computer to more sophisticated computer (Swade, “Construction” 70; Wilkes, 
“Expectations” 141). As illustrated in the previous chapter, the Difference Engine also 
possesses this capacity to automatically operate upon symbol tokens (numerical data) 
according to stored procedural instructions to generate output data from input data. This 
capacity differentiates the Engines from all other nineteenth-century automata (Lovelace 
252; Swade, Difference Engine 83).  
                                                          
14 Babbage proposed additional operations, including approximate multiplication and 
division (“Mathematical Powers” 21). Focusing on the four principle operations, however, 
streamlines this description.  
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Routines specifying the required sequence of arithmetical operations are provided 
to the Analytical Engine as a string of punched cards (Menabrea 223). As Essinger has 
observed, the use of punched cards was a technology derived from the Jacquard loom (47). 
The individual cards that comprise a card-string are known as “Operation cards”, with each 
corresponding to an arithmetic operation (Babbage, Passages 118). The Engine can 
compute whatever is specified to it as a sequence of arithmetic operations for operating 
upon numerical data (Wilkes, “Calculating Machines” 56-57): as several historians have 
observed, the Analytical Engine is programmable (Bromley, “Interface” 5; Haugeland 126). 
Although Wilkes and Swade claim that Babbage had no general concept of programming 
(Wilkes, “Pioneer” 423; Swade, “Construction” 70), it is agreed that Babbage nevertheless 
implemented programming and microprogramming in his Engines (Bromley, “Interface” 5, 
10; Haugeland 126). Although Babbage may not have explicitly defined these concepts, it 
would seem that he understood their fundamental principles. I therefore use the terms 
“program” and “programmer” here as convenient shorthand. 
In order for the Engine to act upon the user-level program specified by the 
Operation cards, however, they must first be interpreted by a mechanism similar to control 
in a modern computer (Wilkes, “Pioneer” 421-22). Babbage in “Mathematical Powers” 
refers to control mechanisms as “the directive part” (49). He describes the card-string 
being draped over a hexagonal structure, or “prism”, “situated in front of a number of 
levers” (23). The prism advances, pushing an Operation card against the levers. If there is a 
hole on the card at a particular position, then the opposite lever passes through 
undisturbed. If there is not, however, “then when the prism advances the lever opposite     
. . .  will be pushed and any order given for which that lever was appointed” (23). 
 As well as being joined by strings, Operation cards are also joined using specified 
relationships. Babbage considered the use of additional holes on the Operation card itself 
and separate cards for the purpose of specifying the order in which Operation cards should 
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be read (Babbage, “Mathematical Powers” 21; Wilkes, “Pioneer” 424). This use of specified 
relationships allows individual Operation cards to be linked as routines for arithmetical 
computation, thus paralleling the architecture of modern programs. Another comparison 
with modern programs is the manner in which these relationships between discrete 
instructions are circumscribed by deterministic rules: the Engine “uses algebraic signs 
according to their proper laws” (Lovelace 285, emphasis in original).  
The patterning of depressed levers generated by an Operation card communicates 
the interpreted instruction to a secondary control mechanism known as a “barrel”, a 
cylindrical structure upon which metal studs are screwed in vertical rows (see fig. 6). This 
mechanism is identified by Bromley as a generalised version of that used to program the 
Difference Engine (“Evolution” 117). Each row of studs forms a discrete instruction, 
referred to as a “vertical” (Babbage, “Mathematical Powers” 19). 
 
Fig. 6. Barrel and Reducing Apparatus. Bromley, Allan G. “Charles Babbage’s Analytical 
Engine, 1838” (Annals of the History of Computing; 4.3 (1982): 196-217. IEEE Xplore; Web; 
26 April 2013). Note the rows of metal studs, or “verticals”. Rotation of the barrel is 
controlled by the “Reducing apparatus”, marked R. © IEEE 1982 
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Bromley compares these verticals to modern subprograms (“Evolution” 124). Verticals are 
interpreted using a mechanism not dissimilar to that used to read Operation cards 
(Babbage, “Mathematical Powers” 19-20). The barrel advances horizontally, pressing a 
vertical against an array of levers (see fig. 6). Each stud either has a rod protruding from it, 
or it is blank (Bromley, “1838” 206). If there is a rod on a particular stud, the corresponding 
lever is depressed: “when the barrels advance horizontally these studs act on levers” 
(Babbage, “Mathematical Powers” 19).  
An instruction designated by an Operation card only initiates a particular sequence 
of verticals. The verticals themselves subsequently control the progress of each operation: 
as Babbage observes, “The barrels . . . direct themselves to be turned to another vertical” 
(22). A stud in each vertical, acting through mechanical linkages and partially toothed 
gearwheels called “sectors”, instructs a mechanism positioned below the barrel known as 
the “Reducing Apparatus” to rotate through a specified number of verticals: “It consists of 
six or eight sectors which can be made to act on the barrel and give it a rotatory movement 
so as to make it pass over 1, 2, 3 or any required number of verticals” (22). The final vertical 
in the sequence requests the next instruction to be interpreted by the higher-level control 
mechanism (22). Sequences of subroutines are thus created using specified relationships: 
“Every vertical orders the transfer to the next” (Bromley, “1838” 206). This allows a 
sequence of verticals to be interpreted as a single instruction at the higher hierarchical 
level: “Babbage was clearly aware of the hierarchical nature of his machine” (Bromley, 
“Evolution” 129). A comparison with modern computing is that architectural complexity in 
this Engine is generated using specified relationships, a technique which allows the 
construction of units that can function as discrete and inflexible components within more 
complex routines.  
If Operation cards and verticals share similarities with modern subprograms, then 
each stud can be regarded as similar to a primitive instruction. Each stud corresponds to an 
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elementary, inflexible unit of executable machine behaviour, paralleling the 
correspondences between primitive instruction and primitive process in a modern 
computer: “studs act on levers which cause various movements in the mill” (Babbage, 
“Mathematical Powers” 19). All computation in the Analytical Engine is ultimately 
expressed as a sequence of elementary behaviours: as Wilkes writes, Babbage understood 
that “What the designer of any general purpose computer must do is define a small closed 
set of fundamental operations . . . from which a program for solving any computational 
problem can be constructed” (“Expectations” 144).  
In previous sections it was claimed that flexibility in mid-twentieth-century 
computing consists of the flexible arrangement of inflexible instructions. The purpose of 
the remainder of this section is to compare this model of computational flexibility to that 
found in the Analytical Engine. The Engine has various mechanisms that enable it to modify 
the arrangement of discrete instructions within a card-string. The simplest relationship that 
can be specified between cards in the Engine consists of turning to the next specified card 
in the card-string (or a prior specified card) (Babbage, “Mathematical Powers” 20-21). This 
generates a routine comparable to the list structures of modern computing. I would argue 
that such routines are similar in their architecture to the inflexible and sequential routine 
of the Difference Engine.  
Menabrea observes, however, that the Analytical Engine also has the capacity to 
select between Operation cards in response to a specified contingency: “These new cards 
may follow the first, but only come into play contingently” (240). This flexible ordering of 
inflexible instructions corresponds to a conditional branch (Bromley, “Evolution” 124). 
Conditional branches between cards can be implemented using a mechanism known as a 
“registering-apparatus” (Menabrea 240). The number of repetitions of an Operation card 
required, n, is placed on the registering apparatus. The registering apparatus then subtracts 
1 from n each time the card is read. When n reaches zero, an instruction is given for the 
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prism to be rotated in order to locate the next specified instruction in the card-string (240-
41). Babbage suggested that additional flexibility could be achieved by using a value 
calculated by the Engine for n (“Mathematical Powers” 21). Another comparison with mid-
twentieth-century computing is that conditional branches in the Engine are deterministic: 
Babbage describes cards to “direct the number and nature of those repetitions which are 
to be made” (21). This suggests that the architecture of computational flexibility in the 
Analytical Engine consists of the flexible arrangement of inflexible units within the 
parameters of specified rules. 
Similar modifications can be made at the level of the verticals. The simplest 
movement of a barrel is from vertical to next specified vertical. This is comparable to a list 
structure, one embedded within the higher-level routine specified by the cards. Yet 
Babbage also included functionality for conditional branching between verticals. For 
instance, during the division operation the divisor is repeatedly subtracted from the 
dividend. If the divisor is subtracted once too often, then the value of the dividend will pass 
through 0. Babbage describes this in the “Mathematical Powers” article as “Running up” 
(40). The “running up lever” causes a thick metal wire to raise a sector to gear with the 
reducing apparatus (Babbage, “Mathematical Powers” 40; Bromley, “1838” 206-207) (see 
fig. 6). This causes the reducing apparatus to turn to a different vertical to the one that 
would have been read had Running up not occurred: it is “an order to move such verticals, 
that at the succeeding turns they should direct the erroneous subtraction” (Babbage, 
“Mathematical Powers” 41). In other words, the order in which verticals are read can be 
altered in response to a specified contingency. I would suggest that, once again, flexibility 
in this Engine consists of the flexible arrangement of discrete units that are treated as 
inflexible. The integrity of this model is preserved by making alterations to the sequence of 
verticals implicit within the higher-level instruction: the interpretation of an Operation card 
is not changed by any modifications to the order of verticals that might subsequently occur. 
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Modifications can also be made to the order of verticals using a mechanism called a 
“conditional arm” (Bromley, “1838” 207). When a specified contingency occurs, a 
conditional arm interposes between a stud and a lever (see fig. 6, where the conditional 
arm is marked C). Interposing the conditional arm effectively changes the symbol type of a 
stud, altering the structure of the vertical for a particular advance of the barrels (207). 
When pushing against the levers, however, a modified vertical is treated no differently 
from the inflexible constellation of a preprogramed vertical. Although during the transition 
between verticals changes to the structure of an instruction can occur, the moment it is 
read it is treated as inflexible. Behavioural flexibility at this hierarchical level consists of a 
movement from fixed state to fixed state, with the potential for partial decomposition and 
reconfiguration in the interim. On these grounds, I want to argue that computational 
flexibility in the Analytical Engine encompasses a movement between states of partial 
fragmentation and partial (total yet temporary) inflexibility similar to that found in mid-
century computing.  
Both Babbage and Lovelace saw the potential for routines to be manipulated to an 
extent far surpassing a conditional branch. Although the Analytical Engine is numerical in 
character, Babbage realised that it would be theoretically possible for a modified Engine to 
manipulate algebraic symbols (Belanger and Stein 89; Swade, Difference Engine 169): “the 
engine might act upon other things besides number, were objects found whose mutual 
fundamental relations could be expressed by those of the abstract science of operations” 
(Lovelace 248, emphasis in original). As historian Betty Toole has noted, Lovelace 
recognised that an Engine capable of manipulating arithmetical and algebraic symbols 
could write its own programs (246). It is my contention that this symbol manipulation 
would have consisted of the flexible arrangement of inflexible units according to 
deterministic rules: as Lovelace writes, the “relations” between symbols must be specified.  
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The high degree of inflexibility that underpins the Analytical Engine’s flexible 
routines means that they share correspondences with the inflexible routine of the 
Difference Engine. In addition, both Engines also feature hierarchically structured, modular 
routines constructed from discrete units that are treated as inflexible. The crucial 
difference is that in the Analytical Engine, the configuration of these inflexible units can be 
modified to allow a degree of behavioural flexibility. These parallels suggest that 
establishing the architecture of behavioural inflexibility in the Difference Engine was vital in 
enabling Babbage to develop the architecture of computational complexity and flexibility in 
the Analytical.  
 
Computational Models in Passages from the Life of a Philosopher  
 
The purpose of this section is to show that Passages and Plans can be regarded as 
comparable computational expressions of the tradition discussed in this thesis. This section 
also seeks to illustrate that Passages offers a model of human cognitive-behavioural 
development predicated upon architectural similarities between the Difference and 
Analytical Engines. As far as I am aware, this is the first time that a computational model of 
human cognitive-behavioural development has been identified in the nineteenth century. 
I will return to this discussion of developmental models in Passages in Chapter Four 
with the aim of continuing and broadening my analysis of developmental narratives in this 
text. This chapter, however, focuses on a section in Passages referred to as a “sketch” (52), 
in which Babbage embodies his Engines in a human child, an “inquisitive boy” (51). When 
we first encounter this child-Engine, it is possible to perceive that he is manipulating 
marbles, a discrete symbol token, using a set of procedural rules. He begins by placing five 
marbles in a line. He then places another two marbles under the second group, and in all 
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subsequent groups. He then places another three under the third group, and in all 
subsequent groups, and so forth:  
 
 
                 
Fig. 7. Sequence of Marbles. Babbage, Charles. Passages from the Life of a Philosopher 
(London, 1864; Internet Archive; Web; 26 August 2015; 51) 
 
The child has discovered an inflexible routine for generating a series of triangular 
structures: “commencing always one group later, and making the addition one marble 
more each time” (51). Interpreting the child’s behaviour in computational terms, an 
interpretation that Babbage’s representational strategy invites, this routine can be 
regarded as similar to an algorithm composed of primitive instructions. On the basis of the 
correspondences between Plans and programs described by Miller, Galanter and Pribram, 
this routine can be interpreted as an inflexible Plan with the capacity to guide a 
hierarchically-structured sequence of actions. With its computations at the lowest 
hierarchical level consisting of inflexible sequences of primitive actions and instructions, 
the Difference Engine can be regarded as the model for the computational sophistication 
that the child displays during this Plan. 
Babbage writes that the child “might also want to know how many marbles the 
thirtieth or any other distant group might contain” (51). Babbage, inserting himself into the 
sketch, provides the child with a deterministic Plan for generating triangular numbers, not 
through the mechanical action of arranging marbles, but by manipulating numerical digits. 
Babbage explains that “a Table of these numbers, representing the group of marbles, might 
be constructed to any extent by mere addition” (53). Because “an inquisitive boy would 
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naturally count the numbers in each group”, the child has already found the values he 
needs to begin differencing (51):  
 
Fig. 8. Table of Differences for Triangular Numbers. Babbage, Charles. Passages from the 
Life of a Philosopher (London, 1864; Internet Archive; Web; 26 August 2015; 52). 
 
To identify this Plan I will refer to it as the Plan for tabulation. As an inflexible Plan 
constructed from a chain of inflexible subplans, this Plan is similar to the marble-
manipulating routine. By depicting the child executing this Plan, Babbage further 
emphasises correspondences between the cognitive-behavioural capacities of the child at 
this stage in its development and the inflexible program of the Difference Engine.  
As several historians have noted, Babbage was fascinated with symbolic 
representation and manipulation, as demonstrated by the “Mechanical Notation” he 
devised for depicting the component parts of mechanism (Otis, 39; Hyman, 58). Ashworth 
has argued that Babbage sought to “condens[e] language and ideas into symbols”, thus 
making mental processing comparable to algebraic analysis (629): “perception and 
discrimination were mechanical and were based on the operations of modern analysis” 
(649). To explain how this “mechanical” view of mental processing relates to the Engines, 
Ashworth quotes a section of Passages in which Babbage compares the operation of 
carriage mechanisms to “memory” and “foresight” (649). It is unclear, however, how this 
quote relates to algebraic analysis, especially as Ashworth does not provide any further 
explanation of this material.  
158 
 
Certain claims made by Lovelace have also led historians to focus on symbol 
manipulation as a means of drawing parallels between the Engines and human mental 
processing. Dasgupta writes that the Engine offered “a link . . . between the machinations 
of a material artefact and the kinds of symbol manipulations the mind carries out in 
mathematical reasoning”, quoting Lovelace’s assertion that “the punched-card mechanism 
imbues the Analytical Engine with an ability to ‘combine together general symbols’ of 
‘unlimited variety’” (21). In a similar vein, Maas claims that Lovelace “implied that the 
reasoning processes of minds and machines were organised by the very same science of 
operations that first came into existence with Babbage’s Analytical Engine”, citing 
Lovelace’s claim that “when mathematical processes pass through the human brain instead 
of through the medium of inanimate mechanism, it were equally a necessity of things that 
the reasonings connected with operations should hold the same place as a clear and well-
defined branch of the subject of analysis” (Jevons 111). Historian Dorothy Stein identifies 
this “science of operations” as the separation of operation cards from those designating 
numerical data, thus enabling the independent manipulation of arithmetic symbols (53). 
Stein does not go further, however, than observing that Lovelace attributed this “cognitive 
significance” (53).  
I would suggest that the evidence offered by these historians does not offer 
conclusive proof that either Babbage or Lovelace saw the totality of mental processing as 
comparable to the type of symbol manipulation theoretically possible in computers. In 
these accounts, the comparison is only applicable to the operations that occur when 
“mathematical processes pass through the human brain”. As Lovelace implies, however, 
algebraic analysis is amenable to computational representation as it involves the 
manipulation of discrete symbol tokens within the parameters of specified rules. I want to 
show that this manipulation of discrete symbol tokens is how Babbage applies this 
computational model to the generality of human mental processing.  
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The child begins by physically manipulating marbles as discrete symbol tokens 
whose combinations are determined by rule, and then proceeds to manipulate numerical 
digits in a comparable manner. This manipulation of numerical digits can be compared with 
the manipulation of discrete symbol tokens in the Difference Engine. It is my contention 
that Babbage in the sketch gestures towards the potential for this computational model to 
generalise across a range of cognitive-behavioural capabilities.  Another feature of the 
manipulation of symbol tokens in the sketch that suggests a comparison with 
computational models is the manner in which these manipulations are guided by rules that 
are hierarchical and modular in character, paralleling the modular and hierarchical 
architecture of the Engines.  
Another indication of similarities between the computational model in Passages 
and Plans are the corresponding biases that emerge in their accounts. These include a bias 
towards forms of cognition and behaviour amenable to representation in terms of symbol 
manipulation within well-defined fields such as formal games and arithmetic. Using a 
similar representational strategy to Miller, Galanter and Pribram, these examples allow 
Babbage to apply an analogue-to-digital converter to the child’s cognitions and behaviours. 
By concentrating on the formal manipulation of marbles and numerical digits, Babbage 
shifts emphasis away from analogue processes such as the motion of the child’s hands.  
Babbage directs the child to square numbers as another sequence calculable using 
this inflexible Plan, asking that he “make for his own instruction, the series of their first and 
second differences (54-55). Babbage indicates that another point of comparison between 
this child and the Difference Engine is the ability to apply an inflexible Plan to different data 
sets. Babbage requests that the child apply this Plan to the square numbers independently. 
The child is assisted by the fact that the components of this Plan are chained using the 
relation next. Paralleling the execution of programs in the Difference Engine, executing this 
Plan is just a matter of cranking through an inflexible sequence of predetermined subplans. 
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The child-Engine is now not only operating as a formal system during arithmetical 
computations, but also as an automatic formal system. He can now perform an inflexible 
algorithm without external intervention, making his functioning similar to that of the 
Difference Engine.   
The remainder of this section aims to illustrate that Babbage uses the architectural 
evolution of the Engines as the basis for a narrative of human cognitive-behavioural 
development. With the child-Engine functioning as an automatic formal system for 
arithmetical computation, Babbage helps him to devise a Plan to compute the number of 
cannonballs stacked in various pyramids (55). In a move that can be compared with the 
computational heuristics of Plans, Babbage frames the process of discovering a solution to 
this problem not only as a search, but as a search for a Plan:  “Looking on the simplest 
form- the triangular pyramid- he will observe that it exactly represents his own heaps of 
marbles placed each successively above one another until the top of the pyramid contains 
only a single ball” (55). Babbage’s reasoning can be represented diagrammatically:  
 
 
Fig. 9. Construction of triangular pyramids. Diagram by the author.  
 
Another comparison with Plans is that problems in the sketch are figured as reducible to 
formal symbol manipulation similar to that found in computers. Babbage begins by 
manipulating the discrete symbol tokens of the data, breaking down the structure into its 
component forms and revealing triangular structures familiar to the child. This indicates 
that the pyramidal numbers might be calculated by a Plan corresponding to the Plan for 
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tabulation: Babbage refers to the pyramidal numbers as “The new series thus formed by 
the addition of his own [the child’s] triangular numbers” (Passages 55).  
 Babbage represents the problem to the child in a manner that it can process within 
its computational capacities, a responsibility shared by the Engines’ programmers 
(Babbage, “Mathematical Powers” 45). At this point in the sketch, Babbage continues to 
state problems in a form computable using the Plan for tabulation. He instructs the child to 
apply this Plan to the pyramidal numbers:  
 
 
Fig. 10. Table of Differences for Pyramidal Numbers. Babbage, Charles. Passages from the 
Life of a Philosopher (London, 1864; Internet Archive; Web; 26 August 2015; 55). 
 
Although the child is now able to execute inflexible Plans automatically and apply them to a 
range of contexts, he is not yet capable of manipulating their component subplans. 
Applying this Plan to the pyramidal numbers necessitates an additional column, but this 
does not represent cognitive-behavioural flexibility any more than it represents 
computational flexibility. The child at this stage in its development continues to offer a 
closer parallel with the Difference Engine than the Analytical.  
By this point, however, Babbage has already referred to a second Plan that is 
presented as a sequence of deterministic steps. In this sense, this Plan is comparable to the 
Plan for tabulation. This inflexible Plan allows any value in the table of triangular numbers 
to be calculated without the need to calculate the entire series of previous values. For 
example, for the fifth group:  
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Take the number of the group  . . . . 5 
Add 1 to this number, it becomes     . . . . 6 
               
Multiply these numbers together     . . .                         2)30 
                                        _______ 
Divide the product by 2                       . . . .             15                                                                                                                                                                                
(Babbage, Passages 56) 
This Plan can be compared with Wilkes’ observation that algorithms for arithmetical 
computation must be specified to a computing machine as a sequence of arithmetical 
functions. Yet whereas the Plan for tabulation is constructed solely from a series of 
additions, this Plan also comprises multiplication and division. The introduction of these 
subroutines suggests that this is the routine that will enable the child to develop capacities 
corresponding to those of the Analytical Engine. For clarity, I will call this the Plan for direct 
calculation, as opposed to the Plan for tabulation.  
Babbage asks the child to suggest a Plan to find the nth term of the pyramidal 
sequence: “a little consideration will lead him to a fair guess” (56). Babbage and the child 
search for a Plan to solve this problem by being “unsystematic-in a clever way” (Miller, 
Galanter and Pribram 160): by making a fair guess. Because the child in the sketch is both 
child and Engine, this not only offers an indication that Babbage had considered the use of 
heuristics in computing, but that he had also considered their applicability to human 
cognition and behaviour. This would appear to be another respect in which Passages is 
similar to Plans.  
Babbage and the child begin with their existing heuristic metaplan, transferring the 
Plan for direct calculation to the new data. It is my contention that Babbage at this point in 
the sketch incorporates shared features of the Difference Engine and Analytical Engine into 
his developmental narrative. This technique of applying a deterministic routine to various 
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data sets is found in both Engines, even if its implementation is very different in each. The 
deterministic character of these examples also underscores the deterministic nature of 
algorithms in both Engines.  
This transfer of a Plan to another set of data is given an additional degree of 
sophistication in Passages, as it is figured as a heuristic method of generating a Plan. Wilkes 
observes that the Analytical Engine was a tool of logical, mechanical and theoretical 
exploration, and this elaboration of its principles seems commensurate with this (“Pioneer” 
428). As a Plan used to operate upon the discrete units comprising another Plan, Babbage’s 
suggestions to the child can be compared with Lovelace’s insight that a modified Engine 
could theoretically operate upon symbol tokens in order to generate its own routines. I 
have argued in this section that Babbage in Passages applies this concept to the 
modification and construction of cognitive-behavioural sequences in humans. The 
emergence of this comparison is currently dated to the mid-twentieth century (Gigerenzer 
and Goldstein 137; Kolers and Smythe 291-93).  
By depicting techniques to extend the relevance of inflexible Plans, it is my 
contention that Babbage highlights correspondences between cognitive-behavioural 
flexibility and inflexibility. The cognitive-behavioural capacities associated with the 
Difference Engine in Passages are very different to those in Economy, with emphasis placed 
upon the independent and adaptive implementation of even inflexible Plans. With this 
initial heuristic metaplan, a more sophisticated understanding of cognitive-behavioural 
inflexibility begins to emerge.15 Babbage and the child find, however, that simply 
                                                          
15 Babbage in the late 1840s designed an improved version of the Difference Engine, the 
“Difference Engine No.2” (Swade, “Construction” 70). This suggests that even after 
designing the Analytical Engine, Babbage still considered computational inflexibility- and by 
extension, behavioural inflexibility- to be valuable.   
164 
 
transferring the Plan will not provide the correct answer. An additional heuristic is needed 
to fit the Plan to the data.  
Babbage suggests to the child that they might make the following alteration to the 
structure of the Plan: 
Now let us make a bold conjecture respecting the Table of cannon balls, 
and try this rule: -  
Take the number whose tabular number is 
[sic] required, say . . . . . .             5 
Add 1 to that number    . . . . . 6 
Add 1 more to that number        . . . . 7 
                                                                                                         ________ 
Multiply all three numbers together               . .            2) 210  
Divide by 2           . . . . .            105   
(Babbage, Passages 56, emphasis added) 
This example underscores the principle that cognitive-behavioural complexity is 
constructed using a hierarchical architecture of inflexible subplans similar to that found in 
computing, with large segments of the Plan for direct calculation treated as inflexible 
subplans within this modified Plan. The construction of cognitive-behavioural complexity in 
Passages once again corresponds to that found in Plans. 
I want to suggest that the primary significance of this example for the child’s 
cognitive-behavioural development, however, is its demonstration that inflexible subplans 
form the basis of not only cognitive-behavioural complexity but also of cognitive-
behavioural flexibility. The inflexible subroutine “add 1 more to that number” is part of the 
original routine for direct calculation, and the modification the child makes to the routine 
consists of its repetition. This “bold conjecture” alters the configuration of subplans within 
a Plan for the first time. Marbles turn into cannonballs as Babbage assists the child in 
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making this structural change, with this image serving to highlight the partial fragmentation 
taking place within this routine.  Unlike the Plan for tabulation or the original Plan for direct 
calculation, this modified Plan can now be termed flexible.  
It has been claimed that the Analytical Engine possesses a similar capacity to repeat 
or reconfigure inflexible subroutines at a number of hierarchical levels. I would argue that 
Babbage imagined human cognitive-behavioural flexibility to be structured in a similar 
manner, making Passages and Plans corresponding computational expressions of the 
intellectual tradition described in this thesis.16 The choice of modular, hierarchically-
organised Plans as a basis for these flexible modifications also highlights correspondences 
with the inflexible routines performed by the child when it was functioning in a similar 
manner to a Difference Engine. I would suggest that this model of human cognitive-
behavioural development derives from similarities between the modular hierarchies of 
inflexible units that characterise the architecture of the Difference Engine and the flexible 
arrangement of inflexible units within modular hierarchies found in the Analytical. This 
analysis of Passages aims to illustrate that Babbage not only used his computing machines 
to formulate a model of cognition and behaviour, but also as the basis for a model of 
cognitive-behavioural development. 
Another comparison with the Analytical Engine is that flexible modifications to 
Plans are delimited by deterministic instructions. Although the child performs these 
modifications as part of an ostensibly nondeterministic “fair guess”, Babbage intensively 
structures this heuristic process by signalling to the child the particular modifications that 
                                                          
16 Schaffer has described how the Mechanical Notation allowed Babbage to envisage the 
combination of machine parts within the Engines (“Intelligence” 210). This model of the 
combination of discrete units is, however, very different from the one foregrounded in this 
thesis, which seeks to explain how the architecture of Babbage’s computers resulted in a 
model of human cognitive-behavioural flexibility as a flexible arrangement of inflexible 
units at multiple levels within modular hierarchies.  
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should be made to a specific Plan. The sketch elaborates upon principles derived from the 
Analytical Engine by indicating how the nondeterministic choices crucial to cognitive-
behavioural flexibility could theoretically be regulated by deterministic Plans. This mode of 
representing nondeterministic choice as governed by deterministic rules can be regarded 
as another point of comparison between Passages and Plans. Historian Laura Otis claims 
that Babbage believed that the rule-bound nature of the Engines disqualified them from 
replicating “the more versatile human brain” (32; see also Bullock 31). In contrast, it is my 
contention that Passages illustrates that Babbage understood how heuristic reasoning 
could be represented using deterministic rules theoretically capable of being programmed 
in a computer.  
Schaffer observes that the Difference Engine can calculate rule-bound series in 
which there are apparently arbitrary “leaps” between values: “To the observer, each 
discontinuity would seem like a ‘miracle’ . . . Yet in fact the manager of the system would 
have given it foresight” (“Intelligence” 226). According to Maas, Babbage saw this as 
demonstrating how free will and consciousness could be subject to mechanistic rules 
(“Mechanical Rationality” 592-93). Although Maas cites a specific feature of the Difference 
Engine, the subsequent comparisons he formulates with consciousness and “freedom of 
the will” are far less specific (593). Maas also cites the Analytical Engine’s ability to 
anticipate if a carry will take place, claiming that this for Lovelace “qualified Menabrea’s 
assertion that the Analytical Engine would only be able to execute mechanically prescribed 
rules” (595). He does not specify, however, whether this statement is intended to 
foreground a more sophisticated concept of rule-bound behaviour, or whether it is 
intended to show that the Engine could transcend rule-bound functioning altogether.  
 Historian Herbert Sussman claims that Lovelace saw both minds and machines as 
operating “according to a set of laws or algorithms” (46), citing her description of the 
Engine’s capacity “translat[e] the operations which may be indicated to it” (qtd. Sussman 
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46). I would argue, however, that this does not offer conclusive proof that either Lovelace 
or Babbage understood the Engine to replicate human mental processing. This section has 
sought to demonstrate that Babbage saw correspondences between rule-bound behaviour 
in computers and human cognitive-behavioural processing by highlighting the specific 
expression of this concept in his writings.  
 A final point illustrated by the sketch is that this principle of constructing flexible 
behaviour as a flexible arrangement of inflexible units has the potential to repeat at 
multiple levels within a hierarchically organised Plan. The child finds that the modified Plan 
still does not arrive at the correct solution: “The real number in the fifth pyramid is 35. But 
the number 105 at which we have arrived is three times as great” (Babbage, Passages 56). 
Because this metaplan is heuristic, it is therefore fallible. Babbage instructs the child that 
an additional subplan derived from the original Plan for direct calculation-division- should 
be added to the modified Plan: “If, therefore . . . we had divided by 2 and also by 3, we 
should have arrived at a true result” (56). 
 Although it is designated by a discrete instruction, Babbage indicates that this 
division step is composed of repeated subtractions. Babbage learns from the Plan for 
tabulation that the number in the fifth pyramid is 35. He compares the two numbers and 
ascertains that 35 can be subtracted from 105 three times (56). The subsequent inflexibility 
of this sequence of primitive instructions (subtractions) allows it to be designated as a 
discrete instruction (division), and for this composite subplan to form part of a flexible Plan. 
It would appear that cognitive-behavioural flexibility and complexity is again portrayed as a 
hierarchical arrangement of inflexible instructions similar to those found in the Analytical 
Engine, with Babbage transposing the concept of welding together units using “algorithmic 
glue” to human mental processing. The application of these computational principles to 




It is not only subplans, however, that are treated as inflexible. Although it has been 
modified, the entire Plan for direct calculation is treated as inflexible as it is executed. This 
movement between states of total yet temporary inflexibility, through states of partial 
fragmentation and reconfiguration, is fundamental to behavioural flexibility in the 
Analytical Engine. I would argue that the specific expression in Passages of a tradition of 
conceptualising cognitive-behavioural flexibility as a flexible arrangement of inflexible units 
parallels the structures of computational flexibility in the Analytical Engine.  
Although the child now has the ability to construct and modify Plans, the decision 
to begin with an existing routine indicates that the easiest method of generating new Plans 
is by modifying the arrangement of component units within existing Plans. Paralleling the 
use of metaplans in Plans, rules of transformation are more frequently employed than rules 
of formation. The child therefore follows a similar developmental pathway to the Engines: 
inflexible routines corresponding to those associated with the Difference Engine persist to 
provide the structural foundation of the child’s subsequent cognitive-behavioural flexibility.  
The next section explores how correspondences between the Engines engendered a model 
of normative pedagogy that shares similarities with the incestuous pedagogies of the 
nineteenth-century factory.  
 
Passages and Incestuous Pedagogies 
 
Babbage in the sketch portrays himself providing intensive pedagogical support to the 
child-Engine by furnishing both Plans and metaplans. Babbage also describes himself as 
“teaching” the Analytical Engine to perform different tasks, indicating that he perceived 
similarities between the roles of pedagogue and programmer (114). This section proposes 
that Babbage’s comprehension of how pedagogy supports the development of flexible 
cognition and behaviour evolved alongside his understanding of what mechanisms and 
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techniques could be used to achieve behavioural flexibility in the Analytical Engine. A 
similar trajectory is visible in Plans, where human learning is compared with machine 
learning: “If we want to develop a self-programming automaton, maybe we should let it 
learn the way we do” (Miller, Galanter and Pribram 184). 
It is my contention that Babbage’s attitude to machine and human behaviour 
underwent a transformation between 1834 and 1864. The previous chapter argued that, as 
a result of the influence of the Difference Engine, Babbage in Economy portrays children as 
requiring disciplinary strategies in order to regularise their actions. Chaos is opposed to 
order, the latter being viewed as synonymous with behavioural inflexibility. This chapter 
has suggested that, a result of developments in his thinking regarding computing machines, 
by 1864 Babbage no longer saw chaos opposing itself to inflexibility in a simple binary. 
Instead, correspondences between behavioural flexibility and inflexibility are depicted as 
the foundation of adaptive behaviour in both humans and machines.   
The child in Passages begins the process of attaining flexible cognition and 
behaviour by establishing a degree of cognitive-behavioural inflexibility that, if left 
undeveloped, would prove similar to that which Ferenczi associated with incest trauma. 
When the child does achieve flexibility, it is through utilising states of partial fragmentation 
and total inflexibility comparable to the total fragmentation and total inflexibility that 
characterises incest trauma on this model. I therefore wish to argue that, as a result of the 
architectural evolution of the Engines, normative pedagogies in Passages share similarities 
with the incestuous pedagogies of Economy. The computational metaphor in Passages 
generates a pedagogical model predicated upon “stamping in” largely inflexible routines, 
making the depiction of pedagogy in this text similar to that found in Plans.  
In addition, the child in Passages is taught how to effect flexible behaviour as a 
movement from fixed state to fixed state, with partial decomposition and reconfiguration 
possible in the interim.  If we represent total inflexibility and total fragmentation as 
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pathological extremes, then computing produces a model in which similarities exist 
between states found in normative and pathological cognition and behaviour. This chapter 
has argued that these correspondences also characterise Plans as a result of similar 
computational models. This is a challenging model, as it invites us to consider similarities 
between pathological states caused by incest trauma and normative flexible behaviour, and 
between normative pedagogies and the sufferings of children in nineteenth-century 
factories.  
 
Attachment Theory and Computing: Nineteenth-Century Parallels  
 
Although psychologists Peter Fonagy and Mary Target have described Bowlbian attachment 
theory as predicated upon a “metaphor of the mind as an information-processing 
mechanism”, no detailed reading of Bowlby’s work in relation to Plans or specific features 
of mid-century computing yet exists (421). This final section seeks to address this gap in the 
literature. Having situated Plans and Passages as corresponding computational expressions 
of the tradition described in this thesis, I hope to show that a computational model similar 
to that foregrounded by Babbage structures attachment theory as a result of the influence 
of Plans. As far as I am aware, this is the first time that parallels have been suggested 
between attachment theory and a computational model of mental processing in the 
nineteenth century.   
Bowlby defines attachment behaviour as that which results “in a person attaining 
or retaining proximity to some other differentiated or preferred individual” (Making and 
Breaking 154). Bowlby claimed that attachment behaviour evolved as a means of securing 
proximity to those able to nurture and protect (Attachment 227; Chisholm 3). From the late 
1960s Bowlby depicted attachment behaviour as hierarchically organised as a result of the 
influence of Plans:  
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The great merit of the contribution of Miller, Galanter and Pribram is that 
they have shown how some of the most complex and flexible sequences of 
behaviour could in principle be organised by means of a hierarchy of 
systems… (Attachment 77) 
In an image that can be compared with the architecture of an IPS, Bowlby uses a military 
metaphor to illustrate that a hierarchically-structured behaviour is guided by a 
corresponding hierarchy of instructions: “in a hierarchical system . . . each plan and sub-
plan is to be regarded as a set of instructions for action” (Attachment 78). He imagines a 
commander outlining a plan to achieve an objective. Each subordinate down the hierarchy 
is then “expected to make more detailed plans” (78). This elaboration of the plan proceeds 
until instructions are finally communicated to those executing the operation (78).  
At this lowest level, attachment behaviour corresponds to the primitive 
instructions and operations found in computing:  
each of the sub-plans in turn being made up of a number of sub-sub-plans, 
and so on right down to miniscule plans (or, more probably, systems of 
simpler type) that control the most elementary units of behaviour. (78)  
 As Fonagy and Target have observed, the information-processing model conceptualises 
mind in terms of “distinct and divisible systems” (423).  
According to Bowlby, the hierarchically-structured instructions guiding behaviour 
must be mediated by “a regulating apparatus” (Attachment 42). It is possible to perceive 
that this “regulating apparatus” is similar to the control mechanism in an IPS. The 
attachment system thus corresponds to the tripartite structure of instructions, executed 
behaviour and interpreted instruction found in both mid-nineteenth- and mid-twentieth-
century computing.   
Bowlby in Attachment writes that “the simplest method of organising behaviour . . . 
is by means of a chain” (75). Paralleling the limitations of list structures, Bowlby observes 
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that these “simple chains” cannot encompass contingencies: “the whole organisation fails 
in its purpose if one link in the chain miscarries” (76). The solution is to use conditional 
branching, making the model of cognitive-behavioural flexibility in attachment theory 
similar to the model of computational flexibility in mid-twentieth-century computing:  
There are, however, ways by which a chain-linked organisation of 
behavioural systems can be made more flexible . . . at any point in a chain it 
can have one or more alternative links so that, whenever activation of the 
first of a set of alternative behavioural systems fails to achieve results . . . 
one of the other systems of the set becomes active. (76)  
According to Bowlby, “any particular link in a chain can be a behavioural system of any 
degree of complexity” (76). In other words “chains”, which may or may not include 
conditional branches, are eventually incorporated as discrete components within a 
hierarchically-structured Plan. Complex attachment behaviour is therefore a “structure 
made up of a hierarchy of subordinate structures” (77). Inge Bretherton has observed that 
the work of Miller, Galanter and Pribram led Bowlby to foreground “behavioural systems 
organised as plan hierarchies”, but does not mention the influence of computing upon this 
model (766). This section aims to reveal the extent to which computing informs the 
Bowlbian attachment system through detailed study of mid-century computing.  
A further comparison with computing is that Bowlby foregrounds a model of 
cognitive-behavioural flexibility as a flexible arrangement of “subordinate structures”:  
The whole [behavioural] sequence is conceived as a master plan . . . the 
master plan itself being made up of a number of sub-Plans . . . and each of 
the sub-plans in turn being made up of sub-sub-sub-plans, and so on . . .  
the complete master plan must be executed, but the sub-plans and other 
subordinate systems that go to make it up, can, within limits, be varied. 
(Attachment 78)  
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Cognitive-behavioural flexibility is equated here with a capacity to reconfigure inflexible 
subplans at various hierarchical levels within a modular Plan. I would therefore argue that 
Bowlbian attachment theory after 1969 can be interpreted as a computational expression 
of the tradition described in this thesis: Bowlby observed that Plans had demonstrated how 
“flexible sequences of behaviour could in principle be organised by means of a hierarchy of 
systems”. The model described by attachment theory therefore corresponds to the 
cognitive-behavioural model depicted in Passages.  
It is my contention that attachment theory also shares with Passages and Plans the 
specific computational expression of this tradition as a movement between states of partial 
inflexibility and partial fragmentation. Paralleling the computational model in Passages and 
Plans, significant areas of inflexibility remain to structure modifications made to 
attachment Plans: “Usually they [changes] are completed but only slowly” (Attachment 82). 
In addition, the inflexibility of attachment Plans can be temporary. Bowlby claims that 
although “patterns, once formed, are apt to persist, this is by no means necessarily so . . . if 
the parent treats the child differently the pattern will change” (Secure Base 127).  
A further comparison with Passages and Plans is the heuristic quality that Bowlby 
attributes to attachment planning. He writes that “many of the mental processes of which 
we are most keenly conscious” involve “making a novel plan” (Attachment 82). This 
planning is heuristic and therefore fallible: it involves “considered (though not necessarily 
well-judged) planning of behaviour” (117). In a move that can be compared with the 
depiction of heuristics in Passages and Plans, a key heuristic method is to transfer an 
existing Plan, making minor modifications to tailor it to a specific individual: “the pattern 
becomes increasingly a property of the child himself, which means that he tends to impose 
it, or some derivative of it, upon new relationships” (Bowlby, Secure Base 127). This is 
similar to how an IPS makes minor adjustments to fit a program to a given data set.  
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It has been previously argued in this chapter that the prevalence of inflexible 
routines in the Engines led to similarly high levels of cognitive-behavioural inflexibility being 
depicted in Passages. This nineteenth-century context offers an indication of how the 
correspondingly high levels of inflexibility in mid-twentieth-century computing were 
paralleled in attachment theory. The developmental narrative foregrounded by attachment 
theory after 1969 is therefore similar to the narrative of cognitive-behavioural 
development that Babbage extrapolated from correspondences between his Engines: the 
child begins by establishing attachment behaviour as inflexible “chain” or list structures, 
with these inflexible routines forming the basis of subsequent behavioural flexibility within 
“plan hierarchies”. 
The extent of the similarity between pathological and normative states on this 
model is indicated by the fact that this model associates attachment pathologies and 
inflexible Plans. Imposing inflexible attachment Plans is described by Bowlby as 
engendering “inappropriate actions” and “conflict” (Making and Breaking 168):  
The psychological state may be likened to a computer that, once 
programmed, produces its results automatically . . . should an error have 
crept in, however, its correction not only demands skilled attention but 
may prove troublesome and slow to achieve. (Bowlby, Loss 55)  
At the same time, normative attachment planning encompasses “imposing” a largely 
inflexible structure. I would argue that these correspondences between normative and 
pathological states derive from the computational foundations of Plans. This chapter has 
identified a comparable dynamic in Passages, one that results in similarities between the 
model of flexible cognition and behaviour depicted in this text and the cognitive-
behavioural pathologies of Economy. It would therefore appear to be the case that the 
model of normative cognition and behaviour foregrounded by attachment theory shares 
similarities with cognitive-behavioural pathologies attributed to nineteenth-century 
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factories. It is one of the aims of this thesis to show that comparisons with nineteenth-
century thinking can uncover troubling implications of the attachment model.  
Comparing attachment theory with the pedagogical narratives of Passages and 
Plans also suggests correspondences between normative and incestuous attachment 
pedagogies. Although Bowlby believed some rudimentary attachment behaviours- for 
instance, smiling- to be innate, he claimed that most attachment Plans were learnt (Making 
and Breaking 51):   
The processes by which such attitudes and forms of behaviour are acquired 
are presumably those of observational learning and thus no different to 
those by which other complex forms of behaviour, including useful skill, are 
acquired. (167) 
In both Passages and Plans, obtaining Plans from pedagogues forms a major component of 
learning. Similarly, Bowlby observes that we learn attachment Plans from caregivers 
(Separation 418): “much that is learned derives from imitating what mother does” 
(Attachment 225).  
These largely inflexible Plans determine the structure of the child’s subsequent 
attachment behaviour:  “once a sequence of behaviour has become organised, it tends to 
persist . . . The precise form that any particular piece of behaviour takes and the sequence 
within which it is first organised are thus of the greatest consequence for its future” 
(Attachment 160). This suggests that a result of its computational underpinnings, there is a 
tendency in attachment theory to represent learning as a “stamping in” of largely inflexible 
routines. On this basis, the normative pedagogies of attachment theory can be regarded as 
comparable to the incestuous pedagogies of the factory system in Economy.  
A further similarity with the incestuous pedagogies of Economy is the fact that the 
Bowlbian pedagogue not only provides largely inflexible Plans, but also the heuristic rules 
that determine their combination. As Fonagy and Target state, the computer metaphor 
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“assume[s] that cognitive processes are rule-based manipulations of symbols” (421). 
Similarly, when formulating an attachment Plan, the child utilises rules learnt from 
caregivers in a largely inflexible manner: they are “not unlikely to adopt some, at least, of 
the methods she herself employs” (Bowlby, Attachment 356). This makes these pedagogies 
similar to those described in mid-nineteenth-century accounts of the factory system.  
This chapter has sought to show that comparable computational expressions of a 
tradition of representing cognitive-behavioural flexibility as a flexible arrangement of 
inflexible units emerged in the mid-twentieth and mid-nineteenth century. It is my 
contention that correspondences between these models can form the basis of a historically 
sensitive application of attachment theory to nineteenth-century literature and culture. 
The next chapter seeks to offer a further illustration of this by comparing nineteenth-
















The Child-Machine at Play: Play, Child Development and Computational Models in 
Babbage, Eliot, Turing and Attachment Theory 
 
In his critique of Victorian attitudes to play, The World in Play: Portraits of a Victorian 
Concept (2011), historian Matthew Kaiser identifies a logic that he terms “play as paideia”: 
“At its core is the sentimental notion, a truism today, that play is intrinsically productive 
and normative, that children and young animals, in particular, learn, adapt, and develop 
through life-enabling play” (30). Kaiser claims that the “Victorians adored this logic” (30). 
Kaiser’s logic of “play as paideia” is similar to the “rhetoric of play as progress” described by 
play theorist Brian Sutton-Smith (9-10): “The main concern is to show that increases in the 
complexity of play-skill- physical, mental, imaginative or social- lead to increases in some 
parallel kind of human growth or adaptation” (18). Sutton-Smith, however, identifies this 
rhetoric in child development literature from the mid-twentieth century onwards.  
A logic almost exclusively applied to children, this understanding of play as 
progress has exerted considerable influence upon recent theories of child development 
(Sutton-Smith 9-10; D. Cohen 1-2). As paideia has been used to refer to a range of concepts 
within play theory, I will use Sutton-Smith’s “play as progress” rather than Kaiser’s “play as 
paideia” in this chapter. The previous chapter sought to illustrate how, in the mid-
nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries, computing technology provided a conceptual 
framework with which to represent cognitive-behavioural flexibility as a flexible 
arrangement of inflexible units. This final chapter aims to show that computing also lent 
support to the belief that play is necessary in order to develop the type of cognitive-
behavioural flexibility that this model foregrounds.  
This chapter seeks to illustrate that allowing computers to play in the mid-
nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries helped to establish a dominant logic of play as 
progress. This chapter also aims to trace how computing shaped perceptions of the specific 
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developmental patterns enabled by play. The mid-nineteenth century, however, was not 
the first period in which play was regarded as developmentally significant. Play occupied a 
central place in the pedagogical thought of the late eighteenth century, particularly in the 
work of Friedrich Froebel (1782-1852), Maria Edgeworth (1768-1849) and Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau (1712- 1778). This chapter contends that from the mid-nineteenth century 
onwards an established logic of play as progress was reshaped by new technologies, 
resulting in the organic metaphors of Froebel’s “child-garden” being substituted for a 
computational model.   
Like the previous chapter, this chapter is characterised by a reverse chronological 
movement. I hope to illustrate that this is another instance in which this interpretative 
framework can reveal previously overlooked aspects of both nineteenth- and twentieth-
century thinking. This chapter begins with an exploration of the significance of play for the 
theories of machine learning advanced by the British computer scientist Alan Turing (1912- 
1954). Although numerous computer scientists and historians including Cristiano 
Castelfranchi, Susan Sterrett and Elizabeth Wilson have provided extensive discussion of a 
range of concepts and issues associated with Turing’s theories of machine intelligence, the 
pedagogical significance of play in his work has not yet been discussed. There have also 
been claims that Turing “wasn’t seriously . . . us[ing] AI programs to clarify and develop 
specific psychological theories” (Boden 180). 
The next part of the chapter is designed to show that Turing’s thinking on the 
relationship between machine and human learning has shaped the attachment 
understanding of how play facilitates the development of cognitive-behavioural flexibility. 
Rather than focusing on the work of a particular individual working in the field of 
attachment theory, this chapter instead examines a strand of recent attachment thinking 
that identifies play as a crucial factor in the development of cognitive-behavioural 
flexibility. This is, as far as I am aware, the first time that these correspondences between 
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Turing’s work and attachment theory have been identified. This chapter seeks to contribute 
to the historicization of attachment theory by revealing the role of computing in shaping 
the attachment logic of play as progress. 
 The second half of this chapter explores similarities between computing 
technology, attachment theory, and a computational logic of play as progress in the 
nineteenth century. During the mid-nineteenth century Babbage utilised the Engines as the 
conceptual basis for a game-playing machine that he named “Automaton”. I want to show 
that Babbage’s description of Automaton can be compared with Turing’s theories regarding 
the significance of play for human and machine intelligence. Several historians have 
discussed Babbage’s work as an antecedent of modern computer chess, including George 
Atkinson and Alex Bell. Historian Devin Monnens has even offered suggestions as to how 
Babbage envisaged Automaton’s construction. What has been absent from this discussion, 
however, is any consideration of similarities between Babbage’s theories of machine play 
and models of cognitive-behavioural development.  
In “Babbage’s Dancer and the Impresarios of Mechanism” Simon Schaffer explores 
the socio-political ramifications of where “intelligence” is understood to be located in 
relation to machines. He discusses the capacity of Babbage’s “games machine” for “random 
moves programmed in advance”, and its consequent ability to suggest a guiding 
intelligence behind apparently random occurrences (62). He does not, however, consider 
these “random moves” in terms of a flexible combination of inflexible units, or consider 
Automaton’s implications for a model of play as progress. Historian Margaret Boden has 
explicitly denied Automaton’s significance for models of human mental processing: “had he 
built it, it would have been a technologist’s toy, not a psychologist’s model” (151). This 
chapter aims to show that Babbage draws parallels between theories of machine play and 
cognitive-behavioural models in a similar manner to twentieth-century attachment theory.  
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The penultimate section of this chapter offers a reading of Passages that gives 
additional consideration to the developmental narratives contained within this text. I want 
to show that comparing Passages with the pedagogical models discussed in this chapter 
can reveal new aspects of Babbage’s depiction of pedagogical methods. This chapter then 
concludes with a discussion of the influence of computing upon George Eliot’s depiction of 
play behaviours and pedagogy in The Mill on the Floss (1860). This section argues that that 
Eliot identifies play as a means of cultivating forms of cognitive-behavioural flexibility 
associated with the computational model described in this thesis. This section also seeks to 
illustrate that Eliot’s analysis of the cultural implications of this model in Mill can offer a 
framework with which to identify similar correspondences in attachment theory. 
 
Turing and the Child-Machine at Play 
 
In the early 1950s Turing explored the possibilities of machine intelligence using a famous 
thought-experiment. Turing hypothesised that a digital computer- a “child-machine”- could 
be transformed into a more sophisticated one “by a suitable selection of the experiences to 
which it was subjected. This might be called ‘education’” (“Computing Machinery” 456; 
“Heretical Theory” 257). For Turing, pedagogy represented a means whereby a computer 
capable of “imitat[ing] an adult human mind” could be developed (“Computing Machinery” 
455). This section seeks to draw attention to Turing’s hypothesis that computational 
complexity and flexibility could be established through playful pedagogies.   
Turing discusses the concept of a child-machine in the papers “Computing 
Machinery and Intelligence” (1950) and “Intelligent Machinery: A Heretical Theory” (1951), 
although in the latter the phrase “child-machine” is not used.  Ideas relevant to this 
discussion are also explored in the papers “Can Digital Computers Think?” (1951) and 
“Chess” (1953), and in the lecture Turing delivered to the Royal Astronomical Society in 
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1947, “Lecture on the Automatic Computing Engine”. A further paper entitled “Intelligent 
Machinery” (1948) was published posthumously. I will use the phrase “Intelligent 
Machinery” to designate the 1948 paper, and “Heretical Theory” to designate the paper 
written in 1951. 
 Turing wrote that “[o]ne could not send the creature to school without the other 
children making excessive fun of it. It must be given some tuition” (“Computing Machinery” 
456):  “This training may be regarded as not unlike putting instruction tables into a 
machine. One must not expect a machine to do a great deal of building up of instruction 
tables on its own” (Turing, “Lecture” 394). As stated previously, the phrase “instruction 
table” is another way of referring to programs. Turing imagined that a machine might be 
constructed that, given “certain initial instruction tables . . . might, on occasion, if good 
reason arose, modify those tables (393):  
We may also sometimes speak of a machine modifying itself, or of a 
machine changing its own instructions . . . according to our conventions the 
‘machine’ is completely described by the relation between its possible 
configurations at consecutive moments.  
(Turing, “Intelligent Machinery” 419)  
Turing wrote that if a computer had the ability to flexibly modify its instruction tables by 
altering the configuration of the inflexible subroutines from which they were constructed, 
“one is obliged to regard the machine as showing intelligence” (“Lecture”, 393). 
Play is figured by Turing as instrumental in developing this capacity, with the child-
machine “occupy[ing] its time mostly in playing games” (“Heretical Theory” 257). Turing 
observed that this play would be “necessarily intellectual in character”, with suitable games 
including tic-tac-toe and GO (257). As detailed in the previous chapter, this predilection for 
formal games involving rule-bound combinations of discrete states was characteristic of 
mid-century computing. In the learning process that Turing describes the child-machine 
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stores data in “indexes of experiences” (258). The child-machine initially stores data such as 
“the patterns of men or parts of a GO board that had occurred” (258). In the next stage of 
its development, it records “important parts of the configuration of the machine at each 
moment”: “in other words it would begin to remember what its thoughts had been” (258).  
Turing outlines how a child-machine might investigate how certain “thoughts” or 
configurations were derived in order to refine the implementation of its own procedures. 
The previous chapter discussed how the architecture of programs is dictated by rules that 
determine the relationship between component instructions: “Important amongst such 
imperatives will be ones that regulate the order in which the rules of the logical system 
concerned are to be applied” (Turing, “Computing Machinery” 458). Turing writes that the 
child-machine would be taught these rules by its “schoolmaster”: “I suggest that the 
education of the machine should be entrusted to some highly competent schoolmaster” 
(“Heretical Theory” 257); “these [rules] might be ‘given by authority’” (“Computing 
Machinery” 458). As Sterrett observes, Turing “seems to think of education as a special 
kind of interference: it involves a teacher who intentionally tries to affect the behaviour of 
the machine” (706).  
Where the child-machine differs from most mid-century computers is that its 
education eventually allows it to devise its own procedural rules (Turing, “Digital 
Computers” 482):   
When a choice has to be made as to what to do next features of the 
present situation are looked up in the indexes available, and the previous 
choice in the similar situations, and the outcome, good or bad, is 
discovered . . . At first probably some quite crude rule will suffice, e.g., to 
do whichever has the greatest number of votes in its favour. At a very late 
stage the whole question of procedure in such cases will probably have 
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been investigated by the machine itself, and this may result in some highly 
sophisticated and, one hopes, highly satisfactory, form of rule.  
(Turing, “Computing Machinery” 458) 
The rules the child-machine is equipped to formulate as a result of its education are 
heuristic in character. Heuristic methods in computing are fallible but unambiguous 
procedures (or “rules”) for selecting an instruction when there are several legal courses of 
action: “For at each stage . . . there is a large number of alternative steps, any one of which 
one is permitted to apply as far as obedience to the rules of the logical system is 
concerned” (458). As a means of determining a course of action when the choice to be 
made is nondeterministic, heuristic rules are fundamental to games.  
Turing depicts play as integral to the education of a machine capable of formulating 
its own heuristic methods. He observes that when a chess problem “admits of several 
solutions” the machine should have the ability to “choose at random” or “according to an 
arbitary additional condition” (“Chess” 573). Machine learning in this context consists of 
devising increasingly sophisticated rules to govern such choices:  
Could one make a machine to play chess, and to improve its play, game by 
game, profiting by its experience? . . . it would be quite possible to 
programme the machine to try out variations in its method of play (e.g. 
variations in piece-value) and adopt the one giving the most satisfactory 
results. This could certainly be described as learning . . . It might also be 
possible to programme the machine to search for new types of 
combination in chess. (575, emphasis added)   
This increased sophistication in selecting certain heuristic strategies for gameplay is 
explicitly described here as “learning”. This quote would seem to suggest that Turing saw 
correspondences between play and pedagogical methods. 
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Turing also suggests that heuristic techniques utilised in play have a purpose 
beyond acting as a mechanism to enable nondeterministic choice. Turing observed that a 
random data generator, or “random element”, could be programmed into a child-machine 
“to generate possibilities among which some search process is then employed” (Sterrett 
705): “one such instruction might for instance be, ‘Throw the die and put the resulting 
number into store 1000’” (Turing, “Computing Machinery” 438).  This “store 1000” might 
form part of an instruction table, with the resultant combination generating non-
predetermined machine behaviours. 
In generating random data the child-machine performs an action similar to 
throwing a die, as if determining its move in a game, whilst in “Chess” Turing describes “a 
machine . . . which would play random legal moves” (569). From being initially confined to 
a specific instance of gameplay, the child-machine is subsequently able to use techniques 
learnt in play to determine its responses in other situations in which it is necessary to form 
combinations of inflexible procedural instructions, with “the whole question of procedure 
in such cases . . . hav[ing] been investigated by the machine itself” (Turing, “Heretical 
Theory” 258).  
Turing proposed that the child-machine’s heuristic behaviour should be referred to 
as “partially random” (“Intelligent Machinery” 416). This designation would appear to 
derive from the fact that the routines upon which the child-machine bases its heuristic 
strategies are “given by authority”- in other words, by human programmers. As Turing 
notes, the combinations of states formed by the child-machine also depends upon how it 
has been taught to evaluate the outcome of its decisions:  
there should be two keys that can be manipulated by the schoolteacher, 
and which represent the ideas of pleasure and pain. At later stages in 
education the machine would recognise certain other conditions as 
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desirable owing to their being constantly associated in the past with 
pleasure, and likewise certain others as undesirable. 
(“Heretical Theory” 259)  
As Sterrett observes, Turing depicts the structure given by pedagogues as instrumental in 
enabling the child-machine to develop in the direction of intelligence (704): 
Intelligent behaviour presumably consists in a departure from the 
completely disciplined behaviour involved in computation, but a rather 
slight one, which does not give rise to random behaviour, or to pointless 
repetitive loops. (Turing, “Computing Machinery” 459)  
Turing suggests that if no structure is given to the machine’s less “disciplined” behaviours, 
then they will emerge as fragmented and non-functional.  
Owing to their rule-bound nature, formal games provided Turing with a means of 
exploring the pedagogical implications of structured flexibility in machines: “it would be 
quite possible to programme the machine to try out variations in its method of play . . . This 
could certainly be described as learning”. The human programmer furnishes the computer 
with a program that authorises it to “autonomously” vary its own procedures in a manner 
designed to increase the sophistication of its gameplay. The subsequent development of 
the machine is determined to a significant extent by this initial programming.   
Turing nevertheless maintained that routines generated in the manner described 
above represented the child-machine’s own expression of its learning:  
Certainly the machine can only do what we do order it to perform . . . But 
there is no need to suppose that, when we give it its orders we know what 
we are doing, what the consequences of these orders are going to be . . . If 
we give the machine a program that results in its doing something 
interesting which we had not anticipated I should be inclined to say that 
the machine had originated something… 
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(“Digital Computers” 486, emphasis in original) 
Turing also recapitulates this argument in the context of machine play: “If this [chess 
program] produced results that were quite new, and also interesting to the programmer, 
who should have the credit?” (“Chess” 575). On several occasions Turing also uses a 
comparison with pedagogy to explain how a computer might derive novel behaviours from 
deterministic programs: “It would be like a pupil who had learnt much from his master, but 
had added much more by his own work” (“Lecture” 393; see also “Digital Computers” 485).  
Turing observed, however, that sophisticated behaviours could be simulated in a 
child-machine by allowing schoolteachers and programmers to entirely determine its 
behaviour (“Heretical Theory” 257). A machine could even play chess using a deterministic 
instruction table (Turing, “Chess” 571):   
It would be quite easy to arrange the experiences in such a way 
that they automatically caused the structure of the machine to 
build up into a previously intended form, and this would be 
obviously a gross form of cheating, almost on a par with having a 
man inside the machine. (Turing, “Heretical Theory 257) 
This concept of such pedagogies as being “on a par with having a man inside the machine” 
parallels Ferenczi’s claim that the incestuously educated child is compelled to internalise 
the idiom of the aggressor. Although the heuristic rules originated by the child-machine 
have their basis in routines provided by programmers and educators, this capacity still 
offers security against incestuous pedagogies: “the behaviour of the machine not being by 
any means completely determined by the experiences to which it was subjected” (259).  
It is my contention that Turing also sought to draw attention to these parallels 




I will not say much about how this process of ‘programming a machine to 
think’ is to be done . . . I will only say this, that I believe the process should 
bear a close relation to that of teaching . . . The whole thinking process is 
mysterious to us, but I believe that the attempt to make a thinking machine 
will help us greatly in finding out how we think ourselves.  
(“Digital Computers” 486) 
Although in the “Chess” paper Turing cautions that the manner in which computers form 
combinations of moves “is not quite representative of learning as we know it” (575), 
elsewhere in his work the parallels between human and machine learning are strongly 
stated: 
A human graduate has had contact with human beings for twenty years or 
more. This contact has throughout been modifying his behaviour pattern. 
His teachers have been intentionally trying to modify it. At the end of that 
period a large number standard routines will have been superimposed . . . 
He is then in a position to try out new combinations of these routines, to 
make slight variations on them, and to apply them in new ways.  
(“Intelligent Machinery” 421)  
Turing applies to his “human graduate” a computational model in which development 
consists of devising novel methods of combining preprogramed “standard routines”. Turing 
was aware that the lines of demarcation separating human and machine learning in his 
work were highly fluid. He concludes a discussion of machine learning in the “Heretical 
Theory” paper by stating that further examination of the topic would constitute “nothing 
more than an analysis of actual methods of education applied to human children” (259).  
Although in this particular instance Turing shifts focus away from “methods of education 
applied to human children”, the next section proposes that his theories influenced the 
attachment model of the didactic and developmental significance of play. 
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Attachment Theory: The Child (Machine) at Play 
 
It appears that recent work in attachment theory has continued to foreground the 
computational model of cognition and behaviour that Bowlby introduced to the field in the 
1960s. In a volume regarding attachment behaviour and neuroscience published in 2008, 
clinical psychologist Susan Hart writes:  
Children develop adaptation patterns that correspond to their current level 
of mental organisation. This takes place through functional differentiation 
and hierarchical integration . . .  The child’s early adaptive patterns are 
successfully reorganised at different times in life. (59) 
 
In a simplified sense . . . higher order functions are always based on lower-
order functions, while lower-order functions may be independent of 
higher-order functions. (13) 
Simple “functions” are represented in Hart’s account as discrete entities that can be 
combined to create complex cognitive-behavioural “organisations”: “The child develops as 
a result of neural reorganisation and increasing complexity” (59). These combinations, 
however, do not destroy the integrity of the simpler units, which may be highly inflexible 
(13). I would therefore suggest that recent attachment theory continues to share 
similarities with the architecture of mid-century computing. 
 This section aims to show that this model has also been used by recent theorists of 
child development to depict cognitive-behavioural processes associated with play. For 
instance, the influential developmental psychologist Daniel N. Stern writes in his paper 
“The Goal and Structure of Maternal Play” (1974) that: 
Play between mother and infant, like almost any naturally occurring 
interpersonal event, can be conceptualised in terms of a hierarchical 
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structure in which smaller units of behaviour combine to form larger 
organisational units, which together constitute the next larger units… (402) 
 
The largest unit is the entire play period. This is subdivided into several 
“game” sequences wherein each game is determined by the mother’s 
creating different recombinations of her behaviours in distinctive sequences 
. . . Each attention episode is for the infant equivalent to a period of a 
presentation of discrete maternal behaviours, each of which forms the 
fourth and smallest unit, called maternal acts. (407, emphasis added) 
Stern claims that children’s play possesses a similar structure (407). Discrete units of play 
behaviour combine to create larger units, which can subsequently be regarded as 
“distinctive sequences”.  It is possible to perceive that complex play here is structured in a 
similar manner to behavioural complexity in computers. Another comparison with 
computing is that behavioural flexibility consists of the flexible combination and 
recombination of a finite number of behavioural units: “Each new game involves novel 
recombinations of a finite set of behaviours” (416). 
 It is my contention that computing has not only provided attachment theory with a 
model of how play is structured, but has also determined its understanding of play as 
progress. One explanation for this is that the theoretical volumes from which attachment 
theory derived its computational models demonstrate Turing’s influence. The previous 
chapter traced how Attachment was influenced by Plans and the Structure of Behaviour, a 
text that cites Turing as a source for its theoretical model (46, 167-68). In turn, Stern’s 
paper explicitly names Attachment as a source (404, 419). A further explanation is that 
these ideas were disseminated directly to an audience working in the field of psychology, 
as “Computing Machinery and Intelligence”- the paper in which the child-machine is 
discussed- was published in the journal Mind in 1950.   
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 The previous section sought to show that Turing highlighted the importance of play 
to the development of heuristic competencies that enable the child-machine to flexibly 
combine inflexible units of behaviour. I would suggest that there are strong similarities 
between this computational model and the logic of play as progress that Stern describes:  
The more games with which a mother can interest and delight an infant, 
the more practice he will have . . . in different interactive situations 
involving more sense modalities in more patterns . . . Each new game 
involves recombinations of a finite set of behaviours . . . play is a creative 
act, in that it consists of novel transformations of behaviour, or in this case, 
behavioural sequencing . . . very often an unplanned maternal act is avidly 
responded to by the infant and can become the ‘theme’ around which a 
new game is constructed. (416)   
Turing hypothesised that a random element could provide the child-machine with a means 
of generating new behaviours that could then be evaluated and stored in memory. 
Similarly, the child depicted by Stern uses the structure of a random event designated by its 
caregiver as a means of determining modifications to its own behaviour: “an unplanned 
maternal act . . . can become the ‘theme’ around which a new game is constructed”. There 
appears to be a tendency in clinical practice to create physical parallels of this model, with 
tests used to study the development of cognitive-behavioural capacities through play 
encouraging children to form combinations of individual construction blocks or mosaic 
pieces, or to switch between discrete sets of playing cards (Arend, Gove and Sroufe 953; 
Cragg and Chevalier 211; Grossmann et al., “Sensitive and Challenging Play” 316).  
A further comparison with computational models is that the departure from 
disciplined behaviour that characterises play in attachment theory is relatively slight, with 
“free play” depicted as involving minor modifications to a finite number of routines. 
Caregivers in attachment theory are figured as “external organisers” responsible for 
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providing this structure in the form of “guidance, scaffolding, and teaching” (Zimmermann 
et al. 332; Grossmann et al. “Sensitive and Challenging Play” 316). I wish to suggest that 
this belief in the necessity of “scaffolding” parallels Turing’s argument that 
nondeterministic decisions must be structured in order for behaviour to generate 
developmental progression rather than “pointless repetitive loops”. 
It would appear, however, that this application of the computational model has not 
been without its difficulties. As demonstrated by the Sensitive and Challenging Interactive 
Play (SCIP) scale, attachment theory has been forced to demarcate between structured 
flexibility and the imposition of inflexible play patterns (Grossman et al. “Sensitive and 
Challenging Play”, 31). The positively regarded polarity of the SCIP scale has been labelled 
“Responsive-Didactic”, where “scaffolding during teaching interactions” is “responsive and 
emotionally attuned” (Shannon et al. 80, 95). The other polarity is “Negative-Intrusive”, 
characterised by “high structuring . . . intrusiveness, and inflexibility” (95). As discussed 
above, Turing observed that play behaviours might be simulated in a computer by 
providing it with an entirely deterministic set of rules. The “Negative-Intrusive” caregiver 
forces the child to play in a similarly deterministic manner. This inflexible play can be 
compared with the incestuous pedagogies described in previous chapters.  
Yet although it denounces play that is too prescriptive, attachment theory also 
stresses the need for children’s play to be regulated by “external organisers”. Paralleling 
Turing’s concerns, in recent years there has been much discussion of the risks of self-
modifying software: “trial and error in revising one's own code are about as hazardous as 
trial and error in brain surgery . . . experiments in self-modification will be fraught with the 
risks of self-mutilation” (Suber). We love the computer, so we must prevent it from injuring 
itself by placing a degree of “responsibility for the evaluation and modification . . . outside 
the software product itself” (Clark and Osterweil 30): “the beings —human or machine— 
who love a machine, or who designed it, coded it, or raised it, will be those most inclined to 
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save it from itself” (Suber). However, as Suber observes, this has become a coercive 
rationale for controlling the computer. A similar logic structures attachment theory: we 
love the child (machine), so we cannot allow it to modify itself into a behavioural 
fragmentation that represents the other polarity of trauma on this model. We mitigate this 
trauma in the context of play by making the disaggregation of cognitive-behavioural 
structures in the service of creative living a scaffolded one. Yet the comparison with 
computing would suggest that the boundary between scaffolding and controlling play is a 
hard line to hold, perhaps explaining the need for such instruments as the SCIP scale. 
I want to show that there have also been other difficulties that have arisen as a 
result of applying this computational model to human children. In the child-machine 
sophisticated play behaviours correspond to a general capacity for computational 
flexibility. This would later mature into a paradigm in mid-century computing known as 
“generalist AI”, founded on the premise that skills developed in one domain would readily 
generate similar competencies in others (Garnham 7). On this basis, making a computer 
smarter at chess should lead to improved performance in areas such as mathematics and 
logic. Similarly, the idea that skills for organising discrete units learnt in play contribute to a 
general capacity for cognitive- behavioural flexibility has achieved significant currency in 
recent attachment theory:  
Much of human exploratory behaviour is playful . . . Security of exploration 
seems to rest on (1) a child’s ability to organise emotions and behaviours 
open-mindedly . . . and (2) the child’s confidence in an attachment figures’ 
availability and helpfulness, should help be needed. 
(Grossmann et al. “A Wider View” 858-59, emphasis added) 
This thinking possesses strong correspondences with the generalist logic of mid-century 
computing. It argues that the child, as it develops, will use cognitive-behavioural skills 
learnt in play to flexibly organise behaviours across contexts: “Play is meaningful action . . . 
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it is the means by which children progressively explore the world to formulate and organise 
concepts” (Rodning, Beckwith and Howard 276).   
The coordination of affect, cognition and behaviour is closely tied to the 
problem of generating and coordinating flexible adaptive responses to 
demands . . . Through its play and exploration, promoted by its effective 
attachment relationship, the infant is acquiring experiences which will 
promote positive adaptation in the next developmental period.  
(Waters and Sroufe 8-9) 
These quotes appear to suggest that the generalist aspects of Turing’s theories of machine 
learning have influenced the attachment understanding of how futurity is encoded in play.  
Yet by the 1970s the lack of progress in implementing generalist AI had 
precipitated a crisis of faith in the ability of competencies developed in one domain to 
engender corresponding sophistication in other domains (Garnham 7). Cultivating domain-
specific abilities subsequently became the focus of AI research (Dreyfus 14-16). The demise 
of the generalist model has been paralleled in the concerns of some theorists of child 
development. For instance, Sutton-Smith has suggested that this confidence that an 
increase in the sophistication of play behaviours facilitates a corresponding development of 
general cognitive-behavioural capabilities may result in caregivers unconsciously 
generating skill transfers that would otherwise not occur (40). I would argue that 
attachment theory as a discipline has experienced difficulties in responding to the 
limitations of the generalist model, with the logic of generalist AI continuing to determine 







Babbage’s Automaton: Another Child-Machine at Play 
 
This section seeks to illustrate that the child-machine described by Turing was not the first 
instance in which a computer shaped ideas about the developmental purpose of play. 
Babbage in Passages states that his intention in designing “Automaton” was “the 
contrivance of a machine that should be able to play a game of purely intellectual skill 
successfully” (465), with the game chosen “tit-tat-to [tic-tac-toe]” (467). Babbage 
conceived the idea for this machine in 1844, returning to the project at sporadic intervals 
during the following two decades (Monnens 2). Although it appears Babbage initially 
intended to construct Automaton, it remained a thought-experiment: “You say nothing of 
Tic-tac-toe [Automaton] in yr [sic] last [letter]. I am alarmed lest it should never be 
accomplished” (Lovelace, qtd. Toole 340, emphasis in original).  
In a chapter in Passages entitled “Games of Skill”, Babbage writes that the first 
stage in designing the machine was to record all possible configurations of O and X (468). 
Monnens writes that in a diagram dated 1844 Babbage depicted each board position 
associated with an axis that could occupy one of three positions corresponding to empty 
space, O or X (5). Twenty-seven discrete positions are therefore possible (Babbage, 
Passages 468). Each of these can be interpreted as an inflexible unit of machine behaviour 
that can be combined to generate various board configurations. Babbage writes that 
Automaton was based upon “various principles . . .  in my published and unpublished 
papers”, and an underlying principle of the Analytical Engine can be observed here (465). 
Paralleling the manner in which complexity is generated in this computer, Automaton’s 
capacity for gameplay is not described by the number of discrete states that it can effect- 
which in the case of tic-tac-toe Babbage describes as “comparatively insignificant”- but by 
“the myriads of combinations which even the simplest games included” (466).  
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Babbage in “Games of Skill” emphasises the importance of heuristics to the flexible 
combination of inflexible states in gameplay. He outlines a procedure to enable Automaton 
to make nondetermistic choices within the parameters stipulated by the rules of the game:  
1. Is the position of men, as placed before him [Automaton] on the board, a 
possible position? that is, one which is consistent with the rules of the 
game?  
2. If so, has Automaton already lost the game? 
3. If not, has Automaton won the game?  
4. If not, can he win at the next move? If so, make that move.  
5. If not, could his adversary, if he had the move, win the game. 
6. If so, Automaton must prevent him if possible.  
7. If his adversary cannot win the game at his next move, Automaton must 
examine whether he can make such a move that, if he were allowed to 
have two such moves in succession, he could at the second move have two 
different ways of winning the game; and each of these cases failing, 
Automaton must look forward to three or more successive moves. (467) 
Paralleling Turing’s depictions of machine play, a means of evaluating the results of 
potential configurations (moves) is essential in order to implement this heuristic routine 
effectively. Although Babbage did not publish a description of a mechanism to evaluate 
board positions, Monnens identifies a diagram dated August 1848 of being of particular 
interest. This diagram represents a grid, where each square is assigned a value, and all 
horizontal, vertical and diagonal rows add up to fifteen. Monnens suggests that this “magic 
square” could be used to evaluate board positions: “After adding up each of the eight 
possible lines, relative values could be checked. Rows missing only one number would 
therefore be more valuable than rows missing two or three” (6).  
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Babbage’s theoretical interest in gameplay preceded Automaton by several 
decades. In 1817 he published an article entitled “An Account of Euler’s Method of Solving 
a Problem, Relative to the Move of the Knight at the Game of Chess”. Although this article 
was unsigned Babbage included it in lists of his printed works, and its provenance has since 
been accepted by Babbage scholars (Van Sinderen 173).  In this paper Babbage describes 
an algorithm that can be used to play a game now referred to as “Knight’s Tour”. This game 
demands that, using only legal moves, the knight piece must visit every square on a 
chessboard without repeating any square (“Euler’s Method” 72). Babbage writes that a 
number of “courses”, or combinations of moves, can solve this problem (72). Babbage 
treats each square of the chessboard as a discrete state, with the knight piece moving from 
state to state. Each of these courses can be compared to an algorithm in their capacity to 
determine combinations of discrete states.   
Babbage observes that although elements of these routines remain inflexible, 
alternative pathways can be “discover[ed] by trial”: “the square at which the knight finishes 
his course, may be changed in several ways, without altering the square from which he 
started” (73). Babbage writes that the game concludes when the knight re-enters the first 
square or the square next to it (72). One algorithm has the knight moving through a 
sequence of squares beginning on 1 and ending on 32, a sequence that includes the move 
31-64. Babbage notes that this routine can be modified by moving from 64 to 51 when the 
knight arrives at this position. After this, the routine to determine the next move may 
proceed as before, ending on 52. Because moving from this position to the first square is a 
legal move, Babbage- by making allowable “transformations” in a largely inflexible routine- 
changes the course ending on an adjacent square to a re-entering course (72). Babbage 
here explores a structured flexibility that would prove fundamental to his subsequent work 
in computing. There is evidence that Ada Lovelace also influenced Babbage’s thinking 
regarding Automaton. Historian Betty Toole records that Lovelace and Babbage shared a 
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fascination with the mathematics of games, and that Lovelace had started to develop “a 
process for writing out a winning strategy for a game in mathematical terms” (116). In 
1840, Lovelace asked Babbage whether he believed a winning strategy for peg solitaire 
could “admi[t] of being put into a mathematical Formula” (qtd. Toole 118).  
Babbage writes that when designing Automaton, he reviewed means whereby he 
had dealt with contingencies in the Analytical Engine (Passages 469). Yet considering the 
combination of discrete states in gameplay led Babbage to devise an additional approach 
to machine heuristics. Atkinson identifies the use of a “random element” in Automaton 
(41):  
Whenever two moves, which we may call A and B, were equally conducive 
to winning the game, the automaton was made to consult the record of the 
number of games he had won. If that number happened to be even, he was 
directed to take the course A; if it were odd, he was to take the course B.  
If there were three moves equally possible, the automaton was 
directed to divide the number of games the number of games he had won 
by three. In this case the numbers 0, 1 or 2 might be the remainder, and 
the machine was directed to take the course A, B, or C accordingly. 
(Babbage, Passages 469)  
I want to show that the “random” decisions implemented by Automaton are only “partially 
random”, making them comparable to the “random” decisions executed by Turing’s child-
machine. When effecting a decision Automaton uses preprogramed routines, such as 
subjecting the number of won games to a simple division operation. Also, before this 
occurs, probable solutions are determined using the heuristic routine described above. This 
is what Schaffer is referring to when he describes “random moves programmed in 
advance” (see also Swade, Difference Engine 179). These “random” decisions are also 
circumscribed by the rules of the game. If a combination falls outside these parameters, 
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play cannot continue. The first test performed by Automaton assesses whether a given 
configuration is “one consistent with the rules of the game”. Another comparison with 
Turing’s child-machine is, therefore, that the departure from “disciplined” behaviour must 
be restricted in order to prevent play from becoming chaotic.  
Babbage indicates that a random element has the potential to generate gameplay 
superior to that achievable using unmodifiable routines. This can be compared with his 
recollection of playing chess against an expert named Brande, who had read “almost every 
book on the subject”: “if I played any of the ordinary openings, such as are found in the 
books, I was sure to be beaten” (Passages 36). Babbage, however, eventually discovers a 
way to optimise his chances “by making early in the game a move so bad that it had not 
been mentioned in any treatise” (36). Brande’s learnt routines can be regarded as similar to 
a deterministic algorithm programmed in a game-playing machine. The ability to make non-
predetermined combinations- “not mentioned in any treatise”- is a manifestation of 
intelligence that proves more effective than Brande’s inflexible play. I would suggest that 
this apparently incidental episode demonstrates Babbage’s awareness of the significance of 
a random element for both gameplay and cognitive-behavioural flexibility.  
There is evidence that Babbage and Lovelace discussed the idea of making random 
combinations of discrete states in the Analytical Engine in order to generate unpredictable 
machine behaviours and thus “hit upon . . . new methods” (Lovelace 283): “We might even 
invent laws for series or formulae in an arbitrary manner, and set the engine to work upon 
them, and thus deduce numerical results we might not otherwise have thought of 
obtaining” (283). This use of a random element is similar to that described by Turing. 
Although Lovelace regarded the formation of such combinations as “a kind of philosophical 
amusement” (283, emphasis added), the Brande episode suggests that Babbage perceived 
serious consequences for machine intelligence in such games. 
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That Babbage regarded Automaton as a “child-machine” is indicated by the fact 
that he imagined its play being represented externally by a mechanical child: 
I imagined two children playing against each other, accompanied by a lamb 
and a cock. That the child who won the game might clap his hands while 
the cock was crowing, after which, that the child who was beaten might cry 
and wring his hands whilst the lamb began bleating. (Passages 468)  
This comparison is further emphasised by Babbage’s identification of “tic-tat-to” as a game 
“played by little children” (467). Automaton does not, however, offer a perfect parallel with 
Turing’s child-machine. A fundamental difference is the latter’s capacity to use play as the 
starting point from which to develop computational complexity and flexibility across a 
range of contexts.  
I want to argue that the sketch suggests that Babbage had considered such ideas, 
even if he was unable to implement them. As we have seen, this is another instance in 
which Babbage depicts correspondences between children and computers. The sketch 
begins with the child-Engine executing a simple routine involving the manipulation of 
marbles. In what is surely a reference to his discussions with Lovelace, Babbage writes that 
similar combinations could be effected by a “young lady with the balls of her solitaire 
board” (Passages 50). It has been argued previously that the child’s competence in 
manipulating these discrete units corresponds to its ability to manipulate numerical digits. 
This in turn forms the basis for the child’s subsequent cognitive-behavioural flexibility. It is 
my contention that the sketch suggests that Babbage was able to use concepts deriving 
from Automaton and the Engines in order to foreground a computational logic of play as 
progress similar to that of attachment theory. 
In “Computing Machinery and Intelligence”- the paper in which the child-machine 
theory is most comprehensively stated- Turing identifies the Analytical Engine as a digital 
computer, crediting Babbage with “all the essential ideas” (439). Turing argues that a 
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characteristic feature of this class of machines is that given enough storage capacity and 
speed, a digital computer should be able to imitate any other digital computer. They are 
“universal” machines:  
The Analytical Engine was a universal digital computer, so that, if its 
storage capacity and speed were adequate, it could by suitable 
programming be made to mimic the machine in question.  
(“Computing Machinery” 450) 
This statement implies that if its operational limitations could be overcome, the Analytical 
Engine could theoretically develop in a similar manner to Turing’s child machine. There is 
evidence that nineteenth-century observers also believed Automaton to be capable of 
learning. In 1880, economist William Stanley Jevons wrote: 
Charles Babbage proposed to make an automaton chess-player which 
should register mechanically the number of games lost and gained in 
consequence of every possible kind of move. Thus, the longer the 
automaton went on playing games, the more experienced it would become 
by the accumulation of experimental results. (251-52) 
This section has sought to illustrate that Babbage had identified the possibility of a machine 
with the qualities described by Jevons and Turing, even if he was unable to construct such a 
machine. It has also claimed that these insights into machine games allowed Babbage to 
theorise the developmental importance of play in a manner comparable to much 
twentieth- and twenty-first-century thinking on this subject.  
 
Computational Models of Suboptimal Pedagogy in Passages 
 
Building upon the analysis of the sketch in the previous chapter, this section offers an 
extended reading of Passages that gives additional consideration to the developmental 
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narratives contained within this text. This thesis has sought to demonstrate that computing 
technology in the nineteenth, twentieth and twenty-first centuries resulted in a 
pedagogical model that portrays structured flexibility as optimal for both machine and 
human development. The purpose of this section is to illustrate that the computationally-
inflected models of playful pedagogies discussed in this chapter can deepen our 
understanding of Babbage’s depiction of suboptimal pedagogy in Passages. I want to show 
that these narratives depict pedagogical methods similar to those that recent attachment 
theory associates with a lack of “guidance, scaffolding and teaching" and an “intrusive” or 
“high-structuring” approach. 
Babbage in Passages records experiencing a lack of structure in his early education. 
During his childhood Babbage suffered from “violent fevers” (10). Out of concern for the 
fragile state of his health, he was “placed under the care of a clergyman . . . with 
instructions to attend; but, not to press too much knowledge upon me: a mission which he 
faithfully accomplished” (10). Babbage describes how “my mind, receiving but little 
instruction, began, I imagine, to prey upon itself” (14). He records imagining himself subject 
to physical maladies as a result of “great idleness” (10): “Listless and unoccupied, I 
imagined I had a head-ache” (14, emphasis in original). 
 This would appear to be similar to the damage that a computer can inflict upon its 
own program without sufficient restrictions being placed upon its capacity for self-
modification. This chapter has sought to illustrate that the risks of self-modifying software 
have influenced perceptions of the necessity of pedagogical “scaffolding” in attachment 
theory. Although it is unlikely that Babbage possessed the same comprehension of self-
modifying software as a modern computer scientist, his detailed programs for Automaton 
illustrate that he understood that even a nondeterministic program requires structure in 
order to be functional. As I have argued is the case in the sketch, I want to suggest that 
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Babbage’s comprehension of the need to rigorously structure programs informs the 
pedagogical narratives contained in Passages.  
Having previously been provided with negligible pedagogical structure, Babbage 
attempts to institute his own after being transferred to a London school.  Babbage records 
how he, in the company of “one of my school-fellows”,  would “get up every morning at 
three o’clock, light a fire in the school-room, and work until five or half-past five. We 
accomplished this pretty regularly for several months” (19). Through this program of 
studies Babbage institutes a system that fulfils a similar role to the caregiver in attachment 
theory, whose role is to function as an “external organiser” for the child’s behaviours by 
providing appropriate pedagogical “scaffolding”.  
The regularity of this system, however, is disrupted by the unstructured play of the 
boys that subsequently join their “night party”: “three or four other boys . . . joined our 
party, and, as I had anticipated, no work was done. We all got to play; we let off fire-works 
in the play-ground, and were of course discovered” (21, emphasis added). As discussed 
previously in this chapter, Turing argued that if no structure is given to a computer’s less 
disciplined behaviours, then fragmentary and unproductive actions are likely to result. 
Machine play that facilitates computational development is structured play. Similarly, the 
lack of structure imposed upon the play behaviours of Babbage’s companions results in an 
explosive fragmentation of the pedagogical program that he sought to establish. Babbage 
describes how he was scolded by his master for instituting this “irregular system” (21, 
emphasis added). It appears that despite his most concerted efforts, the pedagogical 
structure that Babbage craved continued to elude him.  
Babbage continued to experience inadequate pedagogical scaffolding in key areas 
of his studies, including the mathematics he was “[p]assionately fond of” (26). He records 
how, prior to his entrance at Cambridge, he was “under the guidance of an Oxford tutor, 
who undertook to superintend my classical studies only” (25). Babbage attempts to 
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compensate for this lack of scaffolding and teaching by instituting his own regime of self-
instruction. This can be compared with his system of self-instruction at the London school. 
Babbage recalls how he “instructed myself by means of Ward’s ‘Young Mathematician’s 
Guide’ . . . I now employed all my leisure in studying such mathematical works” (26). Yet 
just as before, these attempts to create pedagogical structure for himself prove 
unsatisfactory. Babbage describes himself as feeling profoundly the absence of a source of 
pedagogical support: “I had, however, met with many difficulties, and I looked forward 
with intense delight to the certainty of having them all removed on my arrival at 
Cambridge” (26).  
Despite his hope of receiving scaffolding and guidance from the program of studies 
at Cambridge, Babbage continued to lack support for his intellectual development. Yet 
whereas Babbage’s previous educational experiences were characterised by a lack of 
structure, the pedagogy he describes at Cambridge can be compared with modes of 
interaction that attachment theory associates with the “Negative-Intrusive” polarity, in 
which the pedagogue displays “high structuring . . . intrusiveness, and inflexibility”. This 
thesis has argued that as a result of their basis in similar computational models, Passages 
and attachment theory regard as optimal pedagogies that enable the learner to develop 
their own procedural rules within a framework of structured flexibility. It has also sought to 
illustrate that this computational model regards pedagogies that are predicated upon 
inflexibility as suboptimal.  
Babbage writes that a few days after his arrival at Cambridge, “I went to my public 
tutor Hudson, to ask the explanation of one of my mathematical difficulties. He listened to 
my question, said it would not be asked in the Senate House, and was no sort of 
consequence, and advised me to get up the earlier subjects of the university studies” (27, 
emphasis added). Instead of being provided with scaffolding for his intellectual 
development, Babbage is instead instructed to confine himself rigidly to the inflexible 
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programme of studies dictated by the University. This inflexibility is depicted as 
characteristic of the pedagogical culture at Cambridge in this period: Babbage describes 
approaching another lecturer, who “treated the question just the same way” (27). Faced 
with this programmatic inflexibility, Babbage describes how he rapidly “acquired a distaste 
for the routine of the studies of the place” (27, emphasis added). Rather than providing 
Babbage with a program of studies that would enable him to develop his own procedural 
rules within a framework of structured flexibility, Babbage’s tutors subject him to 
pedagogical routines characterised by inflexibility.  
I want to show that it is possible to trace comparable fluctuations between a lack 
of scaffolding and intrusive attempts to inflexibly direct developmental processes in the 
narrative that Passages provides of the British Government’s involvement with the project 
to construct the Difference Engine. When describing the project Babbage makes recourse 
to the language of developmental narratives, referring to its purpose as “maturing an 
engine of almost intellectual power” (105, emphasis added). Paralleling the failures of 
Babbage’s education, however, it is argued in Passages that the construction of the Engine 
was jeopardised by the Government’s failure to provide adequate scaffolding at the 
commencement of the project in the early 1820s: “it seemed to be admitted that it was not 
possible to prescribe any very definite system, and that much must be left to Mr. Babbage’s 
own judgment” (71). The initial lack of guidance provided by the Government and the Royal 
Society is cited several times in Passages as a reason for the ultimate failure of the project: 
“it does not appear, from the Report of the Royal Society, that any plan, terms or 
conditions had been pointed out by that body” (71, emphasis in original); “Lord Goderich     
. . . admitted that the understanding of 1823 was not very definite” (73).  
By the late 1820s Babbage was demanding that the Government undertake a more 
proactive role in the supervision of the project and its costs. In 1829 Babbage wrote to the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer Henry Goulburn, stating that “to prevent the recurrence of 
205 
 
difficulty from any remaining indistinctness . . . he wished to propose some general 
arrangements for expediting the completion of the Engine” (75). That Babbage was seeking 
to place a greater degree of responsibility for the management of the project in 
Governmental hands is indicated by his suggestions “[t]hat the Engine should be 
considered as the property of Government” and “[t]hat professional engineers should be 
appointed by Government to examine the charges made for the work” (76). The 
Government, however, was reluctant to undertake these increased responsibilities: 
Goulburn wrote to Lord Ashley in 1829 that “we (the Government) could not adopt the 
course which Mr. Babbage had pointed out . . . without considerable inconvenience” (76). 
They instead instructed Babbage to proceed according to their “original intention”, but it is 
recorded in Passages that this once again proved problematic due to a lack of guidance: “it 
certainly does not appear . . . that the ‘original intention’ was then in any degree more 
apparent than it was at the commencement of the undertaking” (77).   
After numerous entreaties, Babbage was eventually successful in persuading the 
Government to agree to undertake this supervisory role. In 1830 the Government declared 
the Engine their property and appointed professional engineers to examine the accounts 
(80): “Thus, after considerable discussion, the doubts arising from the indefiniteness of the 
understanding with the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in July, 1823, were at length 
removed” (80). Yet only a few years would elapse before Babbage was once again 
experiencing difficulties with the Government’s level of intervention in the project. In the 
mid-1830s Babbage applied to the Government for guidance concerning improvements 
suggested by his designs for the Analytical Engine:  
the Analytical Engine could not exist without inventing for it a method of 
mechanical addition possessed of the utmost simplicity . . . if such 
simplifications should be discovered, it might happen that the Analytical 
Engine would execute more rapidly the calculations for which the 
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Difference Engine was intend; or that the Difference Engine itself would be 
superseded by a far simpler mode of construction . . . To withhold these 
new views from the Government, and under such circumstances to have 
allowed the construction of the Engine to be resumed, would have been 
improper… (84, emphasis in original)  
It appears that Babbage had hoped that the Government would provide guidance and 
scaffolding whilst the design of his calculating Engines underwent a period of development:  
he sought a “temporary suspension, until the character of the new views should be more 
fully developed” (85).  
I would suggest that Babbage was seeking the support of the Government in 
making flexible modifications to previously inflexible Plans:  
The necessary science and skill specially acquire in executing such works 
must also, as experience is gained, suggest deviations from, and changes in, 
the original plan of those works; and the adoption or rejection of such 
changes, especially under circumstances similar to those in which I was 
placed, often involves questions of the greatest difficulty and anxiety. (103) 
Paralleling the manner in which minor modifications are made to the largely inflexible Plans 
of the Analytical Engine, Babbage describes a process in which an “original plan” is 
modified by undergoing a series of “deviations” from its original inflexible form. This thesis 
has argued that because of their correspondences with a fragmentation that this model 
understands to be pathological, these modifications are often depicted as accompanied by 
a degree of distress. This can be compared with the “anxiety” that Babbage describes when 
faced with “the adoption or rejection of such changes”.  
Babbage writes in the “Mathematical Powers” paper that “any neglect would be 
absolutely unpardonable in combining the proper cards” (47). In other words, it is an 
“unpardonable” form of “neglect” to provide a computer with an inadequate program to 
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guide its behaviours. As discussed previously, these behaviours in the Analytical Engine 
include modifications to programs. Similarly, Babbage appears to have regarded it as the 
role of the Government to provide scaffolding for the flexible development of his plans:  
It was obviously of the greatest importance to Mr. Babbage that a final 
decision should be made by the Government . . . Without such a decision 
Mr. Babbage felt that he should be impeded in any plans he might form, 
and liable to the most serious interruptions if he should venture to enter 
upon the execution of them. (Passages 90-91) 
Babbage states that if left without sufficient guidance from the Government, not only will 
he be “impeded in any plans he might form”, but the plans that result will also be 
fragmentary, being “liable to the most serious interruptions”. Yet the Government, 
displaying understandable impatience after over a decade of delays and expense, 
instructed Babbage in 1836 that “he should feel himself bound to look to the completion of 
the first machine” (88). Passages depicts the Government’s previous lack of guidance being 
supplanted by a rigidly inflexible approach to the development of the Difference Engine. I 
would suggest that Babbage’s attempts during this period to engineer a greater degree of 
computational flexibility also intensified his consciousness of pedagogical inflexibility as a 
suboptimal approach.  
Babbage felt that the Government had misconstrued his request as an application 
to construct the Analytical Engine (88). He wrote to the Government again, reiterating his 
query about constructing a new Difference Engine with the improvements suggested by the 
Analytical (90). Yet the Government are described as reverting to their former strategy of 
leaving Babbage without guidance: “for more than a year and a half no further measures 
appear to have been adopted by the Government respecting the Engines” (90). In 1838 
Babbage, “wearied with this delay”, appealed to the First Lord of the Treasury, Lord 
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Melbourne (91): “He asked, not for any favour, but for that which it was an injustice to 
withhold- a decision” (91).  
By this stage Babbage was seeking answers to more fundamental questions 
regarding the Government’s willingness to support the development of the Difference 
Engine. In a letter to the Chancellor of the Exchequer Thomas Spring Rice, to whom the 
matter had been referred, Babbage described “the question he wished to have settled”:   
Whether the Government required him to superintend the completion of 
the Difference Engine, which had been suspended during the last five years, 
according to the original plan and principles; or whether they intended to 
discontinue it altogether? (92, emphasis in original)  
Babbage presents the Government with a stark choice that reflects their inadequate 
caregiving. The choice they must make is either to proceed rigidly according to an 
outmoded plan, or to face the collapse of the project. This choice between behavioural 
rigidity and the atomisation of a plan can be compared with the effect of the pedagogical 
methods that I claim Babbage derived from the Difference Engine. Babbage’s sense that he 
is no longer equipped to exercise his own judgement as a result of developmental failures 
also parallels the effect of incestuous pedagogies. It would appear that previous 
Governmental failures had left Babbage unable to make a “conditional branch” similar to 
those executed by the Analytical Engine: regarding “the courses pointed out by the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer”, Babbage observes that “his past experience having taught 
him not to rely upon his own judgment on matters of that nature, he should be very 
reluctant to offer any opinion” (92, emphasis added).  
In late 1841 Babbage “determined upon renewing his application for a decision”, 
this time approaching the First Lord of the Treasury, Robert Peel (93). After another year 
had passed with no communication aside from a cursory note from Peel, Babbage wrote 
again in October 1842 “requesting an early decision” (93). Peel finally responded on 4th 
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November 1842, promising to communicate with Goulburn and to reach a joint decision. 
Later that day, Babbage received a letter stating that they had decided upon “abandoning 
the completion of the machine” (94). Goulburn informed Babbage that the Government 
had revoked their claim to the machine, in the “hope” that “they might in some degree 
assist him in his future exertions in the cause of science” This gesture of “assistance” 
following the abandonment of the project presents an ironic contrast with Passages’ 
descriptions of Governmental neglect during the period in which they were ostensibly 
providing scaffolding for the development of the Engine. Babbage, however, refused to 
accept this abandonment of both inventor and machine, declining their offer to revoke 
their claim to the Engine, and arguing that he himself had “claims on their consideration” 
(94). Babbage justified these claims for further support by referring to the “anxiety and 
injury he had experienced by the delay of eight years in the decision of the Government” 
(95). 
 On the 11th November, Babbage “obtained an interview” with Peel (94). During 
this meeting, Babbage would suffer a humiliating withdrawal of the last vestiges of 
scaffolding provided by Government:  
The result of this interview was entirely unsatisfactory. Mr. Babbage went 
to it prepared . . . to have pointed out two courses, by either of which it 
was probable that not only a Difference Engine, but even the Analytical 
Engine, might in a few years have been completed. The state of Sir Robert 
Peel’s information on the subject . . . prevented Mr. Babbage from making 
any allusion to either of those plans. (95)  
Babbage’s intention appears to have been that the Government would assist him in making 
a structured decision between “two courses”. The structured flexibility that this decision 
involves can be regarded as similar to a conditional branch in computing. Babbage, 
however, is depicted as once again failing to receive adequate scaffolding to support the 
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development of his planning. This is described as preventing the emergence of the more 
sophisticated and flexible forms of (machine) behaviour that could have developed had the 
Government been willing to offer this support. 
This section has sought to show that the narrative in Passages attributes the 
developmental failings of the Engines to the failure of the Government to provide adequate 
structure for their development. This narrative of Governmental failures shares a similar 
chronology with the narrative of Babbage’s experiences of pedagogical neglect, with 
inadequate scaffolding being superseded by an intrusive, high-structuring approach. 
Correspondingly, the Government’s failure to provide adequate scaffolding is described as 
encompassing not only the Engine, but Babbage himself: the Government was guilty of 
“ignoring the existence of the Difference Engine and its inventor” (148). This “much-abused 
Difference Engine” forms a parallel with Babbage (110), who “experienced only loss and 
neglect” from the Government (106). This section has sought to illustrate that the 
computationally-inflected models of playful pedagogy discussed in this chapter can 
contribute to our understanding of the depiction of suboptimal pedagogy in Passages. The 
final part of this chapter seeks to highlight similar depictions of this model of inadequate 
pedagogical scaffolding in Eliot’s novel The Mill on the Floss.  
 
The Mill on the Floss: Playful Pedagogies and Incestuous Educations 
 
The purpose of this final section is to show that play in Mill is figured as optimal or 
suboptimal according to the extent to which it facilitates cognitive-behavioural 
development on a model that figures normative flexible behaviour as an arrangement of 
inflexible units. This section therefore argues that Eliot in Mill foregrounds a logic of play as 
progress similar to that which Babbage derived from the Engines and Automaton. This 
section also suggests that Eliot in Mill depicts this computational model together with ideas 
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deriving from Herbert Spencer’s Education: Intellectual, Moral and Physical (1861). This 
was an influential pedagogical text whose chapters were published as a series of articles in 
various British journals between 1854 and 1859.   
 A large proportion of Mill is devoted to the childhood of its protagonists, Maggie 
Tulliver and her brother Tom, allowing Eliot to depict a range of play behaviours across 
various contexts. This allows stable features of their play to be observed. Maggie’s 
spontaneous play-acts often consist of structural violence towards objects: she licks paint 
off a lozenge box, scatters a house of cards, and puts her head through a kite (Eliot, Mill 32, 
75). Laura Emery claims that these acts express Maggie’s subconscious aggression towards 
her brother, but there is evidence that this aggression also serves another, more generative 
purpose (25-26). Maggie’s play often involves deconstructing objects with a segmented or 
layered form to reveal their composite units: Maggie scatters the individual cards that 
compose a card pyramid, tears through the quadrants of a kite, and peels away a layer of 
paint to perceive an underlying structure. Maggie’s play can therefore be compared with 
that which Spencer identifies as integral to the child’s “self-education”: “the delight taken 
in biting of corals and the pulling to pieces of toys” (65). In the logic of play as progress that 
this model foregrounds, the purpose of play is to teach techniques for decomposing and 
reconfiguring cognitive-behavioural units. Spencer and Eliot articulate a similar rationale to 
recent attachment theory by paralleling the development of such skills with play-objects 
that invite the child to enact this reconfiguration of discrete units.  
Although only around four years her senior, by dictating the form of much of her 
play Tom acts as play-companion for Maggie (Eliot, Mill 29). Maggie believes Tom to be 
skilled in opening padlocks and gates, operations which suggest a reversible process of 
conjoining and dissociation (35). Yet despite his promise as a play-companion, Tom 
consistently punishes Maggie for structural modifications made in play. This is even the 
case when the structure in question is highly unstable:  
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Maggie, starting up hurriedly from her place on the floor, and upsetting 
Tom’s wonderful [playing card] pagoda . . . Maggie stood in dismay and 
terror while Tom got up from the floor and walked away, pale, from the 
scattered ruins of his pagoda…  (75-76) 
A playing-card house is composed of discrete units, and possesses a hierarchical structure 
similar to the pyramids that the child-Engine forms in Passages. Maggie struggles to 
engineer a final structural completion from the units she is given, something interpreted by 
Tom as a weakness: “Tom could build perfect pyramids of houses; but Maggie’s would 
never bear the laying on of the roof” (75). Maggie is taught that structural revision is 
destructive, annihilating play-object, play-companion, and future opportunity for play: “you 
pushed your head through my kite, all for nothing . . . you shan’t go fishing with me 
tomorrow” (32). Tom can see no purpose in such fragmentation: it is “all for nothing”.  
Tom projects his discomfort regarding structural modification onto Maggie, as 
illustrated by this episode where he makes a game out of splitting a jam-puff: 
“O my buttons!” With this interjection the knife descended on the puff and 
it was in two, but the result was not satisfactory to Tom . . . “I’ll have that 
with the jam run out,’ said Maggie . . .  
“You may have it if it comes to you fair, but I shan’t give it to you without. 
Right or left- you choose, now . . . You keep your eyes shut, now, or else 
you shan’t have any.”  
. . . She shut her eyes quite closed till Tom told her to “say which” . . .   
“Oh please, Tom, have it; I don’t mind- I like the other- please take this.”  
“No, I shan’t,” said Tom, almost crossly, beginning on his own inferior 
piece. 
Maggie, thinking it was no use to contend further, began too . . .  
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“Oh, you greedy thing!” said Tom, when she had swallowed the last 
morsel. Maggie turned quite pale. (40) 
Tom begins by making a structural division with his knife, but the result is “not 
satisfactory”. Despite this inauspicious start, Tom invites Maggie to play a game involving a 
“random” decision between two discrete states: right hand or left hand. Her decision, 
however, is intensively structured by Tom, who dictates its form (eyes shut “now”/choose 
hand “now”). I would argue that this episode demonstrates Eliot’s awareness that play is at 
most partially random. Her sense of its structured flexibility appears to be as acute as 
Babbage and Turing’s. Yet even this amount of flexibility proves too much for Tom to bear, 
and Maggie must bear the brunt of his discomfort with the uncertain outcome of heuristic 
methods. In an episode that can be compared with Babbage’s illustration in the sketch, 
Maggie is described as inept at playing with “marls (marbles)” (29). The inflexible play Tom 
engineers does not allow her to develop skills for effectively manipulating discrete units. 
Maggie’s consciousness of creative potential when a structure is decomposed and 
reconfigured is gradually eroded: she dismisses patchwork as “foolish work . . . tearing 
things to pieces to sew’em together again” (13).   
Eliot identifies two types of unsatisfactory pedagogical intervention in Mill: “one is, 
the enjoyment of the reverend gentleman’s undivided neglect; the other is, the endurance 
of the reverend gentleman’s undivided attention” (120). Similarly, Spencer in Education 
foregrounds structure, but not too much structure:  
And as, in supplying aliment, and clothing . . .  without at all interfering 
with the spontaneous development of the limbs and viscera, either in their 
order or mode; so, they [parents and teachers] may supply sounds for 
imitation, objects for examination, books for reading, problems for solution 
. . . without in any way disturbing the normal process of mental evolution; 
or rather, may greatly facilitate that process. (69) 
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The level of pedagogical intervention that Spencer regards as optimal corresponds to the 
computational logic of scaffolding in attachment theory. Maggie, however, experiences 
fluctuations between undivided attention and undivided neglect in her play interactions. 
Rigidly controlling of their joint play, Tom is also often absent for long periods at school, or 
simply rejecting: “he always represented it as a great favour on his part to let Maggie trot 
by his side on his pleasure excursions” (Eliot, Mill 126).  
Examples of undivided attention given to Maggie’s play by adults are few, and 
function to constrain her play within inflexible parameters. After accidently crushing a cake, 
which, undoubtedly based upon her experiences with Tom, Maggie perceives to be the end 
of her own play, she contrives to ask her cousin Lucy to request a tune from her uncle’s 
musical snuff-box. Maggie, who “think[s] any barrel-organ splendid”, is literally moved by 
its internal movement, the snuff-box containing a miniature version of this instrument 
(339):  
when the magic music ceased, she jumped up, and, running towards Tom, 
put her arm around his neck . . . I must tell you that he had his glass of 
cowslip wine in his hand, and that she jerked him so as to make him spill 
half of it . . .   
“Why don’t you sit still, Maggie?” her mother said, peevishly. (81-82) 
In the Analytical Engine barrels similar to those used in barrel organs are used to determine 
the sequencing of machine behaviours and instructions, including instructions 
communicated by Operation cards: it is notable that Maggie’s play results in the 
rearrangement of Tom’s “cards”. I want to argue that this image of the music box is 
comparable to Silas’ “computational” routine, in that it suggests a conceptual similarity 
with the Babbage Engines. Yet it is ultimately Maggie’s play, not the mechanism of the 
snuff-box, which generates non-predetermined behaviours. Maggie uses the structure of 
the play situation as a “random element” to aid her in forming new behavioural 
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combinations. Yet once again Maggie offends by possessing any behavioural flexibility, 
even the structured kind.  
Eliot depicts a complex relationship between the undivided attention and 
undivided neglect Maggie receives in play interactions with Tom and adult caregivers: 
“aunt Pullet gave permission [for outdoor play], only enjoining them not to go off the 
paved walks in the garden” (82). This “stick to the paths” routine represents an inflexible 
play schema similar to the programme that Turing describes to simulate gameplay using a 
predetermined set of rules. The paradox is that this routine enables Maggie’s caregivers to 
absent themselves from the task of providing further structure for her play, having 
provided an inflexible “programme” that can run in their absence. Tom also finds it too 
challenging to provide structured flexibility for Maggie, confining himself to “stick to the 
path”-type routines. His attempt to provide Maggie with structured flexibility in the jam-
puff episode quickly reverts back to programmatic control: he cannot tolerate her as a 
“random element”.  
Although Maggie is permitted to simulate play using inflexible routines, I want to 
show that Eliot parallels Turing and attachment theory in her implicit judgment that such 
play does not support the development of cognitive-behavioural flexibility. There is 
evidence in the novel that Tom’s cognitive-behavioural traits are the result of incestuous 
pedagogies and unsatisfactory play experiences. Tom’s habitual play objects- a knife and a 
cord- suggest a latent recognition of the processes of division (knife) and combination 
(biding cord) figured in this logic as the purpose of play (125). This desire for reversible 
processes of association and detachment corresponds to the habitual phrase with which 
Tom expresses excitement: “O my buttons!” (40, 142). Despite using this phrase 
immediately before dividing the jam-puff, Tom cannot capitalise upon its insight: “If he 
broke the lash of his father’s gig-whip by lashing the gate, he couldn’t help it- the whip 
shouldn’t have got caught in the hinge” (57). A gate is an object with two distinct “states”. 
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Tom is equipped with an instrument (knife/gate) to form discrete units, or states, and an 
instrument (cord) to effect their combination by binding. Instead, his play obstructs the 
“hinging” point at which movement between states could occur, whilst simultaneously 
destroying the object that could temporarily bind them.  
Tom, like Maggie, requires assistance in applying the heuristics suggested by his 
play. It is clear, however, that Tom cannot seek this from his formal education. Although 
Tom’s tutor Mr. Stelling possesses a “certain hearty kindness”, this does not prevent his 
pedagogical methods from being incestuous (148):  
Mr Stelling was not the man to enfeeble or emasculate his pupil’s mind by 
simplifying and explaining . . . with smattering, extraneous information, 
such as is given to girls. (124) 
 
Mr Stelling’s duty was to teach the lad in the only right way- indeed, he 
knew no other: he had not wasted his time in the acquirement of anything 
abnormal. (122) 
Stelling refuses to decompose structures of knowledge into their constituent parts, as to do 
so would contravene his system of “solid instruction” (121, emphasis added). This inflexible 
method, however, produces the decontextualised fragments, or “smattering”, he wishes to 
avoid. The way in which units of knowledge can be brought into relation remain obscure: 
“though by hard labour he [Stelling] could get particular declensions into his [Tom’s] brain, 
anything so abstract as the relation between cases . . . could by no means get a lodgement” 
(124, emphasis added). With a scattering of decontextualised fragments and a solidified 
mass of material too inflexible to apply, Tom is left “to scramble through life with some 
fragments of more or less relevant knowledge, and a great deal of strictly relevant 
ignorance” (148). Stelling’s methods therefore generate pathologies of fragmentation and 
decontextualisation similar to those associated with incestuous pedagogy.   
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Stelling’s refusal to “simplify” reinforces the anxiety regarding structural 
decomposition that Tom inherits from his parents. After the “breaking down” of his father’s 
fortunes (171), Tom’s mother laments that “I wanted you to have all o’ this pattern[ed 
cloth]” and expresses fears that her china will be broken (178, 183). Despite these 
discouragements, Tom continues to search for a satisfactory play experience, purchasing a 
Dutch doll and sugar-candy for Stelling’s daughter: 
he liked to think how Laura would put out her lips and her tiny hands for 
the bits of sugar-candy; and, to give the greater keenness to these 
pleasures of imagination, he took out the parcel, made a small hole in the 
paper, and bit off a crystal or two, which had so solacing an effect . . . that 
he repeated the process more than once on his way. (140) 
Tom is “solace[d]” for his lack of satisfactory play by nipping off individual units from the 
visibly crystalline structure of the sugar-candy, whilst simultaneously making tiny 
alterations to the once unitary surface of the paper. He can only bear to experience such 
play, however, when projected through another’s experience. I cannot help wondering 
about the “emasculating” play that Tom desires with the jointed Dutch doll. The flexible 
arrangement of discrete units it represents seems to burn a hole in the pocket where he 
stashes his play-objects: stored there, it constitutes a “ray of expected pleasure” (140). 
 Tom’s play must also compensate for another of the pathologies of incestuous 
pedagogy, a failure to teach skills for combining cognitive-behavioural units. This quote 
indicates that play affords a concrete experience of how discrete units combine:  
he [Tom] could throw a stone right into the centre of a given ripple, he could guess 
to a fraction how many lengths of his stick would take to reach across the 
playground, and could draw almost perfect squares on his slate without 
measurement. But Mr. Stelling took no note of these things: he only observed that 
Tom’s faculties failed him before the abstractions hideously symbolised to him in 
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the pages of the Eton Grammar, and that he was a state bordering on idiocy with 
regard to the demonstration that two given triangles must be equal- though he 
could discern with great promptitude and certainty that they were equal. (122) 
 
His eyes were apt to get dim over the page . . . his fingers played absently in his 
pocket with his great knife and his coil of whip-cord, and other relics of the past. 
(125) 
Understanding how discrete units combine is integral to the arithmetical and grammatical 
rules that Eliot associates with Tom’s play: in ascertaining how many discrete stick-lengths 
combine to produce a certain length, he is performing simple geometry. Tom “play[s]” with 
his knife and whip whilst he struggles with abstract grammatical rules, suggesting a vague 
comprehension that the play-behaviours they symbolise could potentially be of assistance 
to him in his difficulties.  
There is evidence in Mill that Eliot understood cognitive-behavioural competencies 
to be transferable: “when you get a thoroughly educated man . . . he’s at no loss to take up 
any branch of instruction. When a workman knows the use of his tools, he can make a door 
as well as a window” (20). Eliot in this quote appears to foreground a pedagogical model 
comparable to the generalist aspects of recent attachment theory. According to this logic, 
Tom should be capable of utilising his thoughts regarding configurations made during play 
as a means of discovering heuristic methods that form the basis of a generalised cognitive-
behavioural flexibility: “What was once thought of as purposeless action, or play, or 
mischief, as the case might be, is now recognised as the process of acquiring a knowledge 
on which all after knowledge is based” (Spencer 63).  
Similarly, in Mill, lack of heuristic ability in play corresponds to a general lack of 
heuristic ability. Eliot observes that Tom regards his Latin exercises as “a kind of puzzle that 
could only be found out by a lucky chance” (146), and that “The state of mind in which you 
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take a billiard-cue or a dice-box in your hand is one of sober certainty” compared with Mr. 
Tulliver’s attempts to solve the “puzzling thing of which school to pick” (147, 8). As Megan 
Norcia observes in her history of puzzle play and its relation to imperial ideologies, jigsaws 
were widely used in the mid-nineteenth century as a means of teaching heuristics (3, 17).17 
What the Tullivers lack, however, is the ability possessed by Automaton and the child-
machine to evaluate the results of a given heuristic. Because of this absence of an 
interpretative mechanism, their application of heuristic methods is subject to the vagaries 
of “lucky chance”.  
To satisfy his need for play, Tom identifies military drill as a compromise. For him 
and his instructor it is a source of “high mutual pleasure” (150): “‘Heads up!’ he added, in a 
tone of stern command, which delighted Tom” (151). Drill enables each “playful” 
movement to be inflexible, with predetermined combinations taking the place of heuristic 
ability. I would argue that because this play is similar to Stelling’s incestuous pedagogies, it 
avoids being equated with any “abnormality”. Its militaristic aspect also staves off any 
suspicion of an “emasculating” taint, with Tom heightening its phallic dimension by 
imploring his instructor to teach him the “sword-exercise” (152). Spencer’s reasoning as to 
why gymnastics fails as a substitute for play can also be applied to this context (171). The 
child’s “natural, spontaneous exercise having been forbidden”, the prescriptive movements 
of gymnastics produce behaviour “less varied than those accompanying juvenile sports” 
(171). Gymnastics does not allow the child to exert agency in modifying their behaviours. 
Paralleling Tom’s experience of drill, the behavioural sequencing it involves is predicated on 
“artificiality” (171).  
When Tom attempts to implement these play behaviours independently, he is 
faced with a mortifying lack of control:  
                                                          
17 The use of the word “puzzle” to describe the toy is first recorded in 1858 (Norcia 4).  
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“I’m the Duke of Wellington! March!” stamping forward with the right leg a 
little bent . . . “One-two” said Tom, resolutely, thought at “two” his wrist 
trembled a little. “Three” came more slowly, and with it the sword swung 
downwards . . . The sword had fallen, with its edge on Tom’s foot, and in a 
moment after, he had fallen too. (Eliot, Mill 158)  
The pacing of this episode emphasises Tom’s difficulty in managing transitions between 
discrete units of behaviour, the “One”, “Two” and “Three”. As argued previously, 
incestuous pedagogies are understood to weaken this capacity- a deficiency that is 
embodied in Tom’s trembling arm and buckling leg. As the alcoholism of Tom’s drill-master 
suggests, a diminishing of cognitive-behavioural agency is the other face of pedagogies that 
demand behavioural rigidity (150).  This fear of losing cognitive-behavioural agency 
exacerbates Tom’s discomfort with play: he turns “pale” when Maggie scatters his pagoda, 
and finds the result of the jam-puff division “not satisfactory”.  
I would argue that these experiences result in Tom subjecting Maggie to incestuous 
pedagogies. Even Maggie’s mother, largely indifferent to her children’s play, understands 
that there is something pathological in the way Maggie plays “like a Bedlam creatur’ [sic]” 
(12). Maggie vividly describes her predicament: 
It is with me as I used to think it would be with the poor uneasy white bear 
I saw at the show. I thought he must have got so stupid with the habit of 
turning backwards and forwards in that narrow space, that he would keep 
doing it if they set him free. (327-28)  
Maggie, like the bear at the show, has ostensibly been present at the scene of play during 
her childhood. During this time, however, she has been subject to inflexible, cage-like 
conditions that have disturbed her cognitive-behavioural development: Maggie indicates 
this when she imagines the bear growing “stupid” with the “habits” he has developed. Even 
now her childhood play is behind her, its lasting effects lead her to believe that she will 
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never recover a satisfactory developmental experience. She remains cognitively trapped 
within the conditions of suboptimal play even when ostensibly “set . . . free” from them.   
In the computational logic of play as progress described in this chapter, 
competencies learnt in play are understood to produce a corresponding increase in 
cognitive-behavioural ability in other contexts. In a corresponding fashion, Tom in 
adulthood exhibits habits resulting from his incestuous education and lack of satisfactory 
play: he remains “unbending, unmodifiable” (425). He also continues to experience Maggie 
as a “random element” that threatens to throw the pagoda of his rigidly constructed 
selfhood into disarray:  
 He [Tom] . . . said, in the tone of a kind pedagogue . . . “you have no 
judgement and self-command . . . a brother, who goes out into the world 
and mixes with men, necessarily knows better what is right and 
respectable for his sister than she can know herself.”  
(344-45, emphasis added).  
With his incestuous pedagogy depriving Maggie of independent “judgement and self-
command”, Tom’s solution is to apply his former strategy of controlling any element of 
Maggie’s behaviour that might be left in play.  
The sibling incest theme in the novel has been explored by numerous critics 
including Joseph Boone, Deborah Nord, and David Smith. Tom’s relationship with Maggie 
can be regarded as a form of asymmetrical incest, where an individual uses force or 
intimidation to compel one younger or weaker into incestuous acts. As demonstrated by 
the jam-puff episode, Maggie is forced by Tom to “play” in ways she finds distressing, 
finding it “no use to contend”. The pathologies that Tom generates in the course of these 
play encounters correspond to those that Ferenczi attributed to incest trauma, including 
the imprinting of the aggressor’s idiom. As Elizabeth Ermarth has observed, Tom makes 
Maggie’s choice for her, “literally requiring her to speak the words he gives her” (597). I 
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would therefore argue that Eliot’s depiction of the consequences of incestuous pedagogies 
remains stable across her novels.  
Maggie can be compared to the child described by Ferenczi who, seeking only play 
and passive tenderness from its caregiver, becomes subject to incest trauma: “carried away 
by the daughter’s sexual play, [he] had raped her” (Diary 165). This asymmetry is indicated 
by the fact that Tom’s pedagogies imaginatively make Maggie “wife”, paralleling Ferenczi’s 
belief that the victim of incest trauma is forced to fulfil a spousal role towards their 
aggressor: “[Tom] meant always to take care of her, make her his housekeeper, and punish 
her when she did wrong” (Eliot, Mill 35). Tom conceptualises the futurity of Maggie’s play 
in terms of her operating as a subservient wife-substitute, whilst imposing upon her in a 
similarly incestuous way in the present. This image reveals Tom’s dependence on Maggie 
for the upkeep of his cognitive-behavioural structures: he demands that she keep his (card) 
house in order.  
The remainder of this section is intended to show that these childhood traumas 
leave Maggie vulnerable to similar traumatisation in her subsequent relationships with 
Philip Wakem and Stephen Guest. Philip’s methods as “brother and teacher” prove similar 
to the incestuous pedagogies visited upon Maggie by Tom in their childhood play (289, 
emphasis added). A comparison that can be made with Deronda is that all subsequent 
aggressors in Mill are figured as similar to the first: Maggie has a dream in which Philip 
metamorphoses into Tom (413). His apparent ability to tolerate structural revision makes 
Philip initially appear promising as a play-companion: “‘Oh yes,’ said Philip, ‘it’s very easy 
[to draw]. You’ve only got to look well at things, and draw them over and over again. What 
you do wrong once you can alter next time’” (142). Maggie’s desire for an adequate 
caregiver is intense, motivating her religious fervour: “I think we are only like children, who 
some one who is wiser is taking care of” (288).This need, along with Philip’s desire that she 
regard him as “brother and teacher”, gradually encourages Maggie to approach him with 
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“playful” intention (291): “Maggie felt herself a child again” (264).  He promises to liberate 
Maggie from the effect of incestuous pedagogies: “It makes me wretched to see you 
benumbing and cramping your nature” (289).  
Philip, however, recognises in himself an attitude towards Maggie that savours of 
“the baseness of compulsion” (363). As Johnstone has recognised, Philip exerts pressure 
upon Maggie to conform to his perspectives and desires (52). Philip views Maggie as a 
machine he can programme using an appropriate play routine: “He laid his plan and 
calculated all his moves with the fervid deliberation of a chess-player” (371). These 
“calculated . . . moves” are similar to the predetermined and inflexible routines that left 
nothing in play for Maggie during her childhood. Tom’s incestuous pedagogies leave 
Maggie vulnerable to this “compulsion”: she feels a “childish contrition” when Philip scolds 
her (Eliot, Mill 363). In a similar manner to Tom, Philip looks to Maggie as a means of 
providing himself with cognitive-behavioural structure: “I’m cursed with susceptibility in 
every direction, and effectively faculty in none . . . there is one thing: a passion answers as 
well as a faculty” (287). Philip’s confession leaves “her own discontent vibrating as it used 
to do” (287). Maggie, present at the sword incident, has already witnessed that this high-
structuring attitude veils a loss of cognitive- behavioural agency.  
Philip’s attitude towards Maggie suggests another facet of the white bear image. 
The play of her companions depends on rigid forms of behaviour being imposed upon her: 
to provide such pleasures, she herself must be caged. Ermarth recognises that Philip makes 
demands on Maggie, but understands the nature of his request to be that “she be herself 
and trust her instincts” (596). Although this is what Philip ostensibly demands, I want to 
suggest that his “playful” pedagogies produce the opposite effect. Rather than developing 
her independent judgment, their joint play leaves Maggie structurally reliant upon Philip’s 
idiom: “I had need have you always to find fault with me and teach me” (Eliot, Mill 363).  
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Eliot emphasises that Maggie is a “child” in play with Philip, seeking the tenderness 
lacking in her brother: “what a dear, good brother you would have been” (288). It is my 
contention that Philip’s subsequent confession of a sexual attraction to Maggie constitutes 
a tipping point in the novel between incestuous pedagogy and incest trauma. Peggy 
Johnstone expresses scepticism when “Eliot claims Maggie’s innocence of his intentions” 
(51), but I would argue that Maggie’s ignorance of a sexual motivation for Philip’s play is 
consistent with a Ferenczian understanding of the mechanics of incest trauma (Eliot, Mill 
294). Ironically, this sexualisation of Maggie’s play coincides with what appears to be a 
transfer of her imaginative play to a corresponding context:  
“I’m determined to read no more books where the blond-haired women 
carry away all the happiness . . . If you could give me some story, now, 
where the dark woman triumphs, it would restore the balance.”  
“Well, perhaps you will avenge the dark women in your own person, and 
carry away all the love from your cousin Lucy.” . . .  
“Philip, that is not pretty of you, to apply my nonsense to anything real”, 
said Maggie, looking hurt.  
(Eliot, Mill 292) 
Philip, however, makes this transfer of Maggie’s play, not Maggie herself. Maggie finds this 
application of her play discomfiting, paralleling Sutton-Smith’s concern that certain play 
transfers constitute cognitive-behavioural impositions. This is not Maggie’s own expression 
of her learning, but another manifestation of play as incestuous pedagogy. This does not 
necessarily represent a rejection of the type of developmental narrative that would later be 
associated with generalist AI, as this section has sought to illustrate that Mill emphasises 
the wider relevance of skills learnt in play. I would instead argue that Eliot regards these 
incestuous transfers as a perversion of an optimal course of development, rather than an 
instance in which the developmental model itself is undermined.  
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Maggie’s relationship with Stephen Guest can be compared with her relationships 
with Tom and Philip, in that it begins as an intersection between play and pedagogy. 
Maggie meets Stephen when staying at her cousin Lucy’s home expressly for the purpose 
of structured play: Lucy insists on placing Maggie “under a discipline of pleasure” (328, 
emphasis added). Immediately attracted to Maggie, Stephen is amused to find that she 
regards him as a combination of play-companion and pedagogue: “as if he had been the 
snuffiest of old professors” (334). Eliot emphasises that boating is a favourite shared play 
activity of Maggie and Stephen:  “she likes it better than anything” (403). However, as in 
the white bear image, the image that represents Maggie’s play is also the image of her 
trauma. In Deronda, the incestuously traumatised Gwendolen uses the image of a boat to 
articulate her fears regarding the loss of her own agency:  “Other people allowed 
themselves to be made slaves of, and to have their lives blown hither and thither like 
empty ships in which no will was present” (34). In a similar image, Maggie in Mill expresses 
her desire to learn cognitive-behavioural agency through play when she expresses a desire 
to steer the boat: “I shall not be satisfied until I can manage both oars” (336). Immediately 
after making this statement, however, Maggie loses her footing and Stephen takes hold of 
her with a “firm grasp” (336).  Maggie’s play once again leaves her in the grip of another.  
Stephen’s incestuous pedagogies culminate in another boat journey: 
Maggie felt that she was being led down the garden among the roses, 
being helped with firm tender care into the boat . . . by this stronger 
presence that seemed to bear her along without any act of her own will… 
(407)  
 
Maggie was hardly conscious of having said or done anything decisive. All 
yielding is attended by a less vivid consciousness than resistance . . . it is 
the submergence of our own personality by another. (410)  
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Maggie’s own idiom is thus submerged in Stephen’s. Maggie drifts along with him until she 
is unable to see a way to recover cognitive-behavioural agency: “the recoil of her fatigued 
sensations from the impracticable difficulty of getting out of the boat . . .  helped to bring 
her into a more complete subjection” (410). The “choices” Maggie makes are not 
structured decisions that permit a degree of agency, but are predetermined and inflexible. 
Maggie is conscious enough of this fact to complain to Stephen that “You have wanted to 
deprive me of any choice” (409).  Paralleling Ferenczi’s descriptions of incest trauma, 
Maggie experiences his incestuous passion as aggression: Maggie perceives the 
“suppressed rage” veiled by his “pleading” (409). Maggie’s most intense feeling towards 
Stephen is also rage: when he kisses her, she “quiver[s] with rage and humiliation” (388). 
Maggie’s ineffectual aggression against her incestuous aggressor represents the 
pathological substitute for the creative aggression of her childhood play. 
I want to suggest that through the Guests’ identity as industrialists and mill-
owners, Eliot draws parallels between the perversion of Maggie’s play and the traumas of 
factory workers.  The industrial machine represented the antithesis of the child-machine 
for Turing, with an inflexible sequence of operations characterising “most machinery 
developed for commercial purposes” (“Heretical Theory” 256). When conditions are 
optimal, play defends against the child becoming a “commercial machine” with capacities 
similar to those of the worker in Babbage’s factory system. Michael Steig identifies in Mill a 
desire for a mechanised body, linking this to the anal retentive trait (48). I would suggest 
that the type of mechanised body imagined here, however, carries very different meanings.  
Maggie is accustomed to such loss of agency: “there was an unspeakable charm in 
being told what to do, and having everything decided for her” (Eliot, Mill 410). It is familiar 
in the true sense of the word: “she almost desired to endure the severity of Tom’s reproof, 
to submit in patient silence” (425). Johnstone explains Maggie’s “weakness for substituting 
another’s will” by claiming that she avoids culpability for her decisions by attributing them 
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to others (54). Yet the most telling phrase here is Maggie’s “never consented”: “my whole 
soul has never consented- it does not consent now” (420). As argued in the first chapter, 
Eliot figures this “never consented” as both a symbol of resistance to the incestuous 
aggressor and a recognition that such consent is negated by their internal and external 
presence. “I don’t consent” is tantamount to “I can’t consent”, something Maggie is acutely 
aware of: “Don’t try to prevail with me again. I couldn’t choose yesterday” (416, emphasis 
added). Maggie is unable to experience meaningful decision-making in her childhood play: 
she only makes a choice in the jam-puff episode because it is “no use to contend further”. 
As a result, Eliot depicts Maggie in adulthood as lacking in the cognitive-behavioural 
attributes that would make her consent meaningful.  
This chapter has sought to show that perceptions of developmentally significant 
play were shaped during the nineteenth, twentieth and twenty-first centuries by a 
computational expression of a tradition of conceptualising the structure of cognition and 
behaviour. It is my contention that reflecting on the meanings of this tradition in the 
nineteenth century can reveal the tensions that continue to beset this model, including the 
correspondences that it foregrounds between incestuous and playful pedagogies. The 
conclusion that follows offers an interpretation of how these tensions are negotiated in the 













This thesis set out to consider the ways in which a specifically computational expression of 
a tradition of representing cognitive-behavioural flexibility was elaborated during the 
period 1830 to the present. It has sought to draw attention to the computational concepts 
that shaped the articulation of this tradition in the mid-nineteenth and the mid-twentieth 
centuries, and has explored the pedagogical practices that have historically been associated 
with this computational model. This thesis has endeavoured to show that this 
computational model continues to determine our understanding of what constitutes 
normative development and optimal pedagogical practice via the conceptual foundations 
of attachment theory in mid-twentieth-century computing. It has also claimed that a result 
of its computational origins, our current thinking about child development features similar 
paradoxes and tensions to those first identified in the nineteenth century by Eliot and her 
contemporaries. I wish to conclude by demonstrating that this is the case in the recent film 
the LEGO® Movie (2014). I want to show that in this film, computational models result in 
similarities between depictions of factory labour and models of normative cognitive-
behavioural development.  
In this film, the majority of the animated LEGO figurines are absorbed into legion 
upon legion of fundamentally interchangeable, blue-collar workers: in this case, of course, 
construction workers. As cultural sociologist Matthias Zick Varul has observed, these LEGO 
figurines can be regarded as “disciplined and deskilled worker[s]” (7). As such, they share 
similarities with the factory workers depicted in Economy. The functioning of these LEGO 
workers can be compared with the execution of an inflexible program in a computer. They 
receive a set of inflexible instructions from the manufacturer who oversees the system, the 
evocatively named “Lord Business”, communicated in the form of booklets similar to those 
provided in boxes of LEGO. The instructions in these booklets are composed of an inflexible 
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sequence of discrete symbol-based instructions, which dictate how to form combinations 
of discrete and inflexible units. Each booklet can therefore be regarded as similar to an 
inflexible program in a computer.  
That the instructions found in boxes of LEGO share correspondences with 
computer programs is perhaps not surprising, as this is a toy which has close ties to 
computing technology. This toy underwent development during a period which saw the 
rapid proliferation of computing technology, with the patent for the LEGO brick in its 
current form in being issued in 1958 (“Toy of the Century”). The correspondences between 
this toy and computational models were highlighted when LEGO began their long-standing 
association with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in the 1980s (Rollins xx). 
One of the products of this collaboration was an educational platform which would teach a 
simple programming language, known as Logo, using LEGO bricks (Martin et al. 12). This 
was known as the “LEGO® tc Logo” system (12).  
The current incarnation of this system, marketed as “LEGO® Education WeDo”, 
claims that LEGO bricks are the ideal vehicle for teaching skills necessary for the 
construction of algorithms. These include “solving problems by decomposing them into 
smaller parts” and “using sequence, selection and repetition in programs” (“LEGO® 
Education”). The manner in which individual LEGO bricks constitute discrete “primitive” 
units which can be unambiguously identified as belonging to a specific “type” gives them a 
similarity with the elementary information processes which constitute the “building blocks” 
of computer programs. These parallels with computer programs are further compounded 
by the fact that complexity in the LEGO system is achieved by forming combinations of 
discrete units according to a set of procedural rules. I would therefore suggest that the 
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LEGO system is computational in character: computer scientist Giulio Ferrari has even 
provided a description of how to construct a “LEGO Turing Machine” (107).18  
Because the program executed by the construction workers in the film is entirely 
predetermined and inflexible, it can run automatically to Lord Business’ precise 
specifications in his absence. These workers have been taught a select portion of the 
computational skills that the LEGO Group believes are taught by engaging with this toy: 
“sequence . . . and repetition”. This enables the behaviour of these workers to be externally 
regulated in a similar manner to how Babbage sought to regulate the behaviour of workers 
in Economy, namely, by being forced to follow predetermined and inflexible sequences of 
discrete instructions corresponding to those found in a computer with the capabilities of 
the Difference Engine. As Babbage was aware, parallels exist between the type of inflexible 
program that can run automatically in a computer and the task of programming a worker 
to execute an inflexible sequence of functions.  
It is emphasised that it is in the interest of Lord Business to enforce this inflexibility. 
Using a similar logic to Babbage in Economy, Lord Business perceives that if he is to retain 
absolute control over the system of production, then the individual worker must not 
develop the agency to make “combinations” (of LEGO bricks) independently. This is 
interpreted in a delightfully literal manner: if workers fail to execute the inflexible program 
stipulated by Lord Business, the individual units from which they themselves are composed 
are literally glued in place. Lord Business thus enforces the specific distribution of cognitive-
behavioural habits that I have argued Babbage in Economy came to regard as necessary as 
a result of his researches in computing.  
Those opposing the inflexible regime of Lord Business are the “master builders”, 
their name evoking their artisan status. Because of their capacity to combine inflexible 
units flexibly, repeatedly decomposing and reconfiguring structures in response to various 
                                                          
18 The phrase “Turing machines” is also used to refer to “universal machines”.  
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contingencies, these individuals move outside the (literally) immobilising logic that is 
imposed upon the majority of workers. The activities of the master builders would appear 
to provide a vivid illustration of the tradition described in this thesis, as the LEGO bricks 
from which they construct their dynamic sculptures are by their very nature inflexible and 
standardised components. I would argue that the structures generated by the master 
builders offer a physical expression of this tradition of representing flexible cognition and 
behaviour as a flexible arrangement of inflexible units. 
I want to show that the master builders can also be regarded as enacting the model 
of total yet temporary flexibility which characterises the specifically computational 
expression of the tradition described in this thesis. The modular structures that the master 
builders construct from inflexible standardised components have the capacity to exist in 
one inflexible form for an indefinite length of time- for instance, maintaining the form of a 
fighter jet or a submarine. Yet this inflexibility is nevertheless temporary, as these 
components retain their potential to be reconfigured as various contingencies dictate. The 
computationally-inflected dynamic between flexibility and inflexibility that the master 
builders enact can be compared with the movement between inflexible verticals in the 
Analytical Engine which allows for partial decomposition and reconfiguration in the interim.  
The patent for which the LEGO Group successfully applied in 1958 concerned the 
stud-and-tube coupling that was designed to enable a secure connection between 
individual bricks (“LEGO Group History”). The fact that during this period in its history the 
LEGO Group chose to expend an appreciable amount of resources ensuring that the bricks 
they produced had the capacity to enact a degree of total inflexibility would appear to 
suggest that that the specifically computational model of flexibility described in this thesis 
has influenced perceptions of the model of flexible recombination that this toy invites. The 
temporary inflexibility permitted by this stud-and-tube coupling functions in a similar 




Fig. 11. LEGO® Skier-Skieur-Skifahrer. Photo used with permission. ©2015 The LEGO Group. 
 
When constructing complex models, many LEGO booklets suggest that the child begin by 
forming a series of smaller components from individual bricks. These structures are then 
treated as “inflexible” components which can be joined together to form a larger model, 
paralleling the construction of complexity in computers (see fig. 11). This suggests that 
individual bricks are regarded as a type of “primitive” unit which can be combined to 
generate units corresponding to the symbol structures of mid-century computing. 
A further comparison with computing is that the flexibility that such inflexible and 
standardised components afford can by its very nature only ever be partial. This thesis has 
argued, however, that the ostensibly minor distinction between the capacity to execute an 
inflexible arrangement of inflexible units and the capacity to engineer a total yet temporary 
inflexibility is understood to constitute a step of significant magnitude in developmental 
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terms. This is similar to the distinction that the child in Passages experiences between 
functioning with the capacities of a Difference Engine and with those of an Analytical 
Engine. In this particular instance, the ability to decompose and restructure temporarily 
fixed constellations of units is understood to offer a prophylactic against a lifetime of 
factory work. I would therefore argue that the computational logic of The LEGO® Movie 
corresponds to that which I have claimed structures Silas Marner, where the incapacity of 
workers to flexibly organise inflexible units results in their subjection to modes of labour 
similar to those depicted in Economy.  
Varul also notes the presence within the film of a drive towards “creative 
destruction, recombination without much consideration for the initial instructions” (7), 
which he interprets as a defensive reaction against what he terms the “necrocapitalism” of 
Lord Business (8). According to Varul, Lord Business’s modus operandi is to prevent the 
frozen products of dead labour- capital- from being broken up in order to be revived as 
living labour: “He wants to fixate the status quo quite literally-using superglue” (8). Varul 
parallels the force which revives dead labour with the Navajo myth of the trickster-Coyote 
who incites humans to undergo creative renewal through his introduction of irregularity 
and surprise into the universe, aligning the qualities of this mythical trickster figure with 
those of the human child (6): “children are natural born tricksters” (7). He then proceeds to 
claim that this trickster impulse is comparable to Joseph Schumpeter’s “entrepreneurial 
function”, a phrase designating economic innovators who disturb existing business practice 
and in the process transform market conditions (7). Varul argues that the capacity of LEGO 
to encompass both creative rearrangement and ossified formal perfection constitutes a 
medium appropriate for the expression of both these attitudes (6).  
I would suggest, however, that the model of flexible recombination depicted in The 
LEGO® Movie corresponds to the computational model of cognitive-behavioural flexibility 
discussed in this thesis. It is my contention that the particular expression of this 
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computational model in The LEGO® Movie also highlights correspondences similar to those 
which this thesis has sought to draw attention to. These include correspondences between 
the execution of an inflexible and modular program composed of discrete instructions and 
the cognitive-behavioural capacities necessary for factory labour.   
Since the 1950s the LEGO Group have identified correspondences between 
computing technology, child development and the type of play that LEGO affords. From its 
inception, the LEGO System of Play was marketed as having an educational benefit (“Toy of 
the Century”). Following the collaboration with MIT, claims regarding the educational 
benefits of LEGO have attained a stronger computational inflection still. Paralleling Turing’s 
belief in the capacity of domain-specific skills to contribute to a general capacity for 
computational flexibility, it has been argued that programming using the LEGO-Logo system 
“supports the development of general and domain-specific skills” (Edwards, Coddington 
and Caterina 35).  
I would argue that The LEGO® Movie is premised upon the computational narrative 
of cognitive-behavioural development described in this thesis. It transpires that the 
animated “LEGO world” in the film is a gigantic playset situated in the basement of a house. 
In the film’s frame narrative, which depicts events occurring in the “real world” rather than 
the animated “LEGO world”, adults are perceived as wanting to play in inflexible ways. The 
father of the film’s child protagonist desires to construct an immovable world out of LEGO 
by gluing his sculptures in place, and cannot tolerate his child’s destructive/creative 
interventions within this space. Something that the father finds particularly distressing is 
the child’s propensity to flexibly join together inflexible units from different playsets in 
order to create structures not found in any booklet. The child has to teach the adult that it 
is ultimately a pathological act to engage in the pursuit of absolute inflexibility. The child 
subsequently enters into a pedagogical relationship with its own caregiver, teaching the 
adult what constitutes developmentally normative play on this computational model.  
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This thesis has argued that in Passages, however, the child has to be taught by the 
adult to play in more flexible ways, as the child initially wishes to play in ways that are 
repetitive and rigidly programmatic. Instead of the child’s “wild” psyche being a place of 
endless creativity, it could be argued that the child in Passages emerges a ready-made 
factory worker. What saves the child from this fate is that it is taught to think in more 
flexible ways by adults. This is closer to the narrative of the animated segment of the film- 
that the industrial worker can be saved from becoming a factory drone by being taught the 
cognitive-behavioural capacities embodied by the master builder. This is the trajectory 
undergone by the film’s animated protagonist, the former construction worker Emmet. 
Having been encouraged under the regime of Lord Business to interpret his programmatic 
labour as a play activity, Emmet is taught by one of the master builders, Wyldstyle, that 
within this logic such forms of play are pathological. The rigid forms of play experienced by 
Emmet prior to this pedagogical intervention can be compared to the “stick to the path” 
routines that prove detrimental to Maggie’s cognitive-behavioural development in Mill.  
Having developed skills to flexibly arrange inflexible units as a result of Wyldstyle’s 
didactic interventions, Emmet, along with the other master builders, communicates these 
capacities to other workers and mounts a communal challenge against Lord Business. By 
this point in the film, Lord Business has threatened to explode the LEGO world if his 
authority to enforce an inflexible structure is undermined. I would suggest that this 
absolute fragmentation constitutes a predictable response to the breakdown of this 
inflexible system, shatter being the obverse of pathological inflexibility on this model. At 
the same time, the film concludes with the LEGO world on the cusp of another 
fragmentation when the sister of the child protagonist launches a playful assault upon her 
brother’s creations using her own Duplo® playsets. Faced with this demonstration of 
playful aggression, the occupants of the LEGO world succumb to panic and disarray. Their 
distress can be compared with that experienced by Tom when faced with his sister 
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Maggie’s destruction of his play objects. This would appear to support the claim that this 
computational model encodes of a degree of traumatic fragmentation as the prerequisite 
for cognitive-behavioural flexibility.  
When Varul states “children are natural born tricksters” he is replicating an ideal of 
childhood which has its roots in the Romantic period, one profoundly at odds with the 
developmental narratives that I argue derive from computing. Whereas the conception of 
childhood associated with the Romantic era is one of “innocence, spontaneity and 
unfettered imagination” (Grenby 182), it has been claimed in this thesis that the untutored 
impulse of the child on this computational model is to play in a repetitive and inflexibly 
programmatic manner. This is exemplified by the sketch, where prior to Babbage’s didactic 
interventions the child’s “spontaneous” play consists of the execution of inflexible routines.  
I therefore want to suggest that tensions exist between how we fantasise the 
cognitive condition of childhood and the cognitive-behavioural models that we have 
arrived at through the influence of computing technology. Brian Sutton-Smith claims that 
children’s play frequently tends towards the “banal and repetitive”, modes of play which 
undermine the cultural logic that “flexibility is play's main function” (31). It is my 
contention that The LEGO® Movie negotiates these tensions by displacing them onto an 
animated figure. Emmet is content to execute inflexible play routines until he is taught by a 
Babbagesque engineer- a “master builder”- that these forms of play are pathological if left 
undeveloped. I would argue that this makes Emmet’s developmental narrative comparable 
to that of the child in the sketch.  
This thesis has claimed that this computational model implies that children become 
ready-made factory workers unless they develop in certain optimal ways, drawing attention 
to this logic in Silas Marner and The Mill on the Floss. The correspondences with factory 
labour encoded within this computational model could be said to underlie the appeal of 
handmade wooden toys, as a tangible referent to the artisan status which is associated 
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with the normative polarity of this model. This is indicated by Mokulock, a wooden version 
of LEGO that offers children the opportunity to hone their combinatorial skills whilst 
isolating them from all taint of the factory. Just how entangled the materiality of these 
artisanal objects has become with this logic is indicated by the statement by the 
manufacturers of Mokulock that “Wood can help enhance creativity” (“Mokulock”). This 
conclusion has argued that the LEGO® Movie and Mokulock suggest that we have yet to 
reconcile the tensions associated with this computational model of child development.  
This thesis has focused upon the depiction of this computational model in the 
fiction of George Eliot, with the aim of illustrating that Eliot critiques this expression of a 
tradition of conceptualising flexible cognition and behaviour in ways that are relevant to 
both nineteenth- and twentieth-century thinking. This concluding section would appear to 
suggest that this computational model is also relevant for the study of twentieth- and 
twenty-first-century literary and film texts. This comparison of The LEGO® Movie with the 
developmental narratives foregrounded by Babbage and Eliot indicates that it might also 
be a productive strategy to draw parallels between the computational expression of this 
tradition in the literature and culture of the nineteenth century and expressions of this 
tradition in twentieth-century literature and culture.  
I would also propose that there is much to be gained in tracing this computational 
expression of a tradition of representing flexible cognition and behaviour in recent 
attachment literature relating to school-based practice. This thesis has sought to trace how 
this computational model influenced nineteenth-century perceptions of what constitutes 
normative pedagogy within the classroom setting, focusing upon public schools and the 
half-time system. I would suggest that a similar consideration of the manner in which 
perceptions of optimal school-based practice have been influenced by computing in the 
twentieth and twenty-first centuries would offer a useful means of elaborating upon the 
analysis contained with this thesis.  
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